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ABSTRACT 
This research gathered information about the ways in which 10 higher education 
institutions (HEIs) in the U.S. are currently making decisions about which 
emergency preparedness activities to pursue and how those most familiar with 
emergency management at HEIs think that these decisions should be made.  
Using this information, in concert with principles from the field of decision 
analysis, a conceptual framework was developed to enable decision makers to 
evaluate proposed preparedness alternatives using a normative approach to 
decision making.  A simplified version of the framework was then presented to 
demonstrate how a proposed preparedness activity could be evaluated using the 
model and how several proposed alternatives could be compared to one another.  
In addition to presenting an analytical framework for evaluating preparedness 
options, recommendations were offered for optimizing preparedness and 
preparedness decision making at HEIs.  These recommendations centered on 
the organizational structure of an emergency management program, including 
roles and responsibilities; strategic planning efforts specific to emergency 
management; and innovative practices currently being utilized by the HEIs 
involved in this study. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), enacted December 
17, 2003, directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national all-
hazards preparedness goal.  Specifically, HSPD-8 established:  
…policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to 
prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a 
national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing 
mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness 
assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to 
strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local 
entities. (White House, 2003)   
The National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG) and accompanying Target 
Capabilities List (TCL), updated in 2007, took the policies outlined in HSPD-8 
and defined what it means for the nation to be prepared for all hazards (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009, p. 2).  The vision for 
preparedness put forth in the NPG is, “A NATION PREPARED with coordinated 
capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards 
in a way that balances risk with resources and need” (DHS, 2007, p. 1).  The 
NPG identified 37 target capabilities as being important to enhancing the nation’s 
preparedness.  One of these capabilities, defined as a common mission 
capability, is Community Preparedness and Participation (CPP).  The CPP’s goal 
is that everyone in America become fully aware, trained, and practiced on how to 
prevent, protect, mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards 
(FEMA, 2009, p. 3). 
Higher education institutions (HEIs) in the U.S. are uniquely positioned to 
contribute to the nation’s preparedness.  In 2007, over 18 million people enrolled 
in the over 4,300 degree granting, post-secondary educational institutions 
located throughout the U.S. (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  If every HEI 
modeled emergency management best practices like teaching and reinforcing 
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simple behaviors such as knowing what to do when a fire alarm sounds, HEIs 
could influence the preparedness behaviors of adults throughout the country.  
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, if every HEI had a robust emergency 
management program, HEIs would collectively contribute to the nation’s 
preparedness by being prepared organizations within their respective 
communities.   
Like any business, a HEI will be concerned about protecting its assets, 
making sound financial decisions, and balancing its budget in order to remain 
solvent.  Conventional wisdom asserts that individuals, organizations, and 
communities that are prepared to respond to and recover from critical incidents 
will recover more quickly and suffer fewer losses.  Logic also supports investing 
in mitigation activities to either reduce the likelihood of a critical incident or the 
severity of the consequences should the risk materialize.  Therefore, preventing 
or minimizing critical incidents and resuming business as quickly as possible with 
the least amount of disruption in the wake of a critical incident would be a 
fundamental business objective for a HEI.  This objective might incent a HEI to 
invest in preparedness and mitigation activities, but how does a HEI determine 
which specific activities to pursue?  In the absence of legislation mandating 
compliance, HEIs will decide which preparedness and mitigation activities to 
pursue predominantly based on the perceived value of that activity to the 
individual institution relative to the cost of that activity.  A tool or framework 
specific to HEIs for making this type of assessment does not currently exist.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The fundamental question this thesis seeks to answer is “How can higher 
education institutions better evaluate emergency preparedness and mitigation 
alternatives intended to address identified risks in order to make optimal 
decisions about how to invest the institution’s limited resources and funds?”  It 
was assumed that several factors would influence the way in which 
preparedness and mitigation decisions are being made at HEIs, including: the 
 3
organizational structure of an emergency management program, the existence of 
a strategic planning process specific to emergency management, the use of a 
structured decision-making process, as well as individual and organizational 
preferences.  Questions were developed to elicit information about: 
• The ways in which emergency management programs at HEIs are 
currently organized and managed;  
• The role of strategic planning in the decision-making process;  
• Processes that are used to make preparedness and mitigation 
decisions;  
• The criteria decision makers use to make preparedness and 
mitigation decisions;  
• The criteria decisions makers should be using to make these 
decisions; and  
• The relationship between institutional values and the decisions 
which are made about which preparedness and mitigation activities 
to pursue.   
The specific research sub-questions that the responses were intended to 
inform are as follows: 
• How does the organizational structure of a HEI emergency 
management program contribute to optimizing the decisions made 
about preparedness and mitigation activities? 
• How does the strategic planning process contribute to optimizing 
the decisions made about preparedness and mitigation activities? 
• What decision-making process or processes contribute to 
optimizing decisions that are made regarding which preparedness 
and mitigation activities to pursue?   
• What criteria should be considered to optimize preparedness 
decisions? 
C. ARGUMENT 
Absent a substantive process for evaluating preparedness and mitigation 
activities, HEIs might not invest in voluntary mitigation and preparedness 
initiatives, preferring instead to focus on those requirements mandated by law. 
Or, HEIs could make sub-optimal decisions with respect to preparing for 
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emergencies and mitigating emergency management risk, which might have a 
negative impact on the HEI and the community in which the HEI is located.  
Given that there are over 4,300 HEIs spread out across the United States, a 
framework or tool for evaluating preparedness and mitigation activities has the 
potential to benefit the institution as well as the community where the HEI is 
located and the state where the HEI is located, and, potentially, the nation.  
Ideally, such a process would incorporate factors such as: the HEI’s mission and 
values; the preferences of the decision maker(s); a decision maker’s level of 
knowledge and experience with certain types of emergency situations, risk 
assessment results, budgetary constraints, competing interests, regulatory 
requirements; and an understanding of interdependencies that exist within the 
organization.  This research will seek to uncover the factors specific to HEIs that 
should be incorporated into a tool or framework for evaluating pre-event 
emergency management activities in order to optimize decisions. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The intended goal of this research is to provide decision makers at HEIs 
with a process for making informed and effective decisions about which 
emergency preparedness and mitigation initiatives to pursue.  The practical 
significance of this research to homeland security efforts is that HEIs might be 
more apt to invest in mitigation and preparedness activities if they are able to 
determine the value of these initiatives to their campuses, which would, in turn, 
enhance the nation’s level of preparedness.  It is also possible that the outcome 
of this study could offer a process for evaluating pre-event emergency mitigation 
and preparedness initiatives outside the framework of HEIs.  The most likely 
consumers of this research will be college and university emergency managers, 
those who are charged with protecting the safety of the campus, and individuals 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The topic of this research is narrow in scope and, as a result, existing 
research on the specific topic is limited.  There is, however, a vast array of 
potentially transferrable information from the fields of emergency management, 
risk management, decision theory, psychology, and organizational management 
as well as other fields of study that could contribute to the development of a 
framework for informing the decision-making process at HEIs relative to pre-
incident emergency management activities.  Additionally, there are numerous 
“how to” guides, including a few guides developed specifically for colleges and 
universities, available on the topics of hazard mitigation, risk assessments, and 
preparedness.  Developed for a broad audience, the information contained within 
most of these guides can be easily understood by individuals new to the 
concepts of emergency management.  At the other end of the spectrum, there 
are exceedingly complex quantitative methodologies for evaluating risks, many of 
which are based on network analysis.  Haimes (2009), for example, has compiled 
a broad array of engineering based approaches to modeling, assessing and 
managing risk in his book Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management.  While 
insightful, the approaches presented in this book require an extensive 
understanding of mathematics and engineering, which makes their practical 
usefulness to the general population, even practitioners at HEIs, somewhat 
limited.  The following sections review some of the existing literature relevant to 
this research. 
A. DEFINING TERMS  
The term “emergency management” has been mentioned several times in 
this document already.  Despite its widespread usage, emergency management 
does not have a single definition.  In fact, the word “emergency” has different 
meanings.  The Guide To Emergency Management And Related Terms, 
Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive 
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Orders & Legislation(Blanchard, 2008, pp. 222–223) captured a variety of 
emergency management definitions, including those for “emergency” which 
follow: 
Emergency/Exigent Circumstances:  “Circumstances that may 
include the existence of a threat to public health or public safety, or 
other unique circumstances that warrant immediate action.”  (DHS, 
Procedural Manual…CVI, June 2007, p. 7) 
Emergency:  “An unexpected event which places life and/or 
property in danger and requires an immediate response through the 
use of routine community resources and procedures. Examples 
would be a multi-automobile wreck, especially involving injury or 
death, and a fire caused by lightning strike which spreads to other 
buildings.” Emergencies can be handled with local resources.  
(Drabek 1996, Session 2, p. 3) 
Emergency: Any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, highwater, wind-
driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, 
landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, fire, explosion, nuclear 
accident, or other natural or manmade catastrophe in any part of the 
United States. Any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to 
supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and 
to protect property and public health and safety or to lessen the threat 
of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. (FEMA, Definitions 
of Terms, 1990) 
Emergency:  “Any occasion or instance--such as a hurricane, 
tornado, storm, flood, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, fire, explosion, nuclear 
accident, or any other natural or man-made catastrophe--that 
warrants action to save lives and to protect property, public health, 
and safety.”  (FEMA, Guide For All-Hazard Emergency Operations 
Planning (SLG 101), 1996, p. GLO-2) 
Emergency:  “Any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to 
supplement State and local efforts to save lives and to protect 
property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat 
of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.  The Governor of a 
State, or the Acting Governor in his/her absence, may request that 
the President declare an emergency when an incident occurs or 
threatens to occur in a State which would not qualify under the 
definition of a major disaster.  Assistance authorized by an 
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emergency declaration is limited to immediate and short-term 
assistance, and may not exceed $5 million, except when authorized 
by the FEMA Associate Director for Response and Recovery under 
certain conditions.”  (FEMA Disaster Dictionary 2001, 39; cites Robert 
T Stafford Act 102; 44 CFR 206.2, 206.35; 206.63, 206.66, and 503) 
Emergency:  “…an unexpected occurrence or sudden situation that 
requires immediate action…It may involve communities (as a disaster 
does) or individuals (which a disaster does not)…”  (Porfiriev 1995, 
291).   
What is noteworthy about these definitions is the lack of distinction, in 
many cases, between an emergency and a disaster.  The terms are often used 
interchangeably, although disasters are generally considered to be larger in 
scope than an emergency.  Below are select definitions of “disaster” also taken 
from The Guide To Emergency Management And Related Terms, Definitions, 
Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders & 
Legislation (Blanchard, 2008, pp. 173–177):  
Disaster: “Disasters are fundamentally social phenomena; they 
involve the intersection of the physical processes of a hazard agent 
with the local characteristics of everyday life in a place and larger 
social and economic forces that structure that realm” (Bolin with 
Stanford 1998, 27). 
Disaster:  “A sudden calamitous emergency event bringing great 
damage loss or destruction.”  (CA OES, SEMS Guidelines, 2006, 
Glossary, p. 7) 
Disaster:  “A disaster is…an event associated with the impact of a 
natural hazard, which leads to increased mortality, illness and/or 
injury, and destroys or disrupts livelihoods, affecting the people or 
an area such that they (and/or outsiders) perceive it as being 
exceptional and requiring external assistance for recovery” 
(Cannon 1994, 29, fn.2). 
 
Disaster:  “A disaster is an emergency considered severe enough 
by local government to warrant the response and dedication of 
resources beyond the normal scope of a single jurisdiction or 
branch of local government.”  (Carroll 2001, 467) 
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Disaster:  “An event in which a community undergoes severe 
danger and incurs, or is threatened to incur, such losses to persons 
and/or property that the resources available within the community 
are exceeded. In disasters, resources from beyond the local 
jurisdiction, that is State or Federal level, are required to meet the 
disaster demands.”  (Drabek 1996, 2-4) 
Disaster/Emergency:  “An event that causes, or threatens to 
cause, loss of life, human suffering, public and private property 
damage, and economic and social disruption.  Disasters and 
emergencies require resources that are beyond the scope of local 
agencies in routine responses to day-to-day emergencies and 
accidents, and may be of such magnitude or unusual 
circumstances as to require response by several or all levels of 
government – Federal, State and local.” (FEMA, Hazards Analysis 
for Emergency Management (Interim Guidance), September 1983, 
p. 5) 
Disaster:  Any event “concentrated in time and space, in which a 
society of a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of society, 
undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members 
and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted 
and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the 
society is prevented” (Fritz 1961, 655) 
It is not imperative to decide upon a singular definition for “emergency” or 
“disaster” for the purposes of this research.  What is relevant is to recognize that 
individuals attribute different meanings to words and that this attribution, in turn, 
influences their thinking, perceptions and actions.   
To complete the examination of definitions, consider the following 
definitions of “emergency management” offered by the Guide To Emergency 
Management And Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, 
Organizations, Programs, Guidance & Legislation (Blanchard, 2008, pp. 224-
227): 
Emergency Management: “The coordination and integration of all 
activities necessary to build, sustain and improve the capabilities to 
prepare for, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against 
threatened or actual disasters or emergencies, regardless of 
cause.” (DHS, Lexicon, October 23, 2007, p. 9).” 
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Emergency Management: “An ongoing process to prevent, 
mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from an incident that 
threatens life, property, operations, or the environment (NFPA 
1600, 2007, p. 7).”   
Emergency Management: “Activities that include prevention, 
preparedness, response, recovery, rehabilitation, advocacy, and 
legislation, of emergencies irrespective of their type, size, and 
location, and whose purpose is reduction in death, disability, damage, 
and destruction (Dykstra , 2003, 3)”.   
Emergency Management: "…governmental function that 
coordinates and integrates all activities to build, sustain, and 
improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
recover from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism or other man-made disasters;...(Public 
Law 109-295 (120 Stat. 1394) October 4, 2006, Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (also referred to as 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006), Title 6, 
p. 40).”   
FEMA has used differing definitions of emergency management, including 
the following two similar definitions (Blanchard, 2008, p. 226):  
Emergency Management: “The process through which the Nation 
prepares for emergencies and disasters, mitigates their effects, and 
responds to and recovers from them (FEMA, A Nation Prepared—
FEMA Strategic Plan—Fiscal Years 2003-2008, 2002, p. 57).” 
Emergency Management: “The process through which America 
prepares for emergencies and disasters, responds to them, 
recovers from them, rebuilds, and mitigates their future effects.”  
(FEMA, Disaster Dictionary 2001, 40, citing FEMA Strategic Plan).”   
As was the case with “emergency” and “disaster,” it is not critical to select 
a specific definition of “emergency management” for the purpose of this thesis.  
What is relevant is to understand that emergency management is generally 
considered to be a cyclical process for managing emergencies and disasters that 
includes no less than four components—preparedness, mitigation, response, and 
recovery.  This paper is focused on the pre-incident decision-making process; 
thus, it is relevant to define what is meant by “preparedness” and “mitigation.” 
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Not surprisingly, there are multiple definitions of “preparedness.”  Training 
materials from FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) IS-230 class 
titled “Fundamentals of Emergency Management” define preparedness as:  
The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to 
build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.  
Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels 
of government and between government and private-sector and 
nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine 
vulnerabilities, and identify required resources. (FEMA, 2009b, pp. 
3–4) 
Preparedness has also been described as:  
A continuous cycle of (1) establishing policy and doctrine, (2) 
planning and allocating resources, (3) conducting training and 
exercises to gather lessons learned, and (4) assessing and 
reporting on the training and exercises to evaluate preparedness, 
including identifying any gaps in capabilities. The results of these 
assessments and reports are then used to inform decision makers 
on what improvements are needed in policies and plans and how to 
target finite resources to improve preparedness for disasters. (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009, p. 2)  
Other definitions for preparedness taken from the Guide to Emergency 
Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, 
Organizations, Programs, Guidance and Legislation include (Blanchard, 2008, pp. 
625–631): 
Preparedness:  “Preparedness within the field of emergency 
management can best be defined as a state of readiness to 
respond to a disaster, crisis, or any other type of emergency 
situation.  It includes that activities, programs, and systems that 
exist before an emergency that are used to support and enhance 
response to an emergency or disaster.”  (Bullock & Haddow 2005, 
181) 
Preparedness:  [A]ctivities and measures designed or undertaken 
to prepare for or minimize the effects of a natural or man-made 
hazard upon the civilian population, to deal with the immediate 
emergency conditions that would be created by the hazard, and to 
effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, 
vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by the hazard; is a 
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continuous operationally focused process for establishing 
guidelines, protocols, and standards for planning, training and 
exercises, personnel qualification and certification, equipment 
certification, and publication management. (DHS, Lexicon, 2007, p. 
19–20) 
Preparedness:  “Preparedness activities are necessary to the 
extent that mitigation measures have not, or cannot, prevent 
disasters. In the preparedness phase, governments, organizations, 
and individuals develop plans to save lives and minimize disaster 
damage (for example, compiling state resource inventories, 
mounting training exercises, or installing warning systems). 
Preparedness measures also seek to enhance disaster response 
operations (for example, by stockpiling vital food and medical 
supplies, through training exercises, and by mobilizing emergency 
personnel on a standby basis).”  (NGA, CEM Governors’ Guide, 
1979, p. 13). 
Similar to emergency management, preparedness is also viewed as being 
a cyclical process.  According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
preparedness includes the following actions:  
• Conduct Risk Assessment 
• Conduct Capabilities Assessment 
• Develop Strategy 
• Plan and Resource Programs 
• Identify/Purchase Equipment 
• Develop Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan and Schedule 
• Conduct Training 
• Conduct Exercises to Validate Training and Plans 
• Assign Corrective Actions resulting from Exercise Evaluation and 
Improvement Plans 
• Track/Implement Corrective Actions 
• Update Capabilities Assessment/Strategy/Multi-year Plans. (DHS, 
2007b, p. 13) 
Another way in which to view the concept of preparedness is by examining 
the preparedness capability as defined by the DHS in the National Preparedness 
Guidelines (NPG).  The NPG breaks preparedness into the following capabilities: 
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planning; organization and leadership; personnel; equipment and systems; 
training; exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions (DHS, 2007a, p. 13).  
Specific explanations for each of these elements are as follows: 
Planning:   Collection and analysis of intelligence and information, 
and development of policies, plans, procedures, mutual aid 
agreements, strategies, and other publications that comply with 
relevant laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to perform 
assigned missions and tasks. 
Organization and Leadership:  Individual teams, an overall 
organizational structure, and leadership at each level in the 
structure that comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance 
necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks. 
Personnel:  Paid and volunteer staff who meet relevant 
qualification and certification standards necessary to perform 
assigned missions and tasks. 
Equipment and Systems:  Major items of equipment, supplies, 
facilities, and systems that comply with relevant standards 
necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks. 
Training:  Content and methods of delivery that comply with 
relevant training standards necessary to perform assigned missions 
and tasks. 
Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions:  Exercises, 
self-assessments, peer-assessments, outside reviews, compliance 
monitoring, and actual major events that provide opportunities to 
demonstrate, evaluate, and improve the combined capability and 
interoperability of the other elements to perform assigned missions 
and tasks to standards necessary to achieve successful outcomes.  
(DHS, 2007a, p. 5) 
The reason it is important to examine the myriad definitions of 
preparedness is to emphasize that the seemingly simple word “preparedness” 
encompasses a broad range of possible actions.  Irwin Redlener, M.D., 
Associate Dean and Director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at 
the Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, aptly summarizes this 
point with the statement, “Whatever you think about being prepared as an 
individual or family, extrapolate that to a hospital CEO. They have no idea of 
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what the end point is because there are no satisfactory benchmarks to establish 
what we mean by ‘prepared’” (PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Health Research 
Institute, 2007, p. 5).  Redlener’s comments could easily apply to any complex 
organization, including a HEI.  In order to “be prepared,” one must define what it 
means to “be prepared.” 
To complicate matters even further, consider the somewhat blurry 
distinction between “preparedness” and “mitigation”.  Again, drawing definitions 
from the Guide To Emergency Management And Related Terms, Definitions, 
Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders & 
Legislation (Blanchard, 2008, pp. 473–479), mitigation has been defined as 
follows: 
Mitigation:  “Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to 
persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or 
consequences of an incident.  Mitigation measures may be 
implemented prior to, during, or after an incident.  Mitigation 
measures are often developed in accordance with lessons learned 
from prior incidents.  Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce 
exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards.  
Measures may include zoning and building codes, floodplain 
buyouts, and analysis of hazard-related data to determine where it 
is safe to build or locate temporary facilities.  Mitigation can include 
efforts to educate governments, businesses, and the public on 
measures they can take to reduce loss and injury.” (DHS, NIPP, 
2006, p. 104) 
Mitigation:  “Mitigation means sustained action taken to reduce or 
eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards and 
their effects.  Mitigation distinguishes actions that have a long-term 
impact from those that are more closely associated with 
preparedness for, immediate response to, and short-term recovery 
from a specific event” (FEMA, Multi Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment, 1997, p. xxii) 
Mitigation:  “Mitigation is the effort to reduce loss of life and 
property by lessening the impact of disasters. Effective mitigation 
measures can break the cycle of disaster damage, reconstruction, 
and repeated damage….Effective mitigation is achieved through 
three critical components—analyzing risk, reducing risk, and 
insuring for flood risk.  
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Analyze Risk: Determining the impact of natural hazards that lead 
to effective strategies for reducing risk.  
Reduce Risk: Reducing or eliminating long-term risk from hazards 
on the existing built environment and future construction.  
Insure for Flood Risk: Reducing the impact of floods on the 
Nation by providing affordable flood insurance.”  (FEMA, Fact 
Sheet, FEMA’s Mitigation Directorate, August 2007, p. 1) 
The National Oceanic Atmospheric Association (NOAA) breaks mitigation 
into two broad strategies: hazard avoidance and hazard reduction.  Hazard 
reduction focuses on strengthening structures and providing safeguards to 
reduce the amount of damage caused by natural hazards.  Hazard avoidance 
strategies are designed to minimize the exposure to risks based on location 
(NOAA, 2007).   
Another definition of mitigation can be found in Developing and 
Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal and Local Government Emergency Plans: 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guidelines 101 (CPG 101):  
Activities providing a critical foundation in the effort to reduce the 
loss of life and property from natural and/or manmade disasters by 
avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster and providing value 
to the public by creating safer communities. Mitigation seeks to fix 
the cycle of disaster damage, reconstruction, and repeated 
damage. These activities or actions, in most cases, will have a 
long-term sustained effect (FEMA, 2009a, p. B-6). 
Mitigation and preparedness are generally considered to be distinct 
activities, but there are instances when it is difficult to distinguish between them.   
For example, obtaining and storing drinking water is generally viewed as being 
an activity associated with preparedness, but it could also be viewed as a 
mitigation activity because the person or institution that has water available 
during a critical incident should be in better shape compared to an individual or 
institution that does not have access to fresh drinking water.  Conversely, the 
decision to reinforce a water storage tank in a part of the country known to 
experience earthquakes could be viewed as being a mitigation strategy; yet, it 
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could also be viewed as a step towards enhanced preparedness.  CPG 101 
states:  “[M]itigation is part of the overall preparedness effort and must be 
considered when developing management strategies for each mission area” 
(FEMA, 2009a, p. 2-2).  This quote illustrates the interconnectedness of 
preparedness and mitigation while also blurring the distinction between them.  In 
the interest of ascertaining how the interviewees defined these concepts, 
preparedness and mitigation were purposefully not defined for the interviewees in 
this study.  For the purposes of analyzing the information collected during the 
interviews, mitigation will be assumed to fall under the umbrella of preparedness.   
B. GUIDELINES 
1. Overview 
The U.S. federal government has produced numerous publications about 
a vast array of emergency management topics.  Examples of these documents 
include: Are You Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness; 
Understanding Your Risks, Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses (FEMA, 
2004); Developing the Mitigation Plan, Identifying Mitigation Actions and 
Implementation Strategies (FEMA, 2003c); and Bringing the Plan to Life, 
Assuring the Success of the Hazard Mitigation Plan (FEMA, 2003b).  Documents 
specifically directed at HEIs are limited, although there are some such as the 
Campus Preparedness Assessment, produced by the State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) Division of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Building a Disaster Resistant 
University, prepared by FEMA (FEMA, 2003a). This section will review several of 
these documents as well as a document from the United Kingdom, Risk 
Management in Higher Education: A Guide to Good Practice (Higher Education 
Funding Council for England [HEFCE], 2005), which contains several noteworthy 
ideas about how to assess and manage risk as well as ways to instill an ethos of 
preparedness within a HEI.   
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2. Campus Preparedness Assessment 
The Campus Preparedness Assessment (DHS, 2005) provides guidance 
on conducting threat and vulnerability assessments, as well as a needs 
assessment, for determining the gap between an identified level of capability 
required to adequately prevent or respond to a likely terrorist attack and the 
current capability of emergency responders.  The document provides tools for 
conducting threat and vulnerability assessments and a template for conducting 
physical security site assessments. The document’s name is somewhat 
misleading—insofar as the content of this document is strictly focused on 
preparedness for terrorism and does not address preparedness for natural 
disasters.  According to the document, the intended purpose of completing the 
assessment using the tools offered is: 
[T]o promote sharing of information about individuals or groups that 
may pose a threat to the safety and security of campus populations, 
personnel, facilities, infrastructure, and operations; to compile a list 
of campus assets and critical infrastructure, including those 
containing sensitive and/or potentially hazardous chemical, 
biological, radiological (including nuclear), or explosive material; to 
determine which campus assets or critical infrastructure 
components may be at greatest risk to be targeted by terrorists; 
and to develop strategies to both reduce risks to campus assets 
and to enhance capability to respond to and recover from an act of 
terrorism on campus (DHS, 2005, pp. 2–3). 
Because the document was developed with colleges and universities as 
the intended audience, it highlights issues that are specific to HEIs.  The 
document’s strength is the risk assessment tools it offers; it does not offer 
guidance, however, on how to prioritize and evaluate preparedness alternatives.  
With respect to mitigation, the advice offered (in bold type) is “The Needs 
Assessment leads to steps in a mitigation plan and should be completed in 
conjunction with the local jurisdiction; the mitigation plan will not be addressed in 
detail in this book” (DHS, 2005, p. 3).  In summary, the guidance and tools 
offered in this document could be modified to address preparedness for natural  
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disasters and, despite its specific focus on terrorism, several of the suggested 
tools are worth considering when developing a framework for evaluating 
preparedness and mitigation options for HEIs.   
3. Building a Disaster Resistant University 
One of the more comprehensive guidelines for informing emergency 
management decision making specific to universities is the document Building a 
Disaster Resistant University (FEMA, 2003a).  According to FEMA, the Disaster 
Resistant University (DRU) project is:  
…both a how-to guide and a distillation of the experiences of six 
universities and colleges that have been working over the past 
several years to become more disaster-resistant…This guide 
provides basic information designed for institutions just getting 
started, as well as concrete ideas, suggestions, and practical 
experiences for institutions that have already begun to take steps to 
becoming more disaster-resistant. (FEMA, 2003a, p. iii)   
In terms of evaluating mitigation and, by extension, preparedness 
alternatives, Building a Disaster Resistant University offers the following 
guidance: “rank the actions needed and develop a timeline for implementation.  
Possible criteria for ranking include life safety, operational criticality, time needed 
to complete the activity, effectiveness/ lifespan, or other hazard-specific 
considerations” (FEMA, 2003a, p. 32).  The document does not offer any further 
guidance on how to go about structuring this ranking exercise.  It does offer:   
[T]he most common basis for prioritization is benefit-cost analysis 
(BCA), which allows multiple projects to be compared across a 
range of hazards.  The basic formula includes the following: the 
cost of the mitigation action; the dollar value of risk reduction 
(calculated from the potential loss of life, property, and function of 
the institution) each time the hazard occurs; the frequency with 
which the benefits of the action will be realized (frequency of 
hazard occurrence assumes that the action performs as expected); 
and the present value of aggregated future benefits (dollar value of 
risk reduction each time the hazard occurs multiplied by the 
probability of occurrence, multiplied by the life span of the action). 
(FEMA, 2003a, p. 32) 
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This formula seems to provide a tangible mechanism for evaluating 
activities; yet, some of the variables that would be significant to a HEI are not as 
simple to calculate as one might imagine.  How does one calculate the loss of 
research?  If the research dollars have already been allocated, then there is no 
direct financial loss, but the loss of knowledge can be immense.  What variable 
calculates the loss of knowledge?  Similarly, what dollar figure does a university 
apply to a person’s life?  Insurance companies use actuarial data to make this 
type of a calculation, but it seems unlikely that a university decision maker will 
make a decision about pursing a proposed preparedness or mitigation strategy 
using actuarial data.      
Building a disaster resistant university in accordance with the guidelines 
offered by Building a Disaster Resistant University requires an extensive 
commitment from a broad selection of personnel from within the HEI—from the 
President’s Office to the student body—as well as external stakeholders.  
Interestingly, the DRU program is no longer being funded by the federal 
government.  Perhaps the costs of running the program outweighed the 
perceived benefits.  Regardless of the reason, the vision of a collective body of 
knowledge specific to colleges and universities, as expressed in the following 
quote, did not materialize outside of the work that was done by the grant 
recipients:   
As larger numbers of higher education institutions work toward 
disaster resistance, a body of knowledge and best practices will 
emerge about how universities and colleges have adapted and 
created mitigation actions to meet their unique requirements.  This 
is still a very new area for many institutions and it will be helpful to 
document what you do and to share your experiences with others 
whenever possible. (FEMA, 2003a, p. 31)   
Despite the listed drawbacks, Building a Disaster Resistant University 
contains a wealth of valuable information worth considering when developing a 
framework for evaluating preparedness and mitigation alternatives even though it 
does not offer detailed guidance on how to structure this evaluation. 
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4. Using Benefit-Cost Review in Mitigation Planning 
In terms of specific guidance, Building a Disaster Resistant University 
(FEMA, 2003a) recommends that college and universities refer to a number of 
other guidelines including: Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation 
Planning (FEMA 386-1) (FEMA, 2002); Understanding Your Risks: Identifying 
Hazards and Estimating Losses (FEMA 386-2) (FEMA, 2001); Developing the 
Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and Implementation Strategies 
(FEMA 386-3) (FEMA, 2003c); Bringing the Plan to Life: Implementing the 
Hazard Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-4) (FEMA, 2003b); and Integrating Human-
Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-7) (FEMA, 2003d).  
FEMA’s Developing the Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-4) (FEMA, 2003c) references 
another FEMA document, Using Benefit-Cost Review in Mitigation Planning 
(FEMA 386-5) (FEMA, 2007) for guidance in prioritizing actions by describing 
appropriate benefit-cost methodologies for evaluating the effectiveness of a 
range of potential mitigation actions.  The tools offered in Using Benefit-Cost 
Review in Mitigation Planning (FEMA, 2007) include financial as well as non-
financial criteria as part of the analysis.  The tools are straightforward and easy to 
understand.  Using Benefit-Cost Review in Mitigation Planning points out that a 
cost-benefit review differs from a cost-benefit analysis (BCA) as follows:  
BCA is a method for determining the potential positive effects of a 
mitigation action and comparing them to the cost of the action…The 
analysis determines whether a mitigation project is technically cost-
effective. The principle behind the BCA is that the benefit of an 
action is a reduction in future damages. (FEMA, 2007, p. 2)   
By comparison, a: 
…Benefit-Cost Review can be broad and need not be complex. It 
needs to be comprehensive so that it covers monetary as well as 
non-monetary costs and benefits associated with each action.  
Some projects can be extremely cost-effective but not as beneficial 
for the community at large. (FEMA, 2007, pp. 2–3)    
One of the tools presented in Using Benefit-Cost Review in Mitigation 
Planning that could be utilized within the HEI arena is the social, technical, 
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political, legal, economic, and environmental (STAPLEE) evaluation criteria 
(FEMA, 2007).  For each of the listed S-T-A-P-L-E-E categories, there is a subset 
of questions related to that specific area.  For example, under the political 
category, the considerations are: political support, local champion, and public 
support.  Raters then evaluate proposed actions under each of these sub-criteria 
with a “+” or a “-“ sign to indicate the perceived level of support or lack of support 
(FEMA, 2003c, p. 2.21).  Figure 1 provides an example of this tool.  Once the 
proposed actions have been evaluated, the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each alternative can be compared.   
 
Figure 1.   STAPLEE Evaluation Table (From Delaware River Basin  
Commission, 2007) 
The strength of the STAPLEE evaluation criteria is that the proposed 
actions are evaluated across a spectrum of considerations, which helps to 
develop a more robust picture of the possible impacts and consequences of 
various proposed actions.  The use of non-monetary criteria in the evaluation of 
mitigation and preparedness programs might be appealing to HEIs because HEIs 
generally consider themselves to be driven by a set of values that are not, as a 
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general rule, solely based on financial profit.  Non-monetary criteria that might be 
important to a HEI could include concepts such as education, service, the 
furtherance of knowledge, and the emotional, spiritual and psychological 
development of students.  The seven STAPLEE criteria (social, technical, 
political, legal, economic and environmental) are relevant to HEIs, but FEMA’s 
methodology could be further customized to an individual HEI by altering the 
specific criteria to be considered.  Any approach should not ignore the fact that 
HEIs must operate like businesses in so far as they must cover their expenses, 
but most HEIs would prefer to communicate that they evaluate their fundamental 
mission and contribution to society through measures that are not solely based 
upon economics.  Thus, the STAPLEE criteria might resonate with HEI decision 
makers and provide an acceptable and motivating framework for evaluating 
mitigation activities, as well as other preparedness efforts.   
A weakness of the STAPLEE evaluation criteria tool is that “+” and “-” 
signs do not fully convey relative importance.  For example, the political 
implications of Action A may be totally and completely unacceptable, which 
would result in a “-” sign being affixed to that option.  The political implications of 
Action B may also be undesirable, resulting in a “-” sign also being associated 
with that option.  Compared to Action A, however, Action B would be tolerable.  
As presented, both Action A and Action B are being rated as being equally 
negative in terms of their impact.  Similarly, the environmental impacts of Action 
A may be far more unacceptable relative to the social impacts of Action A but a 
simple “+” or “-” does not convey the relative weighting.  One solution would be to 
weight the different criteria or give numerical scores rather than using “+” and “-” 
indicators.  This approach makes the system a bit more complicated, but most 
decisions, especially complex decisions, are not so simple that they can be 
evaluated using “+” and “-” rankings.  In essence, this methodology does not offer 
a mechanism for effectively evaluating trade-offs between options, nor does it 
address the interconnectedness of various options.  Another weakness with this  
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rating mechanism is that it does not incorporate uncertainty, which a fundamental 
aspect of a real life decision, especially the types of decisions that are associated 
with emergencies and emergency management.   
5. Target Capabilities List  
Another document that contributes to the literature on preparedness is the 
Target Capabilities List (DHS, 2007b).  As previously mentioned, Community 
Preparedness and Participation (CPP) is one of 37 target capabilities listed in the 
TCL.  The CPP identifies the following as being desired outcomes: the education 
and training of the public in the four homeland security mission areas: prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery; the participation of individuals in volunteer 
programs; and the ability of the public to provide surge capacity support.  More 
specifically, the goals have been defined as follows: 
• Percent of residents within the jurisdiction who are alert to unusual 
behavior—indicative of potential terrorist activity—and who 
understand appropriate reporting procedures, until 80 percent of 
residents maintain knowledge. 
• Percent of households that conduct pre-incident preparation to 
include creating and maintaining a communication plan, obtaining 
disaster supplies, and practicing evacuation/ shelter-in-place and 
additional maintenance skills, until 80 percent of households 
maintain pre-incident preparation. 
• Percent of residents prepared to evacuate or relocate to designated 
shelter (to include residents with special needs), until 80 percent of 
the population is prepared. 
• Percent of a jurisdiction’s population that is knowledgeable of 
workplace, school, and community emergency plans, until 80 
percent of population maintains knowledge. 
• Percent of residents prepared to shelter-in-place and have 
emergency supplies on hand as advised by local authorities, until 
80 percent of population is thus prepared (DHS, 2009, pp. 3–4).  
Unlike most of the other documents that have been referenced thus far 
that do not provide distinct outcomes, the CPP provides clear, measurable and 
specific desired outcomes.  The existence of measureable objectives provides 
direction and informs decision making.   
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6. Risk Management in Higher Education: A Guide to Good 
Practice  
In addition to the “how to” guides produced by the United States federal 
government, the government of the United Kingdom has produced helpful 
guidance documents, which could have applicability to U.S. institutions.  One of 
these documents—Risk Management in Higher Education: A Guide to Good 
Practice—provides numerous interesting and noteworthy insights specific to HEIs 
regarding risk management (HEFCE, 2005). Although focused on risk 
management, the best practices contained within this document could easily be 
applied to strategies and approaches for addressing emergency management, 
which is essentially a type of risk management.    
One insight contained within Risk Management in Higher Education is the 
concept of embedding risk management programs into the organizational culture 
of a HEI in order to reduce risk (HEFCE, 2005). One of the offered strategies is 
to “marry top-down and bottom-up assessments to produce a comprehensive 
picture of risk to the institution (HEFCE, 2005, p. 2).  Figure 2 depicts how this 
“top-down / bottom-up” strategy would be put into operational practice.  
Incorporating such a process would likely require a mandate from the HEI’s 
board of trustees/overseers or the President/Chancellor. It is also possible that 
such a process could be driven by a department or school, especially if there 
were an incentive for participation or the benefit for the individual department or 
school of engaging in this process could be demonstrated.  
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Figure 2.   Figure 1. Elements of an Institution-Wide Risk Management 
Framework (From HEFCE, 2005) 
In terms of support for embedding risk management into the operational 
and organizational culture of the HEI, Risk Management in Higher Education 
notes that at one institution in the U.K.:  
…all academic schools and service departments are required to 
complete and maintain local risk registers1 as part of their annual 
planning process. This helps them play an active role in the risk 
management process… Academic deans at this institution 
commented on how risk management has added focus and a more 
commercial ethos to their areas of responsibility. (HEFCE, 2005, p. 
29)   
“Risk registers,” as explained in the U.K. National Risk Register document, 
are:  
the starting point for emergency planning.  The key to turning this 
into useful planning information is remembering that it is not the 
                                            
1
 Risk registers are a tool for “[u]nderstanding the risks and determining their relative 
significance in terms of potential impact” (U.K. Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 4). 
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risks themselves that people have to deal with when things go 
wrong, but their consequences.  In an increasingly complex and 
interdependent society, emergencies can have increasingly 
complex knock-on effects.  The Register identifies both direct and 
indirect consequences, many of which are common to several risks, 
and provides information on how to prepare for them. (U.K. Cabinet 
Office, 2008, p. 4) 
At another institution, the:  
…risk register is built around the annual operating plan and shows 
the risks of the institutional objectives not being met.  Members of 
the governing body receive the output document periodically, and 
have found that it has enhanced their understanding of the key 
operational issues being dealt with by management. (HEFCE, 
2005, p. 28)   
And, at another institution:  
For each academic department, staff are required to identify risks 
and underlying factors and to work through scenarios considering 
how the risk factors interact. This is an annual, forward-looking 
exercise and is used to feed messages up to the academic board. 
This has assisted in improving academic quality procedures which 
had previously been very bureaucratic.” (HEFCE 2005, p. 15)   
An important observation made in Risk Management in Higher Education 
is the distinction between a truly embedded process, and a process which gives 
the appearance of being embedded (HEFCE, 2005).The report notes: 
Smaller/less complex institutions have tended to adopt top-down 
risk management processes. This suggests that risk management 
processes are overlaid onto existing management processes rather 
than being truly embedded. Better practice would be to fully involve 
faculty and departmental management (academic and non-
academic) in the risk management processes, to make it part of the 
institution’s culture. (HEFCE, 2005, p. 14)  
By comparison, the report states, “Larger and/or more complex institutions 
tend to have a wider group of individuals involved in the risk management 
process, and their processes are more devolved.  However, for some this is still 
an overlaid process.” (HEFCE, 2005, pp. 27–28).    
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Another best practice noted in Risk Management in Higher Education that 
could have applicability to emergency management practices to HEIs in the U.S. 
is the idea of tying emergency risk management assessments and pre-incident 
planning to the institution’s budgeting process or annual planning cycle (HEFCE, 
2005). Such an approach would most likely be regulatory in nature, as opposed 
to being incentive-based, although it is possible that an incentive-based program 
could be established.  An example of an incentive-based approach might be to 
award university grants to schools or departments that engage in a risk 
evaluation process.   
The idea of identifying risks and developing response plans is not unique, 
but the idea of embedding these actions into the operating culture of a HEI, 
especially through the budgeting process, is somewhat avant-garde, at least it 
would be in the U.S.  Tying the process to the budgeting process would certainly 
telegraph that emergency management carries a high level of importance to the 
institution.  Should an institution wish to embark on the path of embedding 
emergency management into the day-to-day operations of the institution, Risk 
Management in Higher Education provides some specific ways in which to 
accomplish the embedding process other than, or in addition to, connecting it to 
the budget cycle.  These examples include: adopting common definitions of risk; 
evaluating both the short and longer-term impact of the key risks identified, such 
as reputational impact; including risk management as part of staff performance 
appraisals; aligning risk management with objectives at all levels of the 
institution; introducing incentives and rewards linked to risk management; 
recruiting on risk management ability as well as experience; building risk 
management into staff inductions; having managers ‘champion’ risk 
management; encouraging innovation, while providing guidance and assistance 
in situations that do not turn out favourably [sic] (HEFCE, 2005, pp. 28–30).  
These are all interesting ideas which, if adopted, would place emergency 
planning into the operating vernacular of the HEI and would inevitability enhance 
levels of preparedness for the HEI. 
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Another idea proposed in Risk Management in Higher Education is for an 
institution to determine its risk appetite (commonly referred to as risk tolerance in 
the U.S.) (HEFCE, 2005). The report found that “in many cases risk appetite was 
seen to be inherent in the way that the institution conducts itself, rather than 
something which needs to be periodically and formally reviewed and described” 
(HEFCE, 2005, p. 10).  The document suggests, “An active contribution should 
be made in defining the institution’s risk appetite…as this helps set the 
framework within which the strategic planning process should operate” (HEFCE, 
2005, p. 5).  With respect to defining risk tolerance, the Risk Management in 
Higher Education report states:    
There is wide recognition that risk management should not be 
about making an institution risk averse (and this point had been 
made at governing body level). However, some institutions may 
have moved straight from identifying risk to treating it, without 
proper consideration of risk appetite. This approach can ignore the 
context of the risk and can lead to the implementation of costly, ill- 
 
conceived and inadequate ‘quick fixes’.  Such dangers can be 
prevented through a proper understanding of risk appetite. 
(HEFCE, 2005, p. 10)   
The concept of “risk appetite” or risk tolerance is a fundamental concept of 
decision analysis, which will be reviewed in a subsequent section.    
One final practical tip offered in Risk Management in Higher Education 
related to risk tolerance was a recommendation that a HEI determine the type of 
solution that is being sought to address the identified risks.  Specifically, what is 
the desired solution? Is it: a satisfactory (but not optimum) solution; the most 
cost-effective solution; the accepted practice (industry norm, good business 
practice); the best achievable result (given current technology), or the absolute 
minimum result that could be accepted (HEFCE, 2005, p. 21)?  A framework or 
model that incorporates this type of analysis would be fairly sophisticated, but the 
general idea is well worth noting. 
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In summary, the guidance offered from the U.K. risk management best 
practices for HEIs is to be deliberate about the emergency management 
decision-making process, starting with the way in which risks are identified to 
determining the level of risk that is tolerable to the HEI to deciding the type of risk 
mitigation strategy to adopt (HEFCE, 2005). The various pieces of advice offered 
in the document could be implemented as independent pieces or, as suggested 
in the document, as an overall process for managing risk. 
7. Summary 
There is a vast amount of literature available from FEMA and other federal 
agencies about how to assess risks; processes for developing mitigation plans; 
information about how to prepare for a broad array of hazards; and, in some 
instances, specific desired outcomes.  Risk Management in Higher Education 
from the U.K. offers practical and noteworthy guidance about managing risks at 
HEIs that could be applied to emergency management efforts in the U.S.  
 
(HEFCE, 2005). These various guidelines provide the foundation upon which a 
framework for evaluating preparedness and mitigation activities could be 
developed.   
C. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS 
Research specifically focused on measuring the levels of preparedness at 
U.S. HEIs appears to be scarce.  The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s Community Preparedness Division, however, does conduct national 
surveys to measure the public’s knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors relative to 
preparing for a range of hazards.  The Personal Preparedness in America: 
Findings from the 2009 Citizen Corp National Survey reports on the nation’s level 
of preparedness based upon a specific set of criteria, which are identified in the 
report (DHS, 2009). Level of education is one of the controlling variables the 
report uses to distinguish between levels of preparedness within the population.  
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This section will describe some of the results from this survey, including the 
impact of education on preparedness activities. 
The following is not an exhaustive list, but it offers insights into some of 
the standards used to gauge preparedness as well as the state of preparedness 
in the U.S.: 
• Just over one-half of individuals (53%) reported having supplies set 
aside in their home, to be used only in the case of a disaster. 
• Only one-third of individuals (30%) said they had disaster supplies 
set aside in their car, a decline from the 2003 survey where 34 
percent reported to have a kit in their car. However, the number of 
individuals who indicated they had set aside supplies in their 
workplace increased from 2003 (41% to 45%). 
• Less than half of individuals (42%) reported having a household 
emergency plan that included instructions for household members 
about where to go and what to do in the event of a disaster. 
• Fewer than half of respondents were familiar with the alert and 
warning systems in their communities (45%) and official sources of 
public safety information (34%). 
• 4 in 10 individuals (41%) reported having participated in a 
workplace evacuation drill; only 27 percent had participated in a 
workplace shelter-in-place drill. Even fewer individuals had 
participated in school or home based shelter-in-place drills (14% 
and 10%, respectively). Only 13 percent reported having 
participated in a home evacuation drill, and just 10 percent stated 
they had taken part in a home shelter-in-place drill (DHS, 2009, pp. 
7–13). 
Compared to the desired levels of preparedness established by the 
federal government, these results indicate that as a nation we are only marginally 
prepared to deal with man-made and natural disasters.   
Controlling for education, the report found the following: 
• Individuals with some college education (36%) were significantly 
more likely than less educated individuals (29%) to have supplies 
set aside in their cars (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2009, p. 8).  
• Individuals with a high school degree or less (45%) were 
significantly more likely not to have prepared because of perceived 
 30 
reliance on emergency responders such as fire, police, or 
emergency personnel, than more educated individuals (23%). 
Individuals with a high school degree or less (32%) were 
significantly more likely than higher educated individuals (21%) to 
state that a lack of knowledge was a primary reason for not 
preparing (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009, p. 20).  
• Individuals with no college experience were significantly more likely 
than individuals with some college experience to expect to rely a 
great deal on state and federal government agencies (28% 
compared to 17%), nonprofit organizations (34% compared to 
16%), people in their neighborhood (31% compared to 25%), their 
faith-based community (36% compared to 20%), and fire, police, 
and emergency personnel (48% compared to 34%) (DHS, 2009, p. 
22).  
Based upon this sampling of results, it appears that higher levels of 
education correlate with higher levels of preparedness.  Assuming that these 
results reflect the level of preparedness at HEIs is probably not appropriate, 
especially for a residential-based HEI in which students rely upon the institution 
to provide room and board, but, given that well-educated individuals (e.g., faculty 
members) comprise a significant portion of the population of a HEI, these results 
could indicate the potential for higher levels of preparedness to be found among 
some portions of a HEI community compared to the national average.  
Regardless, the results indicate that significant portions of the U.S. population 
are not prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from man-made and natural 
disasters.  The following section offers some explanations as to why the desired 
levels of preparedness have not been achieved.    
D. BARRIERS TO PREPAREDNESS  
Despite the availability of information about how and why to prepare for 
and mitigate risks, research has shown that many individuals are not engaging in 
these activities.  The Personal Preparedness in America: Findings from the 2009 
Citizen Corp National Survey offers several explanations about why people are 




made and natural disasters (DHS, 2009). The following paragraphs describe 
some of these findings along with the report’s recommendations for ways in 
which to overcome these barriers.   
One finding is that individuals have high expectations of assistance from 
emergency responders and that this mindset might inhibit individual 
preparedness.  The study found that:  
From a list of possible reasons why individuals had not prepared, 
29 percent of individuals indicated that a primary reason they had 
not prepared was because they believed that emergency personnel 
would help them in the event of a disaster.  Further, 61 percent of 
participants indicated they expected to rely on emergency 
responders in the first 72 hours following a disaster. (DHS, 2009, p. 
47)  
The study recommends that “communication to the public must emphasize 
the importance of self-reliance and convey a more realistic understanding of 
emergency response capacity” (DHS, 2009, p. 47).    
The study also found that “perceptions of the utility of preparedness and 
confidence in ability to respond varied significantly by type of hazard” (DHS, 
2009, p. 49).  More specifically, the report noted:  
[W]hile most individuals (66%) believed that preparing for a natural 
disaster would help them better handle the disaster, individuals had 
significantly lower response efficacy regarding acts of terrorism, 
with 35 percent of individuals indicating that preparing for a terrorist 
attack would not help them respond to that type of event. (DHS, 
2009, p. 49)   
The study asserts, “Because all-hazards messaging may dilute critical 
differences in preparedness and response protocols, preparedness and 
response education should include a focus on hazard-specific actions 
appropriate for each community” (DHS, 2009, p. 49).  On the positive side, the 
study found that an awareness of vulnerabilities to natural disasters motivates 
individuals to prepare.  But, the study found that “[o]nly 40 percent of individuals 
thought a natural disaster was likely ever to impact their communities, with even 
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less believing in the likelihood of an act of terrorism, hazardous materials 
accident, or severe disease outbreak…ever impacting their communities” (DHS, 
2009, p. 49).  The study concludes, “…educating individuals about their 
communities’ vulnerabilities to natural disasters as well as concerns with utility 
outages, extreme heat or cold, and other disruptive circumstances should 
increase awareness of risks and, in turn, increase motivation to prepare” (DHS, 
2009, p. 49).   
In the article The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of Mass-
Mediated Fear, Breckenridge and Zimbardo (2007) cite several research studies 
that indicate that psychological factors influence people’s thoughts and behaviors 
related to preparedness.  With respect to how people perceive threats, for 
example, they cite research that indicates, “Each of us tends to view our own 
prospects and circumstances as superior to that of others (Mezulis, Abramson, 
Hyde, & Hankin, 2004)” (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 119).  The implication is that  
 
individuals will recognize that threats exist in the world but they will not perceive 
themselves as being vulnerable to a given threat and, thus, will not be inclined to 
prepare for it. 
Kapucu and Wang draw similar assessments about risk perceptions and 
behavior in their article titled Public Complacency under Repeated Emergency 
Threats: Some Empirical Evidence: 
It is widely acknowledged that an individual’s risk assessment on 
expected damages for an incoming threat influences the person’s 
level of complacency or willingness to prepare (Riad, Waugh, and 
Norris 2001). The literature suggests that people act to their 
expectation. Their emergency preparation efforts depend on their 
expected chance of impact by the emergency. For example, the 
most common reason people do not evacuate during natural 
disasters is the belief that they are not in immediate danger (Dunn, 
Lewandowsky, and Kirsner 2002; Lindell and Perry 2004; Mileti and 
O’Brien 1992; Perry 1985; Tierney, Lindell, and Perry 2001). Since 
disasters are such a rare experience for most people, the natural 
reaction to a threat warning is that it would not happen here. This  
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effect is magnified when the warning is related to a type or severity 
of threat that is unlikely to occur in the recipient’s area. (2007, p. 
61) 
In developing the framework for their research, Kapucu and Wang cite 
some of the seminal research studies related to preparedness behavior 
including: 
Public complacency can cause under or nonpreparedness for 
emergencies (Burby 1998; Coombs 1995, 1999; Davidson and 
Lambert 2001; Fischer 1998; Fitzpatrick 1999; Lerbinger 1997; 
Otway and Wynne 1989; Pielke and Pielke 1997; Smart and 
Vertinsky 1977; Tobin and Montz 1997; Witte 1994). The 
development of public complacency in ignoring the threat can lead 
to lack of actions and nonactions in preparing for the emergency. It 
can be argued that public complacency contributes to the lack of 
earthquake preparedness among San Francisco residents (Drabek 
1985) and to the poor tornado preparation in Grand Island, 
Nebraska (Quarantelli 1982). In case the emergency does occur, 
the actual damage caused by public complacency and poor  
 
 
preparedness can be substantial (Burby 1998; Knight 2005; 
Partnership for Public Warning 2002; Williams and Olaniran 1998). 
(Kapucu & Wang, 2007, pp. 60–61) 
Kapucu and Wang offer the following about the relationship between 
knowledge and behavior: 
Public complacency is different from poor public awareness in 
which the public does not possess necessary threat information to 
develop a threat ignoring / unwilling-to-prepare intention. On the 
other hand, a well-aware public can be a fully complacent one as 
well. Public complacency also differs from poor public 
preparedness. Public complacency may be one of many causes for 
poor preparedness. Other factors, such as lack of threat-dealing 
capability or poor awareness, may also cause poor public 
preparedness. (Kapucu & Wang, 2007, p. 58)  
An informal poll of emergency management professionals from Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) cohort 0902 during a classroom 
discussion seems to lend support to the idea that complacency impacts 
preparedness behavior.  The poll revealed that three people out of a class of 15 
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public safety professionals had placed emergency supplies in their homes or 
personal vehicles—a very basic and easy action to perform.  Informal 
conversations with other first responders have yielded similar results.  If the 
persons who are most knowledgeable about the value of being prepared—
including knowledge about the impacts that not being prepared have on 
individuals, as well as organizations, communities, and even the efforts of first 
responders—are not taking steps to be personally prepared, increasing the 
educational messaging about the importance of being prepared and what to do 
during an emergency may not be sufficient to actually change behavior.  
Combined with the cited literature, the significance of this observation is that it 
might be worthwhile to consider factors such as expected outcomes, 
complacency, and risk behavior when evaluating the anticipated impact of a 
particular preparedness or mitigation activity. 
In addition to perceptions about risks and the utility of preparedness 
efforts to mitigate risks, another barrier to preparedness programs is funding.  
HEIs, especially those that conduct research, are subject to myriad rules and 
regulations related to safety.  A few examples include: the Animal Welfare Act 
governing the transportation, sale and handling of certain animals (07 USC, 
Chapter 54, 2131–2157); the Possession, Use and Transfer of Select Agents and 
Toxins (07 CFR 331); and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act (42 USC, Chapter 116, 11021–11023).  Similarly, any HEI that 
receives federal aid, including student loan programs, must comply with the 
Higher Education Act (20 USC 1002).  This federal law governs a broad range of 
activities including safety and security measures.  The Higher Education Act 
(HEA) Sec 485(f)(1)(J), for example, requires an annual disclosure of campus 
security policies to include immediate emergency response and evacuation 
procedures, including the use of electronic and cellular communication. More 
specifically, this regulation requires: 
Campus policies shall include procedures to immediately notify the 
campus community upon the confirmation of a significant 
emergency, dangerous situation involving an immediate threat to 
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the health or safety of students or staff occurring on the campus; 
publicize emergency response and evacuation procedures on an 
annual basis in a manner designed to reach students and staff; and 
test emergency response and evacuation procedures on an annual 
basis. (EdFund Government Relations and Regulatory Analysis 
Unit, 2009)   
HEA Section 485(i)(1)(A) requires institutions of higher education that 
house students on campus to publish a fire safety report, including: statistics; fire 
safety procedures for each housing facility; policies regarding electronic 
appliances, smoking, and open flames; and plans for improvements.  These laws 
are beneficial to the concept of preparedness from the standpoint that they 
mandate compliance with safety regulations, but there are possible downsides to 
mandates as well.  One possible downside is that resources that must be 
dedicated to complying with the myriad regulatory mandates deplete funds and 
resources that might otherwise be dedicated to non-mandated or voluntary 
preparedness efforts.  These non-regulatory activities could actually be more 
beneficial to the institution’s overall preparedness compared to those which are 
required by law, but they might not be pursued because funding and resources 
must be dedicated to compliance efforts.  Similarly, some decision makers may 
adopt the mindset that activities that are truly important to safety and 
preparedness will be regulated or legislatively mandated.  The bottom line is that 
decision makers must be convinced that funding a voluntary, non-regulatory 
preparedness or mitigation activity will be more beneficial to the HEI than not 
funding the program or initiative.  Thus, decision makers need a way to 
determine the value of preparedness activities and to evaluate these potential 
alternatives. 
E. THE VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 
The document Building a Disaster Resistant University, produced by 
FEMA, offers the following insights about the value of preparedness for HEIs: 
In the last decade, disasters have affected university and college 
campuses with disturbing frequency, sometimes causing death and 
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injury, but always imposing monetary losses and disruption of the 
institution’s teaching, research, and public service. Damage to 
buildings and infrastructure and interruption to the institutional 
mission result in significant losses that can be measured by faculty 
and student departures, decreases in research funding, and 
increases in insurance premiums. These losses could have been 
substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-
disaster planning and mitigation actions. (FEMA, 2003a)  
The document offers several other specific examples of the damage 
caused to HEIs by critical incidents.  For example:  
In June 2001, Tropical Storm Allison inundated the Houston Area 
and its universities and colleges with 10 to 24 inches of rain. The 
total losses are estimated to be $745 million. The University of 
Texas at Houston Medical School Building had 22 ft. of water in it, 
causing the hospital to close for the first time in its history and  
 
seriously disrupting its research efforts. Damage to the Medical 
School has been estimated at more than $205 million. (FEMA, 
2003a, p. iii) 
Another example took place on January 19, 2000, when:  
a fire raced through an old residence hall at Seton Hall University in 
the middle of the night. Students leapt from windows, crawled out 
stairways, and a number were rescued by firefighters. The fire killed 
three students, and seriously injured 12 more. The residence hall 
did not have a sprinkler system. (FEMA, 2003a, p. 9)   
As suggested by the results from the Personal Preparedness in America: 
Findings from the 2009 Citizen Corp National Survey, if individuals perceive a 
threat as being likely, they are more apt to take action to prepare for or mitigate 
the hazard (DHS, 2009). Thus, the potential value of the aforementioned 
examples is that they could create the perception for a university decision maker 
that there is a potential threat to her institution, which might motivate her to make 
certain preparedness or mitigation decisions that she would not otherwise be apt 
to make. On the other hand, these threats might not be perceived by HEI 
decision makers as posing a risk, in which case their value is marginal.  A more  
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compelling mechanism might be a tool that allows decision makers to evaluate 
preparedness alternatives based upon their own beliefs and knowledge 
regarding threats, consequences, and risks.  
F. STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Skinner describes strategic planning as “a set of coordinated decisions” 
(Skinner, 2001, p. 358).  Bryson, the author of Strategic Planning for Public and 
Non-Profit Organizations states that strategic planning “is a disciplined effort to 
produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an 
organization (or other entity) is, what it does, and why it does it” (2004, p. 6).  
Bryson continues with the explanation as follows:    
At its best, strategic planning requires broad-scale yet effective 
information gathering, clarification of the mission to be pursued and 
issues to be addressed along the way, development and 
exploration of strategic alternatives, and an emphasis on the future 
implications of present decisions.  Strategic planning can facilitate 
communication and participation, accommodate divergent interests 
and values, foster wise and reasonably analytical decision making, 
and promote successful implementation and accountability. 
(Bryson, 2004, p. 6) 
Stated simply, strategic planning is about identifying the current state of 
affairs for an organization; deciding where the organization wants to be, and 
developing a plan for moving from the current state to the desired state (Bryson, 
2004, p. 6).  This process is depicted in Figure 3 (Bryson, 2004, p. 7). 
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Figure 3.   The ABCs of Strategic Planning (From Bryson, 2007) 
With respect to the benefits of strategic planning, Bryson offers the 
following as being reasons why strategic planning is a worthwhile endeavor:  
…the promotion of strategic thinking, acting, and learning, 
especially though dialogue and strategic conversation among key 
actors (Van der Heijden, 1996); improved decision making; 
enhanced organizational effectiveness; and enhanced 
effectiveness of broader societal systems. (Bryson, 2004, pp. 12–
13)   
Kaplan and Beinhocker offer a similar perspective in their article The Real 
Value of Strategic Planning, “The goal of a strategic planning process should not 
be to make strategy but to build prepared minds that are capable of making 
sound strategic decisions” (Beinhocker, 2003, p. 71).  
Focusing on strategic planning for emergency management, the CPG 101 
defines a strategic-level plan as a blueprint for: 
…how a jurisdiction wants to go about meeting its emergency 
management or homeland security responsibilities in the long term. 
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They identify policy objectives and provide overall, high-level 
guidance for planners. These plans have the widest scopes and are 
the least detailed in the planning hierarchy. (FEMA, 2009a, p. 1.4)    
Figure 4 from CPG 101 (FEMA, 2009a, p. 1.8) provides a visual depiction 
of how strategic planning fits with other types of planning.  As the figure 
indicates, strategic planning has a long-horizon while operational planning has a 
shorter time horizon.  
 
Figure 4.   Planning Horizons (From CPG-101, 2009a) 
The CPG 101 explains the distinction between a strategic plan and an 
operational plan as follows:  “In the simplest terms, strategic planning sets the 
context and expectations for operations planning, while operational planning 
provides the framework for tactical-level plans and operations” (FEMA, 2009a, p. 
1.4).  The CPG 101 does not provide additional insights on how to develop a 




developing an emergency management strategic plan, including institutional 
resources such as a faculty member who teaches business or organizational 
management. 
In terms of the specific elements a strategic plan should contain, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended specific elements.  
These elements, along with a brief description of each element, are contained in 
Table 1, which was taken from the report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of 
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2004, p. 11).  Disregarding the 
references to national policies, the GAO’s recommendations could be adapted to 
strategic planning for HEIs.   
Table 1.   Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy from 
Conception to Implementation (From Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of 
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism) 
Desirable Characteristic Description 
Purpose, scope, and methodology Addresses why the strategy was produced, 
the scope of its coverage, and the process 
by which it was developed.  
Problem definition and risk 
assessment 
 
Addresses the particular national problems 
and threats the strategy is directed towards 
Goals, subordinate objectives, 
activities, and performance 
measures 
Addresses what the strategy is trying to 
achieve, steps to achieve those results, as 
well as the priorities, milestones, and 
performance measures to gauge results 
Resources, investments, and risk 
management 
 
Addresses what the strategy will cost, the 
sources and types of resources and 
investments needed, and where resources 
and investments should be targeted by 
balancing risk reductions and costs 
Organizational roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination 
 
Addresses who will be implementing the 
strategy, what the roles will be compared to 
others, and mechanisms for them to 
coordinate their efforts 
Integration and implementation  
 
Addresses how a national strategy relates 
to other strategies’ goals, objectives and 
activities—and to subordinate levels of 
government and their plans to implement 
strategy 
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In summary, strategic planning is a process for determining an 
organization’s current state of being, its desired state and a plan for reaching that 
desired state.  The structure and content of a strategic plan are not absolute.  
The GAO recommends that a plan contain six basic elements, which can be 
found in Table 1.  The strategic planning literature suggests that strategic 
planning benefits an organization by: creating a shared vision of the direction in 
which the organization is moving; developing a plan for accomplishing goals; and 
improving decision making.  Based upon this information, engaging in a strategic 
planning process specific to emergency management should contribute to 
enhanced levels of preparedness or, at a minimum, to a better understanding of 
the current state of preparedness and a plan for achieving a desired level of 
preparedness.  A HEI could utilize the literature on preparedness, including the 
myriad definitions of preparedness, to develop a strategic plan specific to the 
HEI. 
G. DECISION MAKING  
Developing a basic understanding of decision theory and how people 
make decisions would contribute to developing a more effective framework for 
evaluating pre-incident emergency management preparedness activities.  Within 
the realm of decision making, there are vast amounts of research from a broad 
array of fields including but not limited to: psychology, business, engineering, 
business, and the social sciences.  Differing fields of study examine the decision-
making process using different frameworks.  The following theoretical 
approaches will be reviewed in this section: normative, descriptive, and 
prescriptive decision making.   
The distinction between a normative and a descriptive theory of decision 
making is that the normative theory describes how decisions should be made 
and the descriptive theory describes how decisions are actually made (Hansson, 
1994).  The normative approach to decision making focuses on using logic to 
make decisions.  According to Edwards, “Normative models are built on basic 
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assumptions (or axioms) that people should consider to provide logical guidance 
for their decisions” (Edwards, Miles, & Winterfeldt, 2007, p. 5).  The normative 
school of thought offers norms of thinking that need to be accepted before the 
theory can be used to arrive at the best decision for an individual decision maker.   
The descriptive perspective of decision making, which focuses on how 
people actually make decisions, makes it clear that individuals make decisions 
that do not adhere to norms and logic.  Research conducted by Tversky and 
Kahneman has shown, for example, that the way in which a problem is framed 
(presented) affects the decision-making process (2002).  Specifically, research 
has shown that people tended to avoid taking risks when outcomes were framed 
as gains, and they tended to take risks when the outcomes were framed as 
losses, even when the outcomes were exactly the same (Beach, 1997, p. 20).  
Kahneman and Tversky’s research showed that people use unconscious 
shortcuts, termed heuristics, to help them make complex decisions (1974).  
These heuristics, while generally useful, can lead to “severe and systematic 
errors” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124).  The heuristics lead to biases, 
which when looked at from the normative perspective, would be considered 
errors of judgment.  Tversky and Kahneman identified several biases under three 
categories: the anchoring bias (initial exposure to numbers affecting our 
estimates), the availability bias (that which is easily available to our memory 
appears to be more numerous), and representative bias (balancing what the data 
says with how well the data represents what we know) (1974).  Hammond, 
Keeney and Raiffa build on this foundation and present traps to our thinking: 
The anchoring trap leads us to give disproportionate weight to the 
first information we receive.  The status quo trap biases us toward 
maintaining the current situation—even when better alternatives 
exist.  The sunk-cost trap inclines us to perpetuate the mistakes of 
the past.  The confirming trap leads us to seek out information 
supporting an existing prediction and to discount opposing 
information.  The framing trap occurs when we misstate a problem, 
undermining the entire decision-making process.  The 
overconfidence trap makes us overestimate the accuracy of our 
forecasts.  The prudence trap leads us to be overcautious when we 
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make estimates about uncertain events.  And the reliability trap 
leads us to give undue weight to recent, dramatic events. (2001, 
pp. 143–144)   
Knowing that these biases exist and that they can lead to less than 
optimal decision making is important when trying to develop a framework for 
evaluating preparedness decisions. 
The field of descriptive decision making challenges the mainstream view 
in the field of economics that human beings are rational and choose actions that 
maximize their advantage, sometimes referred to as rational choice.  Gary 
Becker, an economist who was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1992 (Nobel 
Foundation, 1992), for example, asserted that an “economic approach provides a 
valuable unified framework for understanding all human behavior…” (Becker, 
1976, p. 14).  He went on to state: 
The heart of my argument is that human behavior is not 
compartmentalized, sometimes based on maximizing, sometimes 
not, sometimes motivated by stable preferences, sometimes by 
volatile ones, sometimes resulting in an optimal accumulation of 
information, sometimes not.  Rather, all human behavior can be 
viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a 
stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of 
information and other inputs from a variety of markets (Becker, 
1976, p. 14). 
Interestingly, 10 years after Becker received his Nobel, Kahneman 
received an Economics Nobel for his work (All Prizes, 2009).    
Looking at preparedness from the perspective of “maximizing one’s utility,” 
one has to wonder why hundreds of thousands of people in the U.S. are not 
engaging in preparedness activities given the numerous espoused reasons why 
people ought to be prepared.  Have these individuals made a conscious 
determination that the benefits of engaging in these activities do not outweigh the 
costs?  If so, then perhaps the resources that are currently allocated to 
preparedness and pre-incident mitigation efforts should be re-directed towards 
other activities.  Or, could it be that people are making sub-optimal decisions with 
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respect to preparedness decision making?  The descriptive school of decision 
making offers compelling evidence that humans do not always make logical or 
optimal decisions and that there are a host of factors which have the potential to 
impact decision making and, ultimately, behavior.  If people are making sub-
optimal decisions with respect to preparedness, how could they be empowered 
to make better decisions?  Perhaps a prescriptive approach to decision making 
offers a solution. 
Prescriptive decision making, as explained by Edwards et al., “focuses on 
helping people make better decisions by using normative models, but with the 
awareness of the limitations of human judgment and of the practical problems of 
implementing a rational model in a complex world” (Edwards et al., 2007, p. 5).  
In other words, the prescriptive theory of decision making blends aspects of 
normative and descriptive decision theory.  Decision analysis has been described 
as a prescriptive approach to decision making.  Edwards characterizes decision 
analysis as “unabashedly normative in theory and thoroughly prescriptive in 
practice” (Edwards et al., 2007, p. 5).  Howard, who is credited with coining the 
term “decision analysis” (1966), views decision analysis as being normative and 
offers a slightly different perspective from that offered by Edwards et al.: “It 
seems to me that what (other) authors refer to as prescriptive rules, I would refer 
to as approximations that are appropriate when applying the norms in practice.  
These approximations are not mistakes in the sense that they are violations of 
the norms of decision making, but are rather the interpretations that are required 
to apply the norms sensibly in the world” (Howard, 1992, pp. 51–52).  Regardless 
of whether one views decision analysis as a normative or prescriptive approach 
to decision making, it is clear that it has roots in the normative approach and 
might offer a framework for assisting decision makers evaluate preparedness 
activities using logic so as to avoid or minimize some of the biases that can lead 
to less than optimal decision making.  The following section will provide a brief 
overview of the field of decision analysis. 
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H. DECISION ANALYSIS 
Practitioners of decision analysis describe it as a philosophy, a decision 
framework, a decision-making process and a methodology (Celona & McNamee, 
2008).  For a more in depth explanation of these different perspectives see 
Decision Analysis for the Professional by Celona and McNamee (2008).  
Decision analysis has been used to analyze a variety of problems.  Within the 
homeland security arena, Paté-Cornell and Guikema designed a risk analysis 
model to assist decision makers to set priorities “among the possible measures 
that can be taken to reduce the probabilities of different types of attack, capture 
signals of a possible attack, and reinforce the potential targets” (2007, p. 320).  
Buede and Bresnick used decision analysis to define the requirements for the 
U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) mobile protected weapon system during the concept 
selection phase of the systems acquisition phase along with several other 
analyses of acquisitions (2007, p. 539).  This section will provide a basic 
overview of the field of decision analysis, including some of its fundamental 
principles, and will describe in greater depth one of the fundamental 
methodological tools of decision analysis: the decision diagram.    
1. Elements of a Decision 
Howard teaches that a decision is “a choice among alternatives that will 
yield uncertain futures, for which we have preferences” (2007, p. 37).  He asserts 
that decision making is comprised of six elements: information (what we know); 
alternatives (what we can do); preferences or values (what we want); the frame, 
which defines the decision and includes what is being considered and excludes 
what is not being considered; a commitment to action (as opposed to merely 
contemplating options); and logic, which helps arrive at clarity of action (Howard, 
2007, p. 37).  Figure 5 (Howard, 2007, p. 37) depicts this six elements of decision 




decision-making stool and are called the decision basis. The seat of the stool is 
logic, on which sits the decision maker, who is committed to action.  All of these 
elements rest on the frame of the decision.  
Figure 5.   Six Elements of Decision Making (After Howard, 2007) 
A similar model, Figure 6, depicts these same elements, minus the frame, 
as follows (Celona & McNamee, 2008, p. 42): 
 
Figure 6.   The Elements of a Good Decision Analysis Process (From Celona 
& McNamee, 2008) 
It is the application of logic to the elements of alternatives, information, 
and values that places decision analysis into the realm of being a normative 
approach to decision making.  As explained by Raha (2010), the logic 
represents: 
…the set of axioms known as the five rules of actional thought, 
which if accepted, allows us to use mathematics and come up with 
clarity of action.  In brief, the rules are abbreviated as ‘POE’S 
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CHOICE,’ and are: the Probability Rule, the Order Rule, the 
Equivalence Rule, the Substitution Rule and the Choice Rule.  
Once these rules are accepted, the rest of the normative foundation 
is an inevitable consequence.” (Raha, 2010, p. 6) 
2. Decision Quality 
Most people judge decisions on the basis of the outcomes.  Howard and 
others argue that decisions should be judged on the basis of what was known at 
the time the decision was made, and not after-the-fact when the uncertainty that 
was present when the decision was made has been resolved.  The support for 
this argument comes from the fact that good decisions can result in bad 
outcomes just as bad decisions can have good outcomes.  Figure 7, referred to 
as a spider diagram (Celona & McNamee, 2008, p. 255), is a tool for evaluating a 
decision to determine its quality.  The criteria for evaluation correspond with the 
six elements that Howard (2007) teaches comprise a decision.  Different 
practitioners of decision analysis use different end points for the radar (see 
Figure 8, referred to as a Decision Quality Radar Chart, (Skinner, 2001, p. 353)), 
but the general idea remains the same.  Evaluating where a decision stands on 
the diagram enables the decision maker to determine where additional effort 
should be directed in order to improve decision quality.  The closer all elements 




Figure 7.   Spider Diagram (From Celona & McNamee, 2008) 
 
Figure 8.   Decision Quality Radar (From Skinner, 2001) 
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3. Iterative Process of Analysis 
Howard (2007) describes decision analysis as being an iterative process.  
The phases within the cycle have been referred to by different names, although 
the general concepts have remained the same over the years, merely being 
refined and clarified.  The first step is to frame the decision.  The next steps have 
been referred to as the: deterministic, probabilistic, and informational phases, 
which are then followed by the decision.  Figure 9 depicts this process visually 
(Howard, 2007, p. 44). 
 
Figure 9.   Decision Analysis Cycle (From Howard, 2007) 
The following sections provide a brief, high level overview of framing and 
the phases of analysis. 
a. Framing the Problem  
Framing is a critical first step in the process as it establishes the 
problem that the rest of the process will analyze.  A superb analysis is 
inconsequential if it turns out to have provided insights on the wrong problem.  
Howard writes: 
Framing deals with the phenomenon Freud called the ‘presenting 
problem.’ He noticed that when he asked new patients what was 
bothering them, their concerns seldom turned out to be their 
fundamental problems as revealed after the beginning of analysis. 
When you set out to help a decision-maker, it is only too easy to 
think that the opaqueness of his or her problem is correctly stated. 
You must often probe deep to make sure that the framing of the 
decision is really appropriate, that the underlying decision problem 
has really been uncovered. Framing is the most difficult part of the 
decision analysis process; it seems to require an understanding 
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that is uniquely human. Framing poses the greatest challenge to 
the automation of decision analysis (Howard, 1988, p. 684). 
One tool that can help frame the problem is the decision diagram 
(Howard, 2004; Matheson & Howard, 2005).  Howard writes that decision 
diagrams are “very easy for people to understand, regardless of their 
mathematical facility” (Howard, 1988, p. 687).  Skinner explains that a decision 
diagram “is a means of conveying the essence of the problem to others in [a] 
logical and understandable manner” (2001, p. 109).  Howard and Matheson offer 
that a decision diagram “is at once both a formal description of the problem that 
can be treated by computers and a representation easily understood by people in 
all walks of life and degrees of technical proficiency” (2005, p. 127).  They go on 
to state that decision diagrams serve as a “bridge between qualitative description 
and quantitative specification” (Matheson & Howard, 2005, p. 127).   
Figure 10 is an example of a decision diagram (Raha, 2010, p. 29).  
This particular diagram was developed to depict a decision within the realm of 
public safety: shift scheduling.  The elements that were determined to contribute 
to the problem included: the schedule, pending calls for service, and the amount 
of time spent at a call for service.  The diagram depicts the standard 
diagrammatic symbols utilized by practitioners of decision analysis.  The 
rectangular box containing the word “SCHEDULE” represents the decision.  The 
hexagonal box containing the words “% of calls diverted” is the value node, which 
resolves the valuation of the prospects.  In this case, the value attribute is the “% 
of calls diverted” and the goal is to minimize the number of calls diverted.  The 
single-walled ovals represent uncertainties, such as when a call for service will 
occur.  A double-walled oval, or node, is deterministic, meaning its value can be 
ascertained once all its inputs are known, whereas, even if all the inputs to the 
uncertainty node are known, its value would still be uncertain.  The notations are 
significant because they convey to a decision analyst how to build a 
computational model, which is used to evaluate alternatives during the analysis 




Figure 10.   Decision Diagram of Scheduling Situation (From Raha, 2010) 
Within the context of group decision making, framing has been 
described as accomplishing the following objectives: developing a shared 
understanding of the opportunity or challenge being addressed; creating an 
awareness of the different perspectives of the group members and expanding the 
thinking of each individual in the group; creating a respect for the legitimacy and 
importance of others’ perspectives; surfacing unstated assumptions that could 
affect the project; and, explicitly formulating and communicating the problem to 
be solved (Celona & McNamee, 2008, p. 230).    
Part of the framing process is developing alternatives that would 
potentially solve the problem.  As explained by Celona and McNamee, “the 
framing dialog defines the dimensions of the problem; the alternatives dialog 
defines the dimensions of the solution to the problem” (2008, p. 234).  In other 
words, the alternatives dialog proposes different approaches within the shared 
frame of the problem (Celona & McNamee, 2008, p. 234).  There are a number 
of techniques for determining alternatives, such as brainstorming and building 
strategy tables.  These techniques can be found in the literature on decision 
analysis.   
 52 
b. Deterministic, Probabilistic and Information Analysis 
Once the decision has been framed, the analysis takes place. 
Howard explains the phases of analysis as follows:   
After the problem is framed and alternatives are specified, the 
uncertainties that appear to have an effect on the decision are 
given nominal ranges.  The deterministic phase explores the 
sensitivity of alternatives to these uncertainties to determine which 
alternatives are worthy of probabilistic analysis.  The probabilistic 
phase encodes probability distributions on these uncertainties, 
including necessary conditional distributions.  It also requires 
assessing the risk preference to be used for the decision. At this 
point the best alternative can be determined, but the process 
continues to the informational phase to find the value of eliminating 
or reducing any or all of the uncertainties.  The result is not only the 
best decision up to this point, but also clear knowledge of the cost 
of ignorance.  This may lead to new information gathering 
alternatives and a repeat of the cycle, or simply lead to action 
(Howard, 2007, p. 44).    
Stated in layperson’s terms, the analysis portion of the process 
helps a decision maker answer the following questions in order to obtain greater 
clarity: 
1. What is the most I should be willing to spend on the best 
alternative? 
2. What changes in my beliefs would justify a change in my 
decision? 
3. If I could spend resources gathering some information, what 
information should I try to obtain, and what is the most I 
should spend? 
4. If I could spend resources controlling an uncertainty, which 
uncertainty would I select and what is the most I should 
spend? 
4. Group Decision Making 
When more than one person is engaged in the decision-making process, 
Celona and McNamee suggest that a dialogue take place between the decision 
maker(s) and the project team.  The process they recommend is depicted 
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visually in Figure 11 (Celona & McNamee, 2008, p. 228).  Failure to engage in 
this interactive process could result in the following scenario: 
…a person or team goes away and gathers data, picks an 
alternative, performs an evaluation, and presents the 
recommendation back to the decision maker.  If the results of the 
analysis agree with the decision maker’s beliefs and preferences, 
the recommendation is approved and funded.  If the 
recommendation does not match the decision maker’s beliefs or 
preferences, the team is asked to rework the evaluation.  This cycle 
can be repeated several times, as the decision maker may not 
agree with the person or team’s analysis of the situation, their 
proposed decision, the assumptions, or the analysis which lead to 
the business case recommendation (Skinner, 2001, p. 5). 
 
Figure 11.   Dialogue Decision Process (From Celona & McNamee, 2008) 
Celona and McNamee offer the following about traditional decision-making 
processes that fail to incorporate an interactive process: 
What can go wrong in this approach? Working on the wrong 
problem, choosing alternatives because they are not controversial, 
and proposing a solution that no one outside the team is committed 
to. The process encourages advocacy rather than collaboration—
“the answer” needs to be right the first time, otherwise the project 
team has its work disapproved or sent back for repairs. This 
encourages developing conventional solutions and hiding any 
problems with the solution (2008, p. 227). 
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As these two examples illustrate, not touching base during the process 
can result in frustration, time being spent inefficiently, and the potential for 
suboptimal decisions to be made.  In short, Celona and McNamee emphasize 
the importance of framing and the commitment to iterate on the decision analysis 
process, instead of encouraging advocacy for one’s preferred alternative (2008, 
p. 227). 
5. Clarifying Values—The Value Diagram 
Work by Raha (2010) offers an intriguing twist on traditional decision-
analysis modeling.  Building upon the concept of decision diagrams, Raha 
introduces the concept of a value diagram.  He explains that a value diagram “is 
a visual language to develop clarity in the decision-making body about value” 
(Raha, 2010, p. 80).  Raha begins his thesis by distinguishing between two uses 
of the word “value.”  As explained by Raha, in the noun form, when decision 
analysts ask if a prospect has direct or indirect value for us, they are interested in 
“existential comprehension.”  In the verb form, when decision analysts ask how 
we value a prospect relative to other values, they are interested in “numerical 
tradeoffs.”  Raha focuses his work on the existential comprehension as an 
important step in clarifying sources of value prior to any numerical analysis of 
value (S. Raha, Achieving Clarity on Value: Personal CommunicationInterview, 
April 12, 2010).  Raha (2010) proposes looking at three dimensions or types of 
value: intrinsic, prudential and systemic.  Intrinsic values are ends in themselves.  
Prudential (or extrinsic) values are a means-to-an-end.  Systemic values result 
from rule or construct fulfillment.  Intrinsic values would be answered by the 
questions, “What about this prospect can affect our identity? How does this 
prospect relate to our fundamental reasons for being in this venture? How does 
this prospect relate to things we care about intrinsically?” (Raha, 2010, p. 29).  
Prudential (or extrinsic) values are answered by the questions, “What about this 
prospect helps us achieve our goals? Are their behavioral aspects or material 
assets related to this prospect?” (Raha, 2010, p. 30).  Systemic values are  
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answered by the questions, “What are important constructs/regulations that help 
us do what we need to do?  What is the penalty for breaking some of these 
constructs/regulations?”  (Raha, 2010, p. 30).   
To illustrate these distinctions and how they relate to making, Raha offers 
the example of President Obama considering the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan.  The possible prospects the President might consider include:  
• Afghan women are treated badly 
• Educational choices limited to religion 
• Erosion of fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan, a return to the old 
Taliban regime 
• More Buddha statues and cultural heritage sites will be under 
attack 
• American soldiers are not dying anymore in Afghanistan 
• Domestic pressure on Afghanistan eases up (Raha, 2010, p. 33) 
Raha goes on to explain: 
The next step would be to perceive the experience of value in each 
of these prospects.  Which of these prospects would affect the 
decision-maker's identity?  As an example, the decision-maker 
might find that preservation of fundamental freedoms, equality of 
women and the right to choose our children's education are values 
that are a part of the US identity, and as a proxy for the US, the 
President should stand up for them.  Will the US sleep easier with 
fewer of its children getting killed in combat?  The President is 
answerable to the families of the soldiers, and this might be a 
prospect that affects him at the level of identity. At the level of 
assets and behaviors, the military is an asset of great value to the 
US, and diminishing this asset in Afghanistan may not be desirable.  
From the prospect of a stable Afghanistan, the President might 
want to focus the discourse on what assets or behaviors would the 
Afghans need to survive if the Americans pull out.  As an example, 
the answer might include well-trained local police forces and armies 
under civilian command, to combat the Taliban, infrastructure for 
sanitation and education, etc.  Finally, at the level of constructs, it 
would be worth thinking about the value of US promises in the 
future, should it break its promise to help Afghanistan.  Another 
cause of concern might be respect for international law and the 
precedent set by the United States.  For the prospect of 
Afghanistan's survival, what legal framework would help the country 
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stabilize quickly without US presence? The axiological categories 
are helpful in identifying three kinds of value and we need to 
consider all three kinds to get a holistic view of the value in the 
prospects under discussion. (Raha, , 2010, pp. 33–34) 
The way in which these concepts apply to the value diagram might best be 
explained through illustration.  The value diagram shown in Figure 12 was 
developed by Raha, based upon an interview with the President of Stanford 
University, who was asked to clarify the fundamental values that guided his 
decision making relative to university matters (2010).  The intrinsic values were 
distilled to: education, trauma to individuals, and coercion.  The latter two values 
are really disvalues and are represented in the value diagram with a “-“ sign.  The 
intrinsic value of “coercion of others” means that the whenever the decision 
maker applies coercion on other people, he is going against a fundamental value 
that affects him at the core of his identity.  The emergence of this concept from a 
former faculty member who operates in an academic environment is not 
completely surprising given that academic freedom is a fundamental tenet of 
academia. The notations Raha developed to distinguish between the different 
types of values are as follows: triple arrows indicate an intrinsic value; double 
arrows indicate a prudential value; and single arrows represent a systemic value.  
Raha further defines Figure 12 as a specific type of value diagram which he 
termed a “canonical value diagram”.  In a canonical value diagram, only intrinsic 
values can contribute to the “value” node, which is represented by the hexagon.  
All prudential values must connect with intrinsic values either directly or indirectly 
through other prudential values.  All systemic values must connect to a prudential 
value.  Raha’s rationale for the canonical form of the value diagram is to facilitate 
deeper reflection on underlying values.  His argument is that decision makers 
should try to identify the root intrinsic values and not stop at systemic or 
prudential values.  To summarize, traditional decision diagrams are systemic in 
nature as they involve constructs with clear definitions.  Raha proposes explicitly 
representing intrinsic and prudential values to create what he calls a “value 
diagram”.  He offers that “the value diagram helps us tell richer value stories 
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about our value frame” (Raha, 2010, p. 75).  According to Raha, one of the uses 
of a value diagram is to check that the key sources of value in the value diagram 


















Figure 12.   Value Diagram of Stanford University’s President (After Raha, 
2010) 
Translating Figure 12, education was determined to be an intrinsic value, 
meaning there is no other underlying reason as to why education is valuable; it is 
valuable in and of itself.  The arrow between education and the value node is, 
therefore, shown with a triple arrow to indicate its intrinsic nature.  To facilitate 
education, these two decision makers believed that the university must prosper.  
Prosperity was not an intrinsic value for the decision maker who provided his 
input for the model, but a prudential value, as it contributes to the intrinsic value 
of education.  Coercion and trauma were also considered to be intrinsic values 
for the decision makers in this example.  The test that Raha (2010) suggests for 
determining an intrinsic value is to continue to ask the question, “Why is this 
important?”  The inability to answer the question signals that an intrinsic value 
has been reached.   
Raha’s proposed process warrants further analysis and study, but it 
seems to offer several significant potential benefits (2010).  One, as intended, it 
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assists decision makers develop greater clarity about what matters to them at a 
fundamental level.  Achieving greater clarity about one’s fundamental values 
should contribute to a higher quality decision-making process.  Two, the value 
diagram can facilitate conversations and understanding between individuals who 
work together in an organization or group setting.  For example, if an employee 
understands what is important to her supervisor or to the company (what her 
supervisor or the organization values), she can tailor her actions to be in 
accordance with those values.  Distilling a person’s or an institution’s 
fundamental values into a conceptual model allows individuals to see where their 
values diverge, and perhaps discover areas where their values might not be so 
widely divergent.  It is conceivable that business decisions could be made more 
readily and with fewer lengthy discussions about strategy if the decision-making 
group were to invest the time in developing a shared value diagram at the onset 
of a working relationship and use the value diagram to guide the decision-making 
process.   
Anecdotally, it seems that many of the conflicts that arise about the 
direction to pursue or an action in which to engage can be traced back to a 
conflict of values; thus, getting to the heart of the value frame would be of great 
help in any decision or strategy conversation.  Extrapolating this line of thought to 
the higher education environment, most universities and colleges have a set of 
espoused values.  If those values were shown in a value diagram and decisions 
made with those values in mind, it is more likely that espoused values and 
actions would be consistent.   
6. Shortfalls of Decision Analysis  
Decision analysis is not without detractors.  There are those who state that 
complex problems, especially those involving human beings, cannot be 
adequately modeled.  There is an element of truth to this assertion.  Decision 
analysts will even admit that it is possible to miss important factors when 
modeling a decision or to model the wrong problem altogether.  Model a decision 
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incorrectly, and it does not matter if the answer is correct because the wrong 
problem was examined.  Burke Robinson, a practitioner of decision analysis, 
stated, “eighty percent of the value of decision analysis comes from framing and 
structuring the decision” (personal communication, August 22, 2010). 
Paraphrasing the CEO of an oil company for whom Robinson conducted an 
analysis of a decision, Robinson recalled the CEO stating, “Although we greatly 
appreciate all of the decision and risk analysis that you did, more than 80% of the 
value we gained from your assistance was delivered in the first month of framing 
and structuring of our decision. In particular, the process of developing a decision 
diagram helped us to see on one page all of the key uncertainties and decisions 
that we faced” (2010).   
In terms of detractors, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who authored The Black 
Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007), introduces the concept that 
highly improbable events (black swans)—those which would likely be discounted 
in a mathematical model due to low probabilities—often have huge impacts.  He 
cites the terrorist attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001 as an example of 
his point and argues that if the probability of such an attack had been “deemed 
worthy of attention, fighter planes would have circled the sky above the twin 
towers, airplanes would have had locked bulletproof doors, and the attack would 
not have taken place, period” (Taleb, 2007).  Taleb is critical of mathematical 
approaches to risk as evidenced in the following quote:  
For the applications of the sciences of uncertainty to real-world 
problems has had ridiculous effects; I have been privileged to see it 
in finance and economics. Go ask your portfolio manager for his 
definition of ‘risk,’ and odds are that he will supply you with a 
measure that excludes the possibility of the Black Swan—hence 
one that has no better predictive value for assessing the total risks 
than astrology (we will see how they dress up the intellectual fraud 
with mathematics). (Taleb, 2007) 
His point is that “Black Swan logic makes what you don't know far more 
relevant than what you do know” (Taleb, 2007).  Taleb’s argument about the 
impact of the improbable and the unlikely is compelling, but he does not 
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distinguish adequately between trying to predict the future and making good 
decisions based on our best information in the present time.  Indeed, one of the 
foundational pillars of decision analysis is the distinction between decisions and 
outcomes.  We cannot judge decision quality from outcome quality.  Additionally, 
while he is critical of these models of decision making, he does not offer an 
alternative for how decisions should be made; thus, the value of Taleb’s 
contribution rests not in what he offers in terms of how to make decisions but 
more as a reminder not to ignore that which might seem unlikely when 
conducting an analysis.  
7. Summary 
The significance of decision analysis to this thesis is that it offers a 
framework that could be used to assist decision makers at HEIs analyze 
emergency preparedness alternatives.  Even if a full computational analysis were 
not conducted, a partial analysis consisting of framing the problem, identifying 
alternatives, and building a decision diagram would contribute to greater clarity 
around preparedness decisions.  Raha’s idea of developing a value diagram as a 
starting point for the decision-making process is an intriguing prospect that 
seems to offer the advantage of assisting decision makers uncover sources of 
value that might not otherwise be apparent.  Clarifying intrinsic values could 
prove to be particularly beneficial when multiple decision makers are involved 
because the process can enable individuals to have a better understanding of 
what values might be driving or motivating an individual to propose different 
alternatives and make certain choices.  Additionally, the value diagram can serve 
as a tool for reminding decision makers of the institution’s fundamental values so 
that those values can be considered when making institutional decisions.   
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
HEIs are uniquely positioned in the U.S. to contribute to the nation’s 
preparedness by being “prepared” organizations within their own communities as 
well as by modeling preparedness behaviors to students, faculty, and staff.  The 
 61 
civic appeal of contributing the betterment of one’s community might motivate a 
HEI to engage in certain preparedness activities, but a HEI, like any business, 
must make sound business decisions.  If engaging in mitigation and 
preparedness activities reduces the likelihood of a threat or the consequences of 
a threat to the HEI itself or the amount of time to recover from a threat, then it 
would be in the HEI’s best interest to engage in these activities, but HEI decision 
makers are faced with making difficult choices about how to allocate limited 
funds.  How does a decision maker choose between investing in an academic 
program for which the outcome is fairly certain and committing resources to 
preparing for a critical emergency event that may never take place?  Developing 
a process or a model to evaluate preparedness and mitigation programs specific 
to HEIs would contribute to the discussion by demonstrating the potential value 
to the HEI of these types of activities.   
There are numerous documents and tools currently available that provide 
guidance in identifying risks, preparing for a wide variety of hazards, developing 
mitigation plans, and comparing cost and benefits.  A few of these documents 
were developed with HEIs as the target audience, although the vast majority 
were developed for the general population.  The most comprehensive document 
addressing HEI-specific issues, Building a Disaster Resistant University, is seven 
years old and does not contain references to newer materials that have been 
developed (FEMA, 2003).  Additionally, the approach recommended in this 
document is so comprehensive that absent a clear mechanism for determining 
the benefits, it is unlikely that an institution will dedicate the resources to follow 
the guidance offered, even if it the approach would develop a disaster resistant 
university.   
Furthermore, despite all of the information on how to prepare for and 
mitigate the effects of critical incidents, research indicates that individuals in the 
U.S. are not engaging in many of these recommended activities, even simple 
behaviors like storing drinking water and having an emergency medical supply 
kit.  One explanation offered for this failure is that individuals do not anticipate 
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being affected by an emergency or disaster.  Additionally, there is a perception 
that first responders will provide the support in the wake of a disaster.  Research 
associated with the fields of psychology and descriptive decision making provide 
additional explanations as to why individuals do not invest time or resources into 
preparing for critical incidents.  The field of decision analysis claims to provide a 
mechanism for mitigating some of these decision-making biases while also taking 
into account one of the most fundamental challenges of emergency management 
decision making: uncertainty.  This thesis is not intended to extol the virtues of 
decision analysis nor argue its merits over other decision-making models and 
strategies.  Rather, this thesis endeavors to draw upon some of the generalized 
concepts from decision analysis, including Raha’s (2010) proposed value 
diagram, to help in the development of a model specific to HEIs that might assist 
decision makers understand the value of investing in preparedness and 
mitigation activities.  In order to develop this model, it will be necessary to 
understand the current landscape of emergency management programs at HEIs 
in the U.S.; determine how HEIs are currently making decisions about which 
preparedness and mitigation programs to pursue; and identify criteria and values 






An extensive review of the literature on preparedness, including guidelines 
developed specifically for HEIs, as well as more general guidelines, was 
performed to develop a conceptual understanding of the ways in which 
preparedness is defined, measured, and evaluated as well as possible reasons 
why people do not engage in preparedness activities.  Additionally, a review of 
literature on the topic of decision making and decision analysis was conducted in 
order to develop an understanding of the ways in which people make decisions, 
especially under conditions of uncertainty, and the ways in which a normative 
approach to decision making might enable decision makers to make optimal 
preparedness decisions.  A set of follow-on interviews with individuals familiar 
with emergency management at HEIs were used to further understanding about 
how preparedness decisions are currently being made at HEIs and how that 
decision-making process might be improved.  The information gathered from the 
interviews was used to support the development of a conceptual framework for 
evaluating preparedness alternatives. 
B. SAMPLE POPULATION 
Ten HEIs from different parts of the country were selected to provide 
information about how HEIs are currently managing emergency management 
programs, including how decisions are being made regarding which 
preparedness activities to pursue.  The selection criteria included: representation 
from private and public institutions, representation from different parts of the 
country, and student populations of various sizes.  As the project progressed, the 
preponderance of the individuals who had been interviewed were employed by 
four-year degree granting institutions, so the sample population was restricted to 
this population.  Because HEIs share common characteristics, it is assumed that 
the results of this study could apply to HEIs other than four-year degree granting 
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institutions.  At the same time, it is recognized that there are different types of 
HEIs with different characteristics and attributes.  HEIs have different student 
demographics (working adults versus full-time students), funding sources (private 
versus public), motivations (non-profit versus for-profit), educational models 
(residential versus commuter) as well as a host of other distinguishing 
characteristics.  The focus of this study was not to uncover how HEIs differ in 
their approaches to emergency management based upon their unique 
characteristics but rather to discover how a select group of HEIs are managing 
their emergency management programs and making decisions about 
preparedness in order to identify possible ideas and best practices that could 
inform the emergency management decision-making processes at other HEIs.  
For simplicity, the term HEI will be used throughout this thesis rather than the 
longer and more descriptive phrase “four-year degree granting institution.”   
The interviewees included representatives from the fields of law 
enforcement, risk management, and emergency management who were familiar 
with their respective HEI’s emergency management practices.  The individuals 
who were interviewed for this project were either known by the researcher prior 
to the study or were introduced to the researcher through known contacts.  The 
emergency managers who were interviewed as part of this study were identified 
by an emergency manager as being leaders in the field of emergency 
management in the HEI arena.    
C. DATA COLLECTION  
Telephone interviews were the primary mechanism of data collection.  
Interviewees were asked a series of prepared questions and their responses 
were documented in writing by the researcher.  The specific questions are 
included in Appendix A.  Interviews were the preferred data collection 
methodology because they provided the researcher with the flexibility to explore 
any unique characteristics about a given four-year institution that could be 
significant to understanding how decisions are made at that institution.  There 
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were several instances when interviewees provided unsolicited information that 
sparked further questions and dialogue.  Due to time constraints, there were a 
couple of interviews in which the full array of questions were either not asked or 
not answered.  The questions that were eliminated tended to be about mitigation.  
As explained in the Literature Review section, people often generalize 
preparedness and mitigation as being the same type of activity, which is why the 
question was eliminated when interviews needed to be shortened due to time 
constraints.  In addition to interviews, the websites for the various institutions 
were examined, including documents related to emergency management from 
the institutions in the sample.   
D. DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The responses to the posed questions were placed into a spreadsheet so 
that the responses to each of the questions from each of the different institutions 
could be compared.  Perhaps due to open nature of many of the questions, 
respondents frequently provided responses to questions that had not yet been 
asked or offered information that was not related to a specific question but was 
insightful nonetheless.  When this happened, the miscellaneous response was 
assigned to the question that it seemed to answer.  The responses were then 
grouped into four categories: organizational structure, strategy, processes, and 
decision-making criteria. The responses were then examined for themes and 
patterns as well as for noteworthy practices.  The intent of this research was not 
to determine causal relationships.  Rather, the goal of this research was to gather 
information from a variety of sources in order to develop a robust and 
comprehensive picture of current emergency management practices at HEIs, 
especially decision-making processes.  Thus, common themes, individual 
responses, and unique practices were all of interest.   
Respondents indicated a desire to be candid in their responses in the 
interest of furthering emergency management, but several also expressed, either 
directly or indirectly, their desire not to have the respective institutions portrayed 
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in a way that might be perceived as casting a negative light on the institution or 
specific individuals.  It was agreed that information in this thesis would not be 





IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The fundamental question this project sought to answer is:  How can 
higher education institutions better evaluate emergency preparedness 
alternatives in order to make optimal decisions about how to invest the 
institution’s limited resources and funds?  It was assumed that organizational 
structure, strategy, processes, and criteria would influence the way in which 
these decisions are made, so this research also sought to identify how different 
HEIs structure their emergency management programs; how they are making or 
have made decisions about which preparedness activities to pursue; and the 
underlying values that influence preparedness decision making at HEIs.  The 
specific questions these considerations are intended to answer are: 
• In what ways does the organizational structure of a HEI emergency 
management program contribute to optimizing the decisions that 
are made about preparedness and mitigation activities? 
• How does the strategic planning process contribute to optimizing 
the decisions that are made about preparedness and mitigation 
activities? 
• What decision-making process or processes can contribute to 
optimizing decisions that are made regarding preparedness and 
mitigation activities? 
• What criteria should be considered to optimize preparedness 
decisions? 
The interconnected nature of organizational structure, strategic planning, 
processes, and decision criteria made it difficult, at times, to separate the findings 
into these distinct categories.  As a result, there are some instances in the 
following sections in which a process activity, for example, has been included in 
the emergency management organizational structure section or a strategy has 
been included in the decision-making section in order to keep the flow of an idea 
intact.  In addition to the sections on organizational structure, strategy, processes 
and criteria, there is a final section that contains the responses to the question: 
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What do you consider to be the barriers to greater preparedness?  The 
responses to this question could have been parsed out and incorporated into one 
of the four identified categories as applicable, but they are being kept in their own 
section in order to show how the interviewees answered this specific question.    
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE  
In order to answer the question of how the organizational structure of a 
HEI emergency management program contributes to optimizing the decisions 
that are made about preparedness and mitigation activities, questions were 
asked about the student and employee populations, the ways in which HEI 
emergency management programs are structured and managed, and staffing 
levels.  This section will be divided into three subsections: themes and patterns; 
noteworthy practices; and the summary of findings.   
1. Themes and Patterns 
All of the HEIs interviewed for this study had an emergency management 
program, and they employed a variety of organizational structures to address the 
emergency management function.  The aspects of organizational structure that 
will be examined in this section are as follows:  formalization of the emergency 
management function; roles and responsibilities; and geographical span.    
a. Formalization of the Emergency Management Function 
Seven of the 10 HEIs in this study had dedicated emergency 
management departments.  The three institutions that did not have a formal or 
designated emergency management department had the smallest student 
populations of the 10 HEIs in the study: one institution had a student population 
of 13,000 and the daytime population ranged from 16,000 to 20,000 people; the 
second institution had a student population of 6,000 and a daytime population of 
8,000; and the third HEI had a student enrollment of 1,400 and a daytime 
population of approximately 3,000.  
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The three institutions that did not have recognized emergency 
management departments did have someone assigned to perform emergency 
management planning for the institution.  In the first case, someone from the 
President’s Office had been assigned to address emergency management.  
Significant resources had been dedicated to emergency management planning 
efforts, primarily through the use of outside consultants.  The interviewee noted 
that the person who had been assigned to oversee the institution’s emergency 
management program had been promoted, but no one has been assigned to 
assume the emergency management responsibilities that she had performed.  
The interviewee also noted that an emergency management committee 
comprised of senior level administrators had established the broad policy 
guidelines for emergency management at the institution.  First responders, such 
as the Chief of Police, were not represented on this policy making committee.  
Because the interviewee is not on the policy level committee, he did not know 
how frequently the policy group met, if they met at all.  This HEI also has an 
operational level emergency management group that met when there was a 
major event for which planning was needed.    
At the second HEI that did not have a designated emergency 
management department, someone has been assigned to a three year position 
to address emergency management.  The interviewee, the Chief of Police, 
commented that because the school was so small and everyone knew one 
another, decisions were made without the need for the emergency management 
committee to meet on a formal and on-going basis.  There was an emergency 
management committee, and it met primarily during exercises or an actual 
incident. 
At the school with a student population of 1,400 and a day time 
population of 3,000, the person who is responsible for emergency management 
is the Director of Facilities as well as the Chief of Police.  When describing the 
way the institution where she works manages emergency management, she 
stated that the key decision makers gather once a month to discuss emergency 
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management planning.  During the meetings in the past, the group members 
have identified gaps in their preparedness efforts based upon the collective 
wisdom of the group and developed plans to address those gaps.  Similar to the 
interviewee at the second school, this interviewee commented that the small size 
of the school and the regular contact between key decision makers, including 
those who control funding, around a variety of topics other than emergency 
management made the emergency management decision-making process 
relatively straightforward and uncomplicated.   
For the seven institutions in this study that did have dedicated 
emergency management departments, the student populations ranged from a 
low of just over 14,000 to a high of just over 41,000.  The student populations of 
the other schools were approximately: 17,000, 20,000 for two schools, 24,000, 
and 32,000.  The emergency management staffing ranged from one person to 
three and one-half full-time equivalent (FTE) positions at one HEI (and one of 
these three positions had a fixed term).  The institution with the highest student 
enrollment was also the institution with the highest number of dedicated 
emergency management employees (3.5 FTEs).  The institution with the second 
highest enrollment (32,000 students) had an emergency management FTE 
headcount of one.   
b. Roles and Responsibilities  
All of the institutions in this study utilized some form of an 
emergency management committee.  In some cases, these committees 
functioned as the decision-making body; in other cases they served as advisors 
to the decision maker(s); and sometimes it was not clear what role the committee 
was supposed to perform.  It several instances, the purpose of the emergency 
management committee or group seemed to be centered on preparing to 
function as effectively as possible during the response to an emergency but not 
on discussing or evaluating preparedness decisions or determining strategic 
direction.   
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The individuals who chaired the emergency management 
committees varied.  At six of the seven HEIs that had emergency management 
departments, the university’s emergency manager chaired the emergency 
management committee.  At one of these seven HEIs, the Chief of Police 
technically chaired the committee, but, in reality, the emergency manager 
prepared for and managed the meetings.  At another of the HEIs, the emergency 
manager was the de facto chair of the committee, but she indicated the group 
only met to conduct exercises or during real incidents.  This emergency manager 
had made a conscious decision not to have regular meetings because she felt 
the work that needed to be done could be done via email.  At the seventh HEI 
that had an emergency management department, the emergency manager 
position had not been filled pending the hiring of the person to whom the 
emergency manager would report.  The interviewee, the Chief of Police, 
indicated there was an operational gap in emergency management planning as a 
result of the vacancy.  The three HEIs that did not have emergency management 
departments were chaired by individuals who held the positions of Vice 
President, Assistant Vice President, and Assistant to the President.    
When an institution had a designated emergency manager, that 
person seemed to bear the primary responsibility for recommending 
preparedness programs; promoting emergency management within the 
institution; garnering support from others within the institution to focus their 
attention on emergency management; and essentially “carrying the torch” for 
emergency management.   
With the exception of one nursing school at one institution and the 
law school at another institution, none of the institutions had dedicated 
emergency managers at the departmental or school level.  The HEIs that had 
emergency managers at the school level were geographically separated from the 
main campus.  Several institutions mentioned having established points of 
contact for emergency management related matters within the schools or 
departments of the institution.  An institution with a student body of over 14,000 
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and a daily population of close to 30,000, for example, had a fairly robust and 
formalized network of voluntary emergency management contacts throughout the 
institution.  Many of these individuals were responsible for managing the facilities 
and buildings on campus. The Emergency Management Department held 
monthly meetings with these points of contacts in order to keep them informed 
about and to maintain their interest in emergency management issues. 
c. Geographic Span 
Institutional clarity around emergency management planning at 
branch campuses, off-site programs, and off-site facilities appeared to be lacking.  
The term “branch campus” has been defined by the Code of Federal 
Regulations, section 34 CFR 600.2, to mean:   
A location of an institution that is geographically apart and 
independent of the main campus of the institution. A location of an 
institution is considered independent of the main campus if the 
location is permanent in nature, offers courses in educational 
programs leading to a degree or other recognized educational 
credential, has its own faculty and administrative or supervisory 
organization, and has its own budgetary and hiring authority (Office 
of Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education, 2005, 
p. 19).  
For purposes of this analysis, a branch campus will be defined as a 
location that is geographically separated from the main campus, permanent in 
nature, relatively independent from the main campus, and where academic 
instruction takes place.   
Based upon the definition for a branch campus as defined in this 
thesis, all but one of the HEIs had at least one branch campus located either 
domestically or internationally.  Seven institutions had domestic branch 
campuses; four HEIs reported having overseas branch campuses; and two 
reported having at least one overseas and one domestic branch campus.  Table 
2 presents the information about branch campuses as well as whether the HEI 
has a dedicated emergency management program or not.  
 73 















1 Yes Yes No No 
2 No No No No 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 Yes Yes No Yes 
5 No No Yes Yes 
6 No No Yes Yes 
7 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 Yes Yes No Yes 
9 Yes Yes No No 
10 Yes Yes No No 
To illustrate the lack of clarity with respect to emergency 
management planning for branch campuses, one emergency manager stated 
that she had assumed responsibility for emergency management planning at the 
domestic branch campuses even though it was not specifically spelled out in her 
job description.  Another emergency manager stated that the domestic branch 
campuses were included as annexes in the institution’s overall emergency 
management plan.  It was not clear from the interview who was responsible for 
the actual planning.  Another emergency manager stated that the domestic 
branch campuses were “independently minded” and maintained their own 
emergency plans.  A fourth emergency manager echoed this response.   
In terms of responsibility for emergency management planning at 
overseas campuses, one emergency manager stated she assumed that the 
Overseas Studies program was responsible for emergency management 
planning at the international branch campuses.  A second emergency manager 
noted that he also assumed that the Overseas Studies Office was responsible for 
emergency management planning.  He noted that any plans that did exist were 
not incorporated into the university’s overall emergency plan nor had the plans 
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been sent to the university’s Office of Emergency Management, so the 
emergency manager was not certain if planning had been done or not.  A Police 
Chief indicated that he assumed that the individual who oversees the overseas 
programs was responsible for emergency planning.  He noted that the 
institution’s Office of Risk Management and the General Counsel’s Office had 
informed the overseas office how to strategically plan for handling the risks faced 
at the various overseas locations.   
All of the institutions offered opportunities for overseas studies 
through programs (as opposed to an overseas branch campus managed by the 
educational institution).  The locations where programs are held are not, by 
definition, directly under the institution’s control.  None of the respondents 
indicated responsibility for or knowledge of the planning that was being done for 
overseas programs.  There were no respondents in this study representing 
overseas studies offices, so it is possible that the institutions in this study do 
have emergency management plans for overseas programs.      
Six HEIs indicated that the HEI maintained off-site facilities that did 
not fall under the definition of a branch campus.  For clarity, the simplest 
distinction between branch campuses and off-campus facilities is whether 
students directly receive educational instruction at the location.  An off-site library 
storage area where students do not receive academic instruction would be 
considered to be an off-site facility not a branch campus.  Emergency 
management planning for “off-campus” sites seemed to be non-existent or left to 
someone outside the institution to perform.  One police chief stated that 
emergency management would be done by the entity from which the institution 
leased the space.  An emergency manager and a risk manager echoed this 
sentiment for their respective institutions.  Another emergency manager noted 
that he had only recently found out about a sensitive operation that was housed 
at an off-site domestic facility.  As the institution’s emergency manager, he felt he 
should have known about the operation.  He commented that despite the lack of 
formalized systems for integrating the emergency management efforts at these 
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off-site areas, the university would become aware of incidents because there is a 
central office of university safety that houses the various first responder 
departments.  Someone within the safety organization would inevitably be 
contacted in the wake of an incident at an off-site facility and would then alert 
others.  He said this notification would take place as a result of pre-existing 
relationships rather than any formalized process.  His main point was the 
institution would become involved in the response, but it was not necessarily 
involved in the pre-incident planning process.  It is possible that emergency 
management planning had been conducted at the site cited in the example 
above and that the gap was not in the emergency management planning process 
but in the communication between the entity conducting the planning and the 
university’s centralized emergency management program.   
2. Noteworthy Practices 
With respect to the actual management of an emergency management 
program, the University of Oregon has developed a somewhat unique approach.  
The University of Oregon program is managed by a faculty member, which is in 
itself unusual since all of the other emergency management programs in this 
study were managed by individuals holding staff positions.  Faculty management 
of the university’s emergency management program has several benefits.  By 
virtue of the mere fact that faculty members interact with other faculty as well as 
with students, the program receives a level of exposure that it might not 
otherwise receive.  Additionally, as a result of being managed by a faculty 
member, a perception is created that the program is academically sound, which 
gives the program a certain level of credibility that might not otherwise exist.  
What was particularly intriguing about the University of Oregon model is that the 
director funds much of the program the way a faculty member would fund his 
research.  The director seeks grants to fund any positions or programs that are 
not funded by the university.  He commented that funding positions and 
programs through grants means that there is a high level of accountability and a 
continual push to be innovative.  The University of Oregon program is also 
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unique from the standpoint that the director has tied the program to the 
educational mission of the institution by offering service-learning internships.  
Despite the fact that the university does not offer a degree in emergency 
management, five to 15 students perform internships in the community each year 
under the auspices of the program.  Not only do the students receive an 
education, but the community benefits from their work.   
Due to the unique organizational structure of the University of Oregon 
emergency management program, it is worth noting how the evolution took 
place.  The Web site for the Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resilience provides 
an overview of the way in which this partnership with the community, and the 
state of Oregon, evolved: 
• In the summer of 2000, the University of Oregon’s Community 
Service Center (CSC) establishes the Oregon Natural Hazards 
Workgroup (ONHW) specifically to work on identified natural 
hazards issues in Oregon. The role of the ONHW is to link the 
skills, expertise, and innovation of higher education with the natural 
hazard risk reduction needs of communities and regions in Oregon, 
thereby providing a service to the state and learning opportunities 
for students.  
• On October 30, 2000, the President signs into law the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2K). The act establishes a national pre-
disaster mitigation program and creates new requirements for the 
National Post-Disaster Mitigation Program.  
• On December 12, 2000, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber signs an 
Executive Order designating Oregon a "Showcase State for Natural 
Disaster Resistance & Resilience." This Executive Order follows a 
model developed and tested in Rhode Island by the Institute for 
Business and Home Safety (IBHS), an initiative of the insurance 
industry engaged in communication, education, engineering, and 
research of natural hazards.  
• In early 2001, the Showcase State program becomes know as the 
Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resistance and Resilience; ONHW 
takes a lead role in coordinating the group’s risk reduction and 
mitigation activities throughout the state.  
• In 2002, ONHW develops a comprehensive five-year strategic plan 
for the Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resistance and Resilience 
organized around five distinct working groups: state hazard 
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planning; businesses/economic recovery; pre-disaster mitigation; 
public awareness, education and outreach; and public/private 
partnerships.  
• In 2002, ONHW embarks on a regional capacity building initiative 
to develop and implement local natural hazard mitigation plans 
utilizing federal funds made available by the passage of DMA2K.  
• Cumulatively, events such as 9-11, the Indian Ocean tsunami, 
Hurricane Katrina, and Virginia Tech change the priorities, focus 
and demands of local emergency management programs.  
• In 2005/2006 ONHW/CPW assist the University of Oregon in 
developing a natural hazard mitigation plan for campus that opens 
the door to establishing a Disaster Resilient University program.  
• In late 2006/early 2007 the Partnership Advisory Committee begins 
to discuss an organizational restructuring to better serve the needs 
of the communities within the state.  
• In June 2007, ONHW and the Partnership for Disaster Resistance 
& Resilience merge under one name and management structure at 
the University of Oregon: The Oregon Partnership for Disaster 
Resilience (OPDR) is born.  
• Beginning in 2007, the Partnership’s activities look beyond the 
scope of natural hazards only, to a more integrated, enterprise-wide 
emergency management capacity building program.  
• In the Fall of 2007, the Partnership works with the University of 
Oregon administration to implement an enterprise wide emergency 
management program for campus. (Community Service Center, 
University of Oregon, 2010)  
This history demonstrates the idea of innovation, to which the director the 
University of Oregon’s emergency management alluded.   
Another noteworthy practice emerged from Georgetown University.  
Georgetown has organized its emergency management structure on the 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) concept outlined in the National Response 
Framework (NRF).  The ESFs “group federal resources and capabilities into 
functional areas to serve as the primary mechanisms for providing assistance at 




• ESF 1-Transportation 
• ESF 2-Communications 
• ESF 3-Public Works 
• ESF 4-Firefighting 
• ESF 5-Information and Planning 
• ESF 6-Mass Care  
• ESF 7-Resource Support 
• ESF 8-Health and Medical 
• ESF 9-Search and Rescue  
• ESF 10-Hazardous Materials 
• ESF 11-Food and Water 
• ESF 12-Energy 
• ESF 13-Military Support 
• ESF 14-Public Information  
• ESF 15-Volunteers and Donations  
In order to address the fact that some services are provided by 
organizations affiliated with the university that are not under the direct control of 
the HEI, such as the Georgetown Hospital, Georgetown placed them into their 
own independent ESFs rather than incorporating them into an existing and 
applicable ESF.  The specific way in which this organizational model functioned 
operationally was not explored.   
A third noteworthy practice emerged from Stanford University.  Stanford 
has created department level operational centers (DOCs) that function as mini-
emergency operations center (EOCs) for their respective areas.  There are 
currently 26 DOCs.  Each month, under the auspices of the Environmental 
Health and Safety Department, representatives from the various DOCs attend a 
monthly meeting where information about university emergency management 
practices is discussed.  Participation in the program is voluntary.  Many of these 
individuals elect to participate in several of the emergency management related 
training programs offered by the university to members of the university 
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community such as the Building Assessment Teams (BATS) and the Community 
Emergency Response Teams (CERT).  Over 600 people have taken BAT 
training, which provides participants with very basic skills to assess the structural 
damage to buildings and determine if the building should be closed in the 
aftermath of an earthquake, and over 200 people have enrolled in the CERT 
program.  Combined, these programs serve to bolster the institution’s 
preparedness and response capabilities.  Stanford is certainly not unique in 
offering this type of training, but the organizational concepts are worth noting. 
3. Summary of Findings 
All of the institutions in this study engaged in some form of emergency 
management planning.  Three institutions did not have dedicated emergency 
management departments.  Those HEIs that did not have dedicated emergency 
management departments had the lowest student populations of the HEIs 
involved this study.  This finding suggests that the development of a formalized 
emergency management department might be associated with the size of the 
institution.  For those HEIs with emergency management departments, staffing 
ranged from one to 3.5 FTEs.  Student population did not appear to be related to 
the number of personnel employed by the emergency management department.   
All of the institutions in this study utilized some type of an emergency 
management committee, although the purpose of these committees varied from 
institution to institution as did the frequency with which the groups met, who was 
represented on the committee, and who chaired the committee.  The chairperson 
was generally the emergency manager when the institution had an assigned 
emergency manager.  As a general rule, HEIs did not have emergency managers 
at the school or department level, although several had developed points of 
contacts within the schools and departments.  Clarity around the emergency 
management planning for branch campuses, off-campus facilities, and off-
campus programs—both domestically and internationally—seemed to be lacking.  
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Inevitably, the people who are included in the decision-making process—
whether as part of a formalized advisory committee or some other collection of 
people into a group—will impact the way in which a problem is framed, how the 
group understands the problem, and type of solutions that are generated. 
Consider the HEI in this study that did not include first responders in the policy 
level advisory committee that determined the HEI’s guiding principles with 
respect to emergency management.  It is likely that first responders would have a 
higher level of expertise about responding to and managing critical incidents as 
compared to senior administrators; thus, it is possible that the quality of the 
decisions that were made without this expertise might have been less than 
optimal.  Conversely, senior administrators have a broader and deeper 
understanding of the HEI’s overall mission and direction than those tasked with 
specific operational areas.  An organizational structure that includes both 
perspectives—those who deal primarily with operations and those who primarily 
deal with policy level decisions—might lead to “better” decisions.  Additionally, 
the structure allows for a shared or mutual understanding of the problem, the 
alternatives and the solutions.   
The HEIs in this study indicated that senior level administrators were 
engaged with emergency management planning efforts, although to varying 
degrees.  As noted, compared to senior officials at the larger HEIs, individuals 
who held senior level positions at smaller HEIs seemed to be more involved with 
the emergency management planning efforts as a result of their responsibilities 
over multiple areas.  According to the literature, the active involvement of 
someone representing the most senior levels of the institution helps to ensure 
that preparedness concerns receive adequate institutional attention, which can, 
in turn, facilitate optimal decision making.    
Another observation related to organizational structure relates to the role 
of the emergency manager.  When an institution had a designated emergency 
manager, that person seemed to bear the primary responsibility for 
recommending preparedness programs; promoting emergency management 
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within the institution; garnering support from others within the institution to focus 
their attention on emergency management; and essentially “carrying the torch” 
for emergency management.  These responsibilities sound like the performance 
expectations for an emergency manager, so this perception is not surprising.  
The fact that most of the HEIs did not have a dedicated emergency manager at 
the departmental or school level means that an institution’s emergency 
management efforts are essentially being spearheaded by the one to three staff 
persons without any formalized expectation of assistance from designated 
individuals representing the various departments and schools within the 
institution.  The question that emerges from this organizational structure is: If an 
institution’s planning efforts for a full spectrum of hazards are being managed by 
one to three staff persons, how successful can an institution’s emergency 
management efforts truly be?  To deal with this reality, several emergency 
managers indicated that they relied upon the skill of persuasion to involve 
individuals throughout the institution to participate in emergency management 
efforts. 
With respect to decision making, the organizational structure of a HEI’s 
emergency management program did not seem to be associated with any 
specific type of decision-making process.  Some of the HEIs with dedicated 
emergency management departments utilized advisory committees to make 
decisions about which preparedness activities in which to engage, and some did 
not utilize advisory committees to make decisions about which preparedness 
activities in which to engage.  A similar finding was present for the three HEIs 
that did not have emergency management departments.  Furthermore, some 
advisory committees used a consensus model to make decisions; some advisory 
committees generated recommendations to present to a decision maker; and 
some advisory committees did not develop or make recommendations about 
which preparedness activities in which to engage.  At least one interviewee 
representing each of these organizational models questioned whether the way in 
which decisions were made resulted in optimal decisions being made.  
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Interestingly, the interviewees from the two HEIs in this study that had the 
smallest student enrollment seemed to have the most positive outlooks about the 
institution’s decision-making process with respect to preparedness activities.  
This observation could be a reflection of the individuals’ outlooks in general and 
have nothing to do with the size of the student population whatsoever, but both 
interviewees commented that because their respective HEIs were small, 
individuals interacted with one another on a regular basis.  It would not be 
unreasonable to believe that someone who was part of the decision-making 
process regarding preparedness and mitigation activities would feel a level of 
satisfaction with the decision-making process.  It is important to note that 
perceived and expressed satisfaction with decisions and the decision-making 
process do not necessarily equate to optimal decision making, but it does 
indicate that there is a perception that the decisions were adequate, appropriate, 
and reasonable.  
In summary, there was no clear indication from the responses that a 
specific type of organizational structure was associated with a decision-making 
process that produced optimal decisions or even a specific type of a decision-
making process at all.  Some of the literature suggests that support from senior 
level personnel enhances the success of emergency management efforts as 
does a collaborative process that draws upon the expertise of those most 
knowledge about the HEI and emergency management.  The results from this 
study suggest that while organizational structure will undoubtedly influence the 
decision-making process, even if only to determine who might be involved with 
making decisions, organizational structure does not preclude different decision-
making processes and strategies from being employed.    
C. STRATEGIC PLANS AND STRATEGIC PLANNING   
In order to answer the question of how the strategic planning process 
contributes to optimizing the decisions that are made about preparedness and 
mitigation activities, the responses to the following questions were examined: 
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• Does the institution have an emergency management strategic 
plan?  If yes, is this plan documented?   
• How is the plan shared with others?  Which entity or entities 
developed the strategic plan?   
• What process was used to develop the strategic plan?   
• How long ago was the plan developed?   
• How often is the plan updated?   
This study did not define for the interviewees what was meant by a 
strategic plan in order to not restrict the nature of the responses.   
Interviewees were also asked, “What are the institution’s guiding principles 
with respect to emergency management?”  And, lastly, in an effort to solicit 
information about the goals, objectives and performance measures that might be 
included in an emergency management strategic plan, interviewees were asked 
how their respective institutions defined and measured preparedness.  For 
purposes of clarity, this section will be divided into three subsections: themes and 
patterns, noteworthy practices, and, summary of findings.   
1. Themes and Patterns 
The aspects of strategic planning that will be examined in this section are 
as follows: existence of a strategic plan, plan availability and access, plan 
creation and maintenance, guiding principles of the emergency management 
program, and preparedness measures.   
a. Existence of a Strategic Plan 
Four of the 10 institutions reported having an emergency 
management strategic plan.  The interviewees stated that their institution’s 
strategic plans were available on the Internet, which was also the way in which 
the plans were made available to others within the HEI.  If other institutions had 




part of this project or the plans were not recognized by the interviewees as being 
strategic plans.  Three of the four HEIs which indicated they had strategic plans 
had designated emergency management departments.   
In reviewing the strategic plans of the four institutions that indicated 
that they had strategic plans, two of the four HEIs contained elements one might 
expect to see in a well developed strategic plan including: mission and vision 
statements, specific objectives, and benchmarks.  The two HEIs that had well 
developed strategic plans were the University of Oregon and the University of 
Washington.  Highlights from these plans will be discussed in the next 
subsection.  The plans from the other two HEIs that reported having strategic 
plans appeared to be more closely aligned with operational plans.  In fact, in both 
cases, the plans were titled “Emergency Management Plan.”  Both of these plans 
did contain high-level guiding principles and policy statements about the 
emergency management program, which is why they might have been viewed by 
the interviewees as being strategic plans.  Based upon a quick review of the 
emergency management plans from the HEIs in this study that could be located 
on the Internet, most of these plans contained a high-level policy statement and a 
statement of what could be considered to be operational priorities.  If guiding 
principles and high level policy statements were the criteria for defining an 
emergency management plan as a strategic plan, then most of the other 
institutions in this study would be counted as having strategic plans.  But, using 
the strategic plans themselves as the benchmarks, only two of the four plans are 
truly strategic plans.   
Comparing the emergency management strategic plans from the 
University of Washington and the University of Oregon with the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations for the elements a strategic plan 
should contain as found in the report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of 
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism (GAO, 2004, 
p. 11), and taking into account that these plans were not developed with national 
security as a focus, these two plans contain most of the recommended elements.  
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The one notable exception to this observation is that neither plan specifically 
addresses what various strategies will cost, the sources and types of resources 
and investments needed, and where resources and investments should be 
targeted by balancing risk reductions and costs.    
b. Access and Availability  
With respect to the access and availability of strategic plans, the 
emergency management strategic plans for the University of Washington and the 
University of Oregon are publicly accessible via the Internet.  One of the 
interviewees who stated that the HEI did not have a strategic plan indicated that 
the institution had engaged an outside consulting firm to create a management 
plan that identified the institution’s greatest risks and made recommendations for 
mitigating those risks.  He was not certain if that document would be considered 
a strategic plan or not, but since the plan was not accessible to others, he stated 
that the institution did not have a strategic plan.  One of the four HEIs which 
reported having a strategic plan had also engaged the services of a consulting 
firm to develop a risk assessment plan and make recommendations for how to 
address identified risks and develop an emergency management program.  If this 
plan were strategic in nature, it is not being counted as being a strategic plan for 
purposes of this analysis because it is not available to the public, including 
university staff who might be charged with carrying our preparedness activities.   
It is worth noting that both of the HEIs that mentioned having 
confidential reports, which may or may not have been strategic in nature, were 
private institutions.  It is not uncommon for private institutions to conduct risk 
assessments under an attorney-client privilege.  Thus, while these confidential 
reports might be strategic in nature in so far as they outline specific objectives 
and recommendations to achieve those objectives, confidential reports are not 




are not transparent to the rest of the HEI or the surrounding communities and, 
thus, cannot be used to inform decision making except by those who are aware 
of the contents.   
c. Plan Creation and Maintenance 
Focusing only on the strategic plans from the University of Oregon 
and the University of Washington, the University of Oregon’s plan is dated 
November 2007 and has a five-year horizon.  The emergency manager 
developed the plan, which was vetted through the institution’s emergency 
management advisory committee.  The foundation of the plan was built upon 
elements outlined in the NFPA 1600, the Standard on Disaster/Emergency 
Management and Business Continuity Programs produced by the National Fire 
Protection Association, as well as standards established by the Emergency 
Managers the Emergency Managers Accreditation Program (EMAP).  The plan is 
reviewed annually and was last updated in October 2008.  The University of 
Washington’s plan, which is updated every two years, was revised in 2009 and 
has a 2014 horizon-target date.  The plan was developed by the staff of the 
emergency management department with input from the institution’s emergency 
management advisory committee members and other key stakeholders.  Like the 
University of Oregon’s plan, the University of Washington’s plan is based upon 
EMAP accreditation standards and NFPA1600 standards as well as the 
recommendations found in Building a Disaster Resistant University (FEMA, 
2003a). Although not specifically asked, it came out during the interviews that 
both the University of Oregon and the University of Washington had received 
federal “Disaster Resistant University” grants.   
d. Guiding Principles 
With respect to guiding principles, two types of responses were 
given to the question, “What are your institution’s guiding principles with respect 
to emergency management?”  One type of response focused on the guiding 
principles of the emergency management program or of emergency management 
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in general.  The response provided by the University of Oregon, which can also 
be found on the Web site, illustrates this type of response: 
Comprehensive—consider and take into account all hazards, all 
phases, all stakeholders and all impacts relevant to disasters. 
Progressive—anticipate future disasters and take preventive and 
preparatory measures to build disaster-resilient campus. 
Risk-driven—use sound risk management principles (hazard 
identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning 
priorities and resources. 
Integrated—ensure unity of effort among all levels of 
administration and all elements of the campus community. 
Collaborative—create and sustain broad and sincere relationships 
among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a 
team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication. 
Coordinated—synchronize the activities of all relevant 
stakeholders to achieve a common purpose. 
Flexible—use creative and innovative approaches in solving 
disaster challenges. (University of Oregon, 2009, p. 1) 
The other type of response, which was given by the majority of the 
HEIs, reflected the actual or perceived mission of emergency management—
such as saving lives, protecting property, and restoring business operations.  
One emergency manager stated that she focused on the four phases of 
emergency management.  She then specified: prepare the university to respond 
to and recover from any type of emergency incident; protect life, protect property 
and the environment.  In response to the question, another emergency manager 
asked, “How’s that different from mission and vision; can you expound?”  He then 
explained that his institution would consider the existing emergency management 
vision statement to reflect the guiding principles of the emergency management 
program.  The vision for this institution was to work collaboratively to save lives 
and to be a global model for other HEI emergency management departments.  A 
risk manager stated the guiding principles for her institution were outcomes 
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based, meaning the university focused on planning for certain outcomes such as 
providing medical care to the faculty, staff and students of the HEI as well as to 
the broader community.  Thus, planning was focused on how to perform certain 
functions, especially in the absence of key critical infrastructures.   
A police chief stated that his institution had clearly defined the 
guiding principles to be: life safety, operation of critical facilities, restoring 
campus operations, and protecting the institution’s credibility.  During planning 
sessions, these four principles are used to guide decision making. 
An emergency manager stated the guiding principles were not 
written down, but she assumed they would be to make sure that the campus is 
prepared to respond to and recover from a disruption caused by an emergency 
and to ensure mission continuity.  
e. Preparedness Measurements 
In an effort to solicit information about goals, objectives, and 
performance measures related to preparedness, interviewees were asked how 
their respective institutions defined and measured preparedness.  The question 
regarding defining preparedness seemed to catch many people off guard, as 
evidenced by responses such as, “Hmmmm, that’s a good question,” and “I don’t 
know that we have defined it.”  A couple of respondents were puzzled by the 
question and asked for clarification about what type of information was being 
sought.  After the initial momentary pause, several individuals proceeded to 
provide responses to the question.  One interviewee thought that the guiding 
principles which his senior administration had developed might be a starting point 
for defining preparedness.  These principles were: to protect life, critical facilities 
and the institution’s reputation, and to restore campus operations.  In terms of 
measuring preparedness, he was not certain, but he thought that perhaps 
preparedness was measured by university-wide exercises, planning and 
execution of actual events and responses to actual emergencies.   
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Another respondent also stated he was not certain how the 
institution defined preparedness but thought that the institution would define 
preparedness as falling into three parts: being prepared to deal with an event; 
dealing with the event when it occurs; and recovering back to normal as quickly 
as possible.  In terms of measuring preparedness, this interviewee stated that 
testing elements of the emergency management plan—such as making sure the 
emergency notification system and the public address system were in working 
order; determining bulk food capacity; and checking pumps and generators to 
make sure they were operational—was one way of measuring the institution’s 
preparedness.   
A third interviewee stated that the institution had not defined what it 
meant to be prepared, but her personal definition was that everyone knows the 
hazards that exist and what to do to mitigate the damage that might come from 
those hazards.  Another interviewee’s response to the question of how the 
institution measures preparedness was “That’s a tough one.  Metrics are few and 
far between for emergency management and disaster management.  We figured 
out just how difficult when we were required to develop a dashboard score card.”  
He went on to say that there really are no national standards other than counting 
things like the number of people trained, and the number of activities, workshops, 
seminars and training sessions presented.  In terms of defining preparedness, 
this respondent stated, “I guess in the traditional manner: actions and activities 
and events that get the university ready for the hazards we can most likely 
expect; planning training and exercising; all of the activities involved in 
implementing those.” 
Another emergency manager’s response to the question of how the 
institution defines preparedness was “We don’t isolate one word.  We take a 
holistic approach and that is our ability to respond and continue operations and 




the institution’s emergency management strategic planning process along with 
the benchmarks established in the NFPA 1600 and the EMAP accreditation 
standards. 
One interviewee stated that the existence of an emergency 
response and business continuity plan served as the measurements of 
preparedness for her institution.  She pointed out that many departments did not 
have plans and those that did have plans often had not read them and were not 
familiar with the contents of the plan; nor had they exercised their plans.  An 
emergency manager added that universities were not alone in terms of having 
not defined preparedness or how to measure it.  She said she had worked at a 
place where plans were prepared, but never tested, which meant there was no 
way of knowing if what had been in place would work or not.  Conversely, she 
had also worked at a place where exercises were conducted “ad nausea,” but 
plans were never changed as a result of what was learned during the exercise.   
Another emergency manager noted that he was still looking for a 
gauge.  He added that continuous improvement was a fundamental tenant of 
emergency management and preparedness, in particular.  If the goal is to 
continually improve, he stated, how does one measure when the institution has 
done enough to be prepared?    
2. Noteworthy Practices 
As mentioned, the strategic plans for the University of Oregon and the 
University of Washington contained the elements one might expect to see in a 
strategic plan, such as vision and mission statements as well as specific 
objectives.  The following excerpt from the University of Oregon’s strategic plan 
contains the vision and mission statements for this HEI:   
Vision: Create a disaster resilient university  
Mission: To protect the University by facilitating the coordination 
and integration of all activities necessary to build, sustain, and 
improve the University’s ability to mitigate against, prepare for,  
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respond to, continue operations during, and recover from natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, or other human-caused crises or 
disasters. (University of Oregon, 2009, p. 3)  
The vision and mission statements from the University of Washington’s 
strategic plan are:  
Vision: A Disaster Resistant University as a global model for other 
institutions of higher learning. 
Mission: To administer a campus-based comprehensive 
emergency management program in partnership with UW academic 
departments, operating units, staff, administration and neighboring 
jurisdictions to save lives, protect property and safeguard the 
environment. (University of Washington , 2009, p. 4) 
The existence of mission and vision statements is not uncommon.  What 
sets these two plans apart from others in this study is the level of specificity 
regarding goals and objectives included in the plans.  For example, the seven 
objectives in the University of Oregon’s strategic plan are as follows:  
1. Provide oversight, communication, and coordination of a broad and 
diverse group of campus partners.  
2. Employ an integrated all-hazards risk based approach for 
mitigation, response, continuity of operations, recovery, and 
preparedness planning for campus.  
3. Build local, higher education, state, and national partnerships and 
coalitions.  
4. Support campus understanding and utilization of the Incident 
Command System/National Incident Management System 
principles.  
5. Enhance disaster preparedness capabilities through preparing, 
training, and exercising.  
6. Strive for multi-dimensional communications (e.g., redundancy to 
ensure multiple modes of communications) and enhance education, 
awareness, and understanding of what to do before, during, and 
after crisis and disaster events among students, staff, and faculty.  
7. Address sustainability considerations in all endeavors and ensure 
that strategies are measurable. (University of Oregon, 2009, p. 3)  
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For each objective, specific behaviors or outcomes have been 
established.  An example of the level of detail in this institution’s strategic plan is 
shown in the following objective and measurement criteria for objective number 
six that is listed above: 
Core Functions:  
Implement a reliable emergency communications process to 
contact members of the campus community in the event of a 
pending or immediate campus emergency.  
Analyze means and methods of communicating with City, County, 
and State OEM partners (interoperability) and recommend 
improvements to current systems.  
Update and distribute EOC Call-up list (every 6-months).  
Test EOC communications including phones, computers, and 
wireless (every 6-months once we have the new EOC location 
determined and response coordinator/trainer in place). (University 
of Oregon, 2009, p. 6) 
The University of Oregon’s emergency management strategic plan is 
clear, concise, and explicit.  Anyone within the university, or external to the 
university, would be able to understand what activities are being pursued.  
Furthermore, because the expectations are measureable, there is a way to 
evaluate progress against the desired outcomes.   
The University of Washington’s strategic plan contains 17 goals.  Under 
each goal there are specific objectives and implementation plans.  The 17 broad 
goals are categorized under the following headings: 
• Program Management  
• Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Impact Analysis  
• Hazard Mitigation  
• Resource Management  
• Mutual Aid  
• Planning  
• Direction, Control and Coordination  
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• Communications and Warning  
• Operations and Procedures  
• Logistics and Facilities  
• Training  
• Exercises, Evaluation and Corrective Actions  
• Crisis Communications, Campus and Public Information  
• Finance and Administration  
• Change Management and Technology (2 goals in this category) 
• UWEM Employee Development. (University of Washington, 2009, 
p. 2) 
The report clearly indicates that the first 14 goals reflect the standards 
identified in the NFPA1600 (NFPA, 2010). The last two categories, which contain 
three goals in total, are UWEM specific goals that are not identified by 
NFPA1600 as standards.  To illustrate the level of specificity of the UWEM 
strategic plan, the follow excerpt shows the way in which the University of 
Washington’s strategic plan is organized under the goal of Program Management 
(University of Washington , 2009, p. 8): 
Goal 1: 
Ensure strong and ongoing program management through the 
development, review and update of written program policies, 
regulation and authorities.  Included in this goal is the support of an 
overall program coordinator, advisory committee and periodic 
program evaluation. 
Objective 1.1 Use and Promote the UWEM Vision, Mission and 
Balanced Scorecard concepts by all UWEM employees and its 
partners. 
The following excerpt shows the implementation plan for this objective: 
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Figure 13.   Implementation Table (From University of Washington, 2009) 
One additional noteworthy practice from the University of Washington is 
the UWEM strategy map, as shown in Figure 14 (University of Washington 
Emergency Management, 2009).  This one-page document encapsulates the 
elements of the UWEM’s overall emergency management strategic plan. 
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Figure 14.   University of Washington’s Emergency Management Strategic Map 
(From University of Washington, 2009) 
3. Summary of Findings 
Of the 10 HEIs interviewed, two of the HEIs—the University of Washington 
and the University of Oregon—had well developed and clearly defined 
emergency management strategic plans.  The content of these plans was heavily 
influenced by existing standards, specifically NFPA1600 and EMAP accreditation 
standards.  Both HEIs had received federal grants under the “Disaster Resistant 
University” program.  Based upon the responses from the interviewees, it 
sounded as though the grants had influenced the refinement of the institutions’ 
emergency management programs, including their strategic plans. 
Most of the interviewees, including the representatives from the University 
of Washington and the University of Oregon, responded that their institutions had 
not defined preparedness or what it meant to be prepared beyond generalized 
responses such as protecting life, keeping critical facilities operational, protecting 
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the institution’s reputation, and restoring campus operations.  With the exception 
of the University of Washington and the University of Oregon, none of the other 
HEIs had institutionally defined measurements of preparedness.  Despite having 
not defined how to measure preparedness, responses to the question of how to 
measure preparedness included: having an operational plan, conducting training, 
exercising, and reviewing lessons learned from exercises and actual events.    
Given that the University of Washington and the University of Oregon both 
have strategic plans that contain clearly defined goals and objectives that could 
be considered to constitute a definition of preparedness, a better question to 
have asked might have been: “What goals, objectives and benchmarks does 
your institution use to measure preparedness or guide the emergency 
management process at your HEI?”  The responses to this new question might 
not have changed substantially, except perhaps from the two HEIs that have 
well-developed strategic plans, but the question would have been clearer and 
created less confusion for the respondents.   
In summary, despite the apparent espoused benefits of strategic planning, 
only two of the 10 HEIs in this study—the University of Washington and the 
University of Oregon—had publicly accessible, formalized emergency 
management strategic plans that included clearly delineated goals and objectives 
to accomplish those goals.  If the existence of a strategic plan is indicative of 
strategic planning, then most of the HEIs in this study did not appear to have 
engaged in a strategic planning process specific to emergency management.  
Thus, gleaning insights as to how strategic planning at HEIs can contribute to 
optimizing decisions that are made about preparedness from the results of this 
study is limited other than to conclude that since strategic planning does not 
appear to be guiding the decision-making process for most of these institutions, 
then strategic planning is not contributing to optimizing decisions either.   
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D. DECISION PROCESSES 
Decisions about which preparedness and mitigation activities to pursue 
are inevitably going to be made regardless of whether an institution has engaged 
in an emergency management strategic planning process; created a written 
strategic plan; defined what it means to be prepared; or established benchmarks 
to measure preparedness.  Developing an understanding of how these decisions 
are currently being made can help to develop the framework for optimizing these 
types of decisions in the future.  The questions interviewees were asked to elicit 
information about how decisions are currently being made included:   
• How does the institution decide which specific emergency 
preparedness initiatives and programs to pursue?   
• Does the institution utilize any type of decision support tool to 
determine which preparedness or mitigation programs or initiatives 
to pursue?   
• Are you aware of any decision support tools, systems or processes 
for evaluating preparedness or mitigation activities?   
• How can the decision-making process be improved?   
In addition to the responses to these questions, insights obtained from 
interviewees’ responses to other questions that are relevant to “process” will be 
included in this section as well.  Organizationally, this section will be divided into 
sections: themes and patterns; noteworthy practices; and summary of findings.  
Themes and patterns will be further subdivided according to the aforementioned 
questions.  Each question will be presented followed by the responses. 
1. Themes and Patterns 
a. How Does the Institution Decide Which Specific 
Emergency Preparedness Initiatives and Programs to 
Pursue?   
Several respondents stated that decisions were made based upon 
the consensus opinion of those involved with the emergency management 
program.  Another stated that decisions were based upon the risks that were 
perceived to be the most important as determined by a committee consensus 
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process.  This interviewee acknowledged that he was not sure if the process was 
sound, if any benchmarks were actually utilized, or if the informal process 
resulted in a fair assessment of the actual risks.  Another respondent also 
mentioned that the institution based its decisions on the results of a risk 
assessment and focused attention on preparing for and mitigating the threats that 
had been identified as the most likely to take place.    
Two emergency managers stated it was their responsibility to 
advise the decision makers about which programs to pursue.  Another stated that 
in the absence of input from senior administrators, she worked on projects that 
she could accomplish with existing resources.  She also noted that constrained 
resources had forced her department, as well as the HEI, to realign its priorities 
and to be more creative, which sometimes led to changes in business practices.  
She cited the example of reducing the size of the EOC from a group of 60–70 
people to a group of 15 people, which reduced the training burden on the 
emergency management office as well the number of people who needed to 
make time for training.   
One emergency manager stated she intentionally focused on 
initiatives that were meaningful to local and state government and worked to 
integrate the HEI’s plans into these planning efforts.  Her approach was to focus 
on what would make her HEI a better partner with state and local government.  
Three HEIs specifically cited grants as influencing the decision-making process. 
A police chief’s perspective was that the proverbial “squeaky wheel” 
tended to receive the attention and funding.  An emergency manager stated, “It is 
a combination of funding and the hot topic of the day.”  Another emergency 
manager stated that the prevailing attitude toward emergency management 
preparedness was that little could be done to prepare for or mitigate the effects of 
“acts of God.”  This mindset was one of his greatest frustrations given the 
advances in the field of emergency management, policy development, and the 
decision sciences.   
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The involvement of senior level administrators has been identified 
in the literature as being a factor that impacts the potential effectiveness of an 
emergency management program.  Most of the respondents in this study 
indicated that senior level administrators were involved with emergency 
management planning, although the level of involvement varied.   
In summary, the institutions in this study did not appear to employ a 
structured process or processes for deciding which emergency management 
activities to pursue.  Consensus among those involved with emergency 
management program, solo decision making by an emergency manager and 
recommendations from the emergency manager or emergency management 
group were all mentioned as processes that were being employed.  Some 
institutions referenced using risk assessments as a tool for informing these 
decisions.  The exact way in which these risk assessments were utilized was not 
examined.   
b. Does the Institution Utilize Any Type of a Decision 
Support Tool to Determine Which Preparedness or 
Mitigation Programs or Initiatives to Pursue?  Are You 
Aware of Any Decision Support Tools, Systems or 
Processes for Evaluating Preparedness or Mitigation 
Activities?   
Only one interviewee mentioned using any type of a decision 
support tool to help make decisions about which preparedness or mitigation 
strategies to pursue.  This interviewee mentioned several tools including: 
Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping, a modification to FEMA’s cost-
benefit analysis tool for evaluating mitigation strategies, and a business 
continuity planning tool that was in the form of an Excel spreadsheet as well as a 
business continuity tool called UC Ready that had been developed at UC 
Berkeley.  The use of GIS will be examined in greater detail later.    
One emergency manager commented that he was a fan of 
standards and noted that several members of the college and university section 
of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IEAM) were 
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considering creating a set of standards specific for colleges and universities 
based on the EMAP accreditation standards.  He also referred to NFPA1600.  
Other than utilizing these standards, his institution did not use any type of a 
decision support tool.  The remaining seven HEIs stated that their respective 
institutions did not use any type of a decision support tool.   
With respect to decision support tools, one emergency manager 
made the following observation, “Here’s the problem with evaluating tools, there’s 
no way to go to a city council and say, ‘If we spend X, then we will save this 
much…and be able to prove it.’”  She offered the example that if 100 percent of 
the students are enrolled in the mass notification system and the institution uses 
the system to send out a warning to shelter in place and no one is injured, there 
is no way to compare that outcome to what might have happened if the system 
had not been in place.  She went on to add that people want “solid things” and 
this type of argument is not solid.  At that point, she posed the question of 
whether we are better off simply using common sense and good judgment as 
opposed to trying to prove something. 
In summary, most of the HEIs in this study did not use any decision 
support tools to make preparedness decisions with the exception of the use of 
GIS mapping, risk assessments, standards adapted from other sources such as 
the NFPA1600 and the EMAP accreditation standards, and business continuity 
tools.  In reviewing the NFPA1600, it does not prescribe a decision-making 
process, but it does provide a framework for designing an emergency 
management and business continuity program which could, in turn, facilitate 
decision making.  The tools which were mentioned do not independently provide 
a decision-making framework, but they could be included in or contribute to a 
framework. 
c. How Can the Decision-Making Process Be Improved?   
Responses to this question were varied.  Some of the responses 
mirrored activities that are already being done at some of the other HEIs in this 
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study and some responses included suggestions about the criteria that decision 
makers should consider, which will be covered in the next section.   
Doing more exercises on a wider variety of threats was mentioned 
several times as a way to enhance decision making.  Getting the right decision 
makers with the political will and authority to make decisions together “in one 
room” was another response.  Developing relationships and building trust among 
response units and decision makers was also highlighted as an important 
consideration.   
An emergency manager responded by telling a story about a recent 
event that took place on her campus.  She commented that the senior 
administration was reluctant to use the institution’s emergency notification 
system during a recent riot.  She felt the senior administrators, who were all new 
to their positions, had never encountered a situation of the magnitude facing 
them and were not prepared to make the types of decisions that need to be 
made during a critical incident.  Furthermore, she did not perceive that they knew 
what resources and tools were available to them.  She believed training and 
familiarity were the solutions to improving decision making because they would 
allow decisions to be made instinctively.   
Another emergency manager brought up organizational culture as 
an impediment to decision making.  She explained that the previous president of 
the university “ruled with an iron fist.”  Those who made decisions made 
themselves vulnerable to criticism, and even to being fired, so people adapted by 
not making decisions unless forced to do so.  Thus, this respondent felt that 
decision making would be improved if people could overcome the past and start 
speaking out and offering their opinions.  She noted that the university has had a 
new president for several years, but it is taking time to change the organizational 
culture that had been prevalent for over a decade.  She also commented that 
having people work together on the day-to-day stuff would develop relationships 
and build trust.  She thought this was important to do within the university as well  
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as with external first responders.  She commented that she sits on emergency 
management related committees in the city where her institution is located and 
vice versa.   
An interviewee from a school that did not have a dedicated 
emergency manager stated that he thought the university would benefit from 
having a dedicated emergency management manager.  He said the university 
was doing a lot of good work around emergency management, but it was not 
transparent.   
A risk manager stated that decision making would be improved by 
stepping back and looking at the “bigger picture”. She felt that attention needed 
to be given to determining what would interfere with core services, like police and 
fire response, and critical infrastructure, such as water and power supplies.  An 
emergency manager echoed a similar response.  He believed a more systematic 
approach to decision making would produce better justifications.  When asked 
how to make the process more systematic, he said by comparing the impacts of 
risks and the benefits of preparedness programs.  He then admitted that the 
proverbial “elephant in the room” was how to measure these things.  Specifically, 
he questioned, how does one measure losing less than what was actually lost?  
Another emergency manager shared this perspective.  She pointed out that it is 
difficult to prove or to demonstrate that a specific preparedness activity had an 
impact or would have an impact if implemented. 
Although not made in response to this specific question, one of the 
interviewees told a story about his institution’s recent evacuation efforts of 
researchers from Haiti.  He said his department, the police department, was not 
consulted when the planning was being discussed.  He was not critical of the 
decisions that were made but offered that he thought his office might have been 
able to assist the university with their evacuation planning efforts given the 
established professional relationships his department has with the State 
Department.  Because he was unaware of the planning, that potential resource 
was not utilized.    
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As previously discussed, one of the more innovative ideas for 
informing the decision-making process was the use of GIS.  Citing the oft quoted 
expression, “A picture is worth a thousand words,” the emergency manager 
noted that the use of GIS was very effective in convincing decision makers to 
invest in certain projects because they were able to see the anticipated impacts a 
hurricane or an earthquake would have on the campus.  His message was to use 
technology to show key decision makers how their decisions will impact the 
mission and core values of the institution using real, quantifiable data so that the 
decision makers can make optimal decisions.  This same emergency manager 
noted that there are well-versed scholars within HEIs whose knowledge and 
experience could be leveraged to inform the emergency management decision-
making process, as well as tackle some of the issues plaguing emergency 
management, but someone needs to bring the issues to the scholars so they 
could work on them.  This response highlights a key benefit that HEI emergency 
management programs have over many towns, cities and states: resources that 
could apply academic knowledge and expertise to real-world problems to benefit 
the HEI, as well as the greater community.  The other implied lesson in this 
example is that leadership is required to bring together entities that might not 
normally work together. 
2. Noteworthy Practices 
One emergency manager mentioned research being conducted by 
Professor Robin Dillon-Merrill,2 at the Georgetown Business School, who is using 
decision analytics to examine decision making during critical incidents from a 
systems engineering approach.  He thought that one of her projects was 
examining why people chose to evacuate, or not, during Hurricane Katrina and 
the relationship of this decision to the person’s past experiences with hurricanes.  
The exact nature of Dillon-Merrill’s research is not the significant aspect of his 
                                            
2
 Professor Dillon-Merrill obtained her PhD in Industrial Engineering and Engineering 
Management from Stanford University, the same program from which Raha obtained his PhD.    
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point; rather, it is the idea of using a system engineering approach to emergency 
management decision making.  His opinion was the field of emergency 
management has not matured to the point of using quantitative approaches to 
decision analysis. 
The other interesting program comes from the University of Oregon which 
has a robust GIS mapping system.  The Director of the Emergency Management 
program illustrated the power of GIS mapping for decision making with the 
example of plotting on a single overlaid map the location of research, the 
assessed value of the grant on which a given researcher was working, and 
building types.  This integrated map showed visually where the greatest risk 
potential existed for the institution.  This knowledge could be used to make 
mitigation decisions before a critical incident—such as reinforcing infrastructure 
or moving research to a different location.  Or, this information could be used to 
inform preparedness decisions—such as making certain locations the priority for 
developing business continuity plans or training people in the buildings how to 
respond to certain situations.  The other way in which this technology could be 
used is to allocate resources during an actual incident based upon pre-identified 
criteria—such as delivering a generator to a building where the value or criticality 
of the research being conducted is higher than at other places.  The interviewee 
gave a specific example in which he had mapped out the location, diameter, and 
the types of trees on campus.  When a high-wind advisory was issued, he was 
able to advise public safety officials prior to the incident that trees on campus 
were the ones that might be uprooted or have limbs break, thus creating a 
potential public safety hazard.  Public safety was able to restrict access to those 
identified areas during the high wind event. 
3. Summary of Findings 
Of all of the questions asked during the interview process, this one 
generated the most interesting and diverse set of responses.  The responses 
addressed the impact of experience on decision making; the need to educate 
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decision makers about available tools and resources; the need to expose 
decision makers to emergency situations and teach them how to make decisions 
during conditions of uncertainty; overcoming organizational culture and learned 
coping behaviors in order to make better decisions; collaboration as a tool for 
decision making; the importance of developing and using relationships to aid in 
decision making; the use of technology; using a systematic approach to decision 
making; understanding interdependencies; and the impact of organizational 
structure on decision making, specifically the need for an emergency 
management department. 
Based upon the responses from the interviewees in this study, HEIs did 
not utilize any type of a structured decision-making process to determine which 
preparedness activities to pursue.  Several of the interviewees indicated that their 
respective HEIs used risk assessment methodology to identify threats, hazards, 
and consequences and that these assessments informed decisions about which 
risks to address, but the specific ways in which risk assessments were used to 
inform decision making—including which risks to address or how to address 
them—were not explored in any detail.  Other than risk assessment 
methodology, the majority of the HEIs did not report utilizing any type of an 
analytical tool for evaluating the preparedness alternatives that might address the 
identified risks.  Why?  No one was aware of a tool that performed this function.  
There were two exceptions to the blanket statement: cost-benefit analysis and 
GIS mapping.  Neither of these alternatives completely addresses the issue of 
how to evaluate preparedness alternatives, but they do represent a more 
structured approach to decision making compared to decisions being made 
based upon conversation and consensus.  No one mentioned the STAPLEE 
cost-benefit review tool, which incorporates non-monetary criteria such as 
political and environmental impacts into the evaluation.   
Opinions about the practicability of using, not to mention developing, an 
analytical tool for evaluating preparedness activities were less than optimistic. 
The opinions which were offered were unsolicited, so it is possible that others 
 106 
might have had more optimistic opinions if they had been asked.  The downside 
of not endeavoring to create such a tool is that individuals will resort to using 
judgment and intuition to make these decisions.  Decision research has shown 
the individuals do not necessarily make optimal decisions.  Group-think and 
individual biases, such as the status-quo bias and the anchoring bias, are among 
the numerous ways in which psychological factors contribute to less than optimal 
decisions being made.   
In summary, the research questions did not illuminate a process for 
optimizing preparedness decision making.  What the research did reveal was a 
broad array of opinions about the way in which decisions can and should be 
made.  Some interviewees advocated for standards and a systematic approach 
to decision making and others believed the decisions about preparedness should 
be made on the basis of what seems reasonable or logical without the need for 
tools.   
E. DECISION-MAKING CRITERIA 
Two questions were posed to interviewees to determine the criteria being 
used to make pre-incident emergency management decisions:  What criteria do 
you think decision makers use when deciding which preparedness activities to 
pursue?  What criteria do you think decision makers should consider when 
deciding which preparedness activities to pursue?  Additionally, the question 
about institutional values will be included in this section.  The specific two-
pronged question that was asked was: “How does the institution define its core 
mission?  And, what are the institution’s core values?  The format for this section 
will be to list the question followed by the associated responses.  Included in the 
analysis are responses made to previously asked questions if the responses 
seemed relevant. 
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1. What Criteria Do You Think Decision Makers Use When 
Deciding Which Preparedness Activities to Pursue?    
One emergency manager stated, “Honestly, they rely upon my 
recommendations.”  Another stated, “I have no idea.”  Another interviewee 
offered that there is a tendency to respond to a sense of urgency brought on by a 
crisis or event, even external to the institution, that points to a vulnerability.  This 
sentiment was shared by several interviewees.  Although not in response to this 
question, one interviewee noted that she keeps prepared proposals in her desk 
drawer and presents them within two months of a significant incident because 
decision makers tend to be more receptive and more apt to allocate resources 
(spend money) in the wake of an incident, even if that incident did not take place 
at the given institution.  Although not expressed directly, the unspoken criterion 
illustrated by this example is the idea that a perception of vulnerability, often 
brought about by a recent activity, impacts decision making. 
More than half of the respondents mentioned institutional reputation and 
branding as being factors in the decision-making process.  Money was also 
mentioned as a deciding factor by most of the respondents.  One person pointed 
out that local, state, and national politics influenced the decision-making process 
as did the “disaster of the day.”  She added that sometimes her boss was the 
gatekeeper about what was pursued, and sometimes she was the person who 
decided what was a reasonable use of her time and efforts.  One Chief of Police 
noted that priorities are not the same for academicians and police, which leads to 
conflict and a lack of mutual understanding.   
A risk manager offered that decision makers took into consideration the 
expectations that would be needed to manage a minimal program (in the broad 
sense of the word) as well as generally accepted norms.  She also mentioned 
that the expectations that emerge from high-profile public events impact decision 
making.  She cited that in the post-Virginia Tech world, the expectation has 
become that a HEI will have a mass notification system.  Like other interviewees, 
she mentioned money as a determining factor, but she specified that decisions 
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were made based upon an individual’s perception of how much a program could 
be advanced with a given amount of money as opposed to any calculated return 
on investment.   
A couple of respondents stated that decision makers focused on preparing 
for the most likely incidents.  One of the schools in this study was located in a 
hurricane-prone zone, and it was clear from the interviewee’s responses that the 
likelihood of hurricanes and flooding were viewed as being real and likely threats.  
As a result, there was an institutional commitment, measured by resource 
availability and time spent preparing, to address mitigation and preparedness 
efforts around flooding and wind damage.   
Although not in response to this specific question, one interviewee noted 
that the university had engaged a consulting firm to conduct an enterprise-wide 
risk assessment in order to reduce insurance premiums.  This example illustrates 
that a specific outcome, reducing insurance premiums, was a criterion for 
investing resources in pre-incident emergency management activities.  This 
same emergency manager, also not in response to this direct question, 
mentioned that in anticipation of Y2K and then again in the wake of September 
11, there was a big push by the institution to focus on emergency management 
planning, including business continuity planning.  After a period of time, the 
interest waned.  The phenomenon of waning interest after an incident or 
anticipated incident has passed was mentioned by several interviewees in 
response to various questions.   
One individual spoke about the need to understand the values of the 
decision maker and his or her priorities.  She commented that through trial and 
error she had figured out that her boss was much more apt to approve requests 
for physical items as opposed to requests for additional people.  Once she 
figured this out, she adjusted her requests accordingly.  Along these same lines, 
another noted that a criterion was something that provides significant value of 
protection for the cost.  This emergency manager went on to note that when 
presenting a proposal to a decision maker, it is important to try and provide some 
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sense of value so that the decision maker can justify the expense.  He stated that 
it is difficult to put a value on life or days of school/work missed, repair costs, or 
damage costs, so he felt decisions were influenced by what other institutions 
were already doing as well as the potential for negative publicity for not having 
something in place, especially if other institutions had a particular program in 
place.   
Another respondent stated, “Cost is the first parameter.  Senior 
administrators will tell you safety and security is foremost, but it is really more 
about brand management and media relations.  Liability is third.”  This same 
respondent noted that there seems to be a different weighting scale used during 
an exercise than during an actual incident.  He believed that liability was thrust to 
the forefront during an exercise and was not the foremost consideration during 
an actual incident. 
Although not in response to this question, one respondent indicated that 
the President of his university had a close relative who experienced Hurricane 
Katrina firsthand.  He felt the President’s personal experience with a significant 
disaster, even if it was an indirect experience, had shaped the President’s 
decision making about the value of being prepared.  He also noted that the 
institution had prepared for several large-scale, planned events, which shaped 
the institution’s preparedness and planning for other types of events and created 
a commitment to planning.  The implication is that the pending nature of an event 
influences decision making as does personal experience. 
Compliance with mandates and compliance with terms of a grant were 
mentioned as factors decision makers consider when deciding which programs 
and initiatives to pursue. 
In summary, a wide variety of considerations were offered by the 
respondents, most of whom were not in the position to make funding decisions, 
about the criteria decision maker’s used when deciding which preparedness 
activities to pursue.  Money was an obvious consideration as was branding and  
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reputation; focusing on likely threats; addressing those risks that could be 
addressed with given resources; planning for pending and known events; impact 
of past events; liability or perceived liability; perceived value of engaging in a 
certain activity; and what other institutions were doing to be prepared.    
2. What Criteria Do You Think Decision Makers Should Consider 
When Deciding Which Preparedness Activities to Pursue?  
As with the previous question, responses to this question were diverse.  
One interviewee’s response was “Use common sense.  We can all see what is 
real and what is not.  Don’t come back and ask me to show or prove why a 
certain project is worth X amount of dollars….Use empathy, caring, sensitivity, 
concerned understanding, not money.”  Another respondent stated that the 
amount of risk an institution is willing to take should be communicated by 
decision makers.  Several persons mentioned the value of conducting risk 
assessments, identifying the most serious risks and systematically reducing 
those risks.  One respondent stated hard data should be considered, such as 
prior flooding or the number and severity of hurricanes.  Along this line of 
thinking, another emergency manager cautioned against chasing the “hazard 
dejour” and encouraged looking at a risk based decision analysis model that 
looked at the likelihood of an event; the risk exposure; and the cost of action and 
the cost of inaction.  Another person offered that the institution would benefit by 
determining where interdependencies exist, especially with respect to critical 
infrastructure.   
One interviewee spoke about using NFPA 1600 standards as well as the 
EMAP accreditation standards as benchmarks.  Another spoke about developing 
a strategic plan with subject matter experts and key decision makers and then 
working towards accomplishing the plan.  She mentioned the tendency to 
address the “low hanging fruit” while ignoring the “elephants in the room,” such 
as critical infrastructure interdependencies, because these more complex 
problems tend to be overwhelming and they also tend to be outside the sphere of 
control of one person or one department. 
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In summary, there was a diverse array of suggestions.  There seemed to 
be a desire on the part of the respondents to have a clearer, more defined picture 
of expectations and to have specific goals or objectives towards which to work.  
Some felt it was not possible, or at least it would be difficult, to quantity and 
measure the impact of preparedness activities on risk, and others thought more 
sophisticated analysis was needed, especially to show interdependencies. 
3. How Does the Institution Define Its Core Mission? And, What 
Are the Institution’s Core Values? 
The responses interviewees gave to these questions mirrored the 
institution’s mission and value statements as found on their institution’s 
respective Web sites.  In reviewing the various Web sites, most of the HEIs had 
well-developed mission and vision statements and several even had institutional 
strategic plans.  For purposes of illustrating the types of concepts contained 
within a HEI’s mission statement, the University of Oregon’s mission statement 
has been cited: 
• a commitment to undergraduate education, with a goal of helping 
the individual learn to question critically, think logically, 
communicate clearly, act creatively, and live ethically  
• a commitment to graduate education to develop creators and 
innovators who will generate new knowledge and shape experience 
for the benefit of humanity 
• a recognition that research, both basic and applied, is essential to 
the intellectual health of the university, as well as to the enrichment 
of the lives of Oregonians, by energizing the state’s economic, 
cultural, and political structure 
• the establishment of a framework for lifelong learning that leads to 
productive careers and to the enduring joy of inquiry 
• the integration of teaching, research, and service as mutually 
enriching enterprises that together accomplish the university’s 
mission and support its spirit of community 
• the acceptance of the challenge of an evolving social, political, and 
technological environment by welcoming and guiding change rather 
than reacting to it 
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• a dedication to the principles of equality of opportunity and freedom 
from unfair discrimination for all members of the university 
community and an acceptance of true diversity as an affirmation of 
individual identity within a welcoming community 
• a commitment to international awareness and understanding, and 
to the development of a faculty and student body that are capable 
of participating effectively in a global society 
• the conviction that freedom of thought and expression is the 
bedrock principle on which university activity is based 
• the cultivation of an attitude toward citizenship that fosters a caring, 
supportive atmosphere on campus and the wise exercise of civic 
responsibilities and individual judgment throughout life 
• a continuing commitment to affordable public higher education. 
(University of Oregon, n.d.) 
The following is a sampling of mission statements pulled from other HEI 
Web sites:  
The University was founded on the principle that serious and 
sustained discourse among people of different faiths, cultures, and 
beliefs promotes intellectual, ethical, and spiritual understanding. 
We embody this principle in the diversity of our students, faculty, 
and staff, our commitment to justice and the common good, our 
intellectual openness, and our international character. (Georgetown 
University, n.d.) 
Its object, to qualify its students for personal success, and direct 
usefulness in life; And its purposes, to promote the public welfare 
by exercising an influence in behalf of humanity and civilization, 
teaching the blessings of liberty regulated by law, and inculcating 
love and reverence for the great principles of government as 
derived from the inalienable rights of man to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. (Stanford University, 2010 )   
Concepts iterated in the mission statements of several other HEIs 
included:  create a sense of human solidarity and concern for the common good; 
teach students to think critically, objectively, and creatively and to be lifelong 
learners, engaged leaders and productive citizens; pursue research to advance 
knowledge and to address state, national and global challenges; serve the public 
through the generation, broad dissemination and application of knowledge; and 
cultivate a diverse community of learning and discovery that produces leaders 
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across the spectrum of human endeavor.  In addition to values embedded within 
the mission and vision statements, several HEIs specified their values in 
separate institutional value statements.  Some of these values included: diversity, 
excellence, collaboration, innovation, integrity, respect, and accountability.   
Interviewees were not specifically asked how the mission, vision, and 
values of the institution impacted decision making, but several interviewees 
made spontaneous statements.  One commented that performance appraisals 
centered on the institution’s values, but he was not certain if the institution’s 
espoused values drove the decision-making process for emergency 
management.  He was not willing to state that the decisions were not in line with 
the values; rather, it was not clear to him that the espoused values were 
consciously considered during the decision-making process.  Another stated that 
proposals for program or project funding had to demonstrate that the program or 
project fulfilled the institution’s mission.  Another respondent expressed some 
mild criticism that the university’s actions did not seem to resonate, at times, with 
the espoused values.  Another person offered a similar perspective in that she 
felt that the decisions that were made were likely in line with the institution’s 
values, but they might not have been made in order to be in line with those 
values.   
In summary, the mission and values of the HEIs represented in this study 
shared the common goal of education, which was expressed using different 
words, as well as broader goals such as conducting research that improves the 
human condition.  Values included concepts such as citizenship, ethics, and 
tolerance of diversity.  Institutional values were explicitly used to guide the 
emergency management decision making at a couple of the HEIs in this study 
and perhaps implicitly by others, although that is not certain.  
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F. BARRIERS TO PREPAREDNESS 
In terms of barriers to achieving greater preparedness, responses were 
varied to the question:  What are the barriers to reaching a greater level of 
preparedness?    
Money; time; constrained resources (people and equipment); executive 
attention; competing priorities; lack of leadership; human tendency for denial; and 
a lack of a common understanding of exposures were mentioned.  One person 
commented that there is never enough time to work on strategic initiatives 
because there is always a pressing matter with which to deal.  With respect to 
leadership, one respondent stated that the absence of clear directives and 
leaders to direct the process sometimes lead to a lack of follow through because 
people assumed someone else was taking responsibility.  She also commented 
that there is a need to get leaders and middle managers to view emergency 
management as an institutional responsibility.   
Several interviewees stated that the effectiveness of a presentation made 
to senior administrators was a determining factor, making the decision more 
about the effectiveness of the sales pitch and less about scientific rigor.  One 
emergency manager felt there was a lack of institutional guidance, which resulted 
in departments undertaking their own efforts, which sometimes equated to no 
efforts because people were not sure what to do or what was expected.  One risk 
manager spoke about the tendency to plan for the short-term rather than the 
long-term. 
One barrier to preparedness that seems patently obvious from the 
responses, but was only mentioned directly by one individual in response to this 
specific question, is the lack of a clear definition of preparedness and the lack of 
criteria to measure preparedness.  As this one person stated, “It hasn’t been 
defined, so it can’t be measured.”  Given the myriad definitions of preparedness 
that exist coupled with the broad spectrum of potential risks for which an  
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institution might prepare, it is not completely surprising that institutions have not 
defined preparedness.  It is challenging, however, to make optimal decisions in 
the absence of a clearly defined, desired end-state. 
Although not in response to this question, a police chief made the 
following comment about risk assessments: 
I hope you have a lawyer in the room.  My concern is that once you 
have identified the risk, then the institution is on notice.  There’s a 
huge difference between knowing about a risk and doing nothing to 
mitigate it and not knowing that a risk exists. 
Concerns about liability surfaced in several areas.  This same chief also 
noted that a lack of collaboration had a negative impact on preparedness.  
Specifically, she stated that different departments are all competing for the same 
limited pool of money.  She thought it would be more effective if groups came 
together, decided upon strategies and priorities, and worked together to tackle 
projects that would benefit the institution.   
In summary, those familiar with emergency management at HEIs identified 
a variety of potential barriers to enhanced levels of preparedness.   
Organizational barriers included: limited resources (people), competition for 
constrained resources, a lack of collaboration, and a lack of clarity regarding 
roles and responsibilities. Strategic barriers included: the need for leadership and 
executive attention, a lack of understanding of institutional interdependencies 
and exposures, and a tendency to make decisions using a short time horizon 
rather than focusing on longer term planning.  Process barriers included: a lack 
of specific objectives and desired outcomes; the lack of a structured process for 
making decisions, especially a process based upon scientific rigor and data; and 
a tendency to make decisions in response to recent events or from a place of 
denial regarding the potential for events to occur as well as the impact of those 
events. 
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
In order to discover how to better evaluate proposed emergency 
management preparedness activities specifically at HEIs, this research sought to 
understand how HEIs are currently making these types of decisions as well as 
the ways in which individuals who are familiar with the field of emergency 
management at HEIs believe the decision-making process could be improved.  It 
was assumed that several factors would influence how and what decisions were 
made.  This research focused on four areas: organizational structure, strategic 
planning, decision-making processes, and decision-making criteria, including 
institutional values.  The following is a summary of the general findings reviewed 
in this chapter.  
With respect to organizational structure, the research revealed that 
organizational structure influenced decision making insofar as the structure 
determined who was involved, or not involved, with the decision-making process, 
but there was no indication from this small sample population that a particular 
organizational structure contributed to optimal decisions being made.  The 
emergency preparedness guidance literature specific to HEIs recommends that 
representatives from various stakeholder groups within the HEI be included in the 
planning process.  Stakeholders would include faculty, staff and students as well 
as representatives from different functional groups such as police, fire, 
emergency management, environmental health, and safety and senior 
administration.  Most of the HEIs had emergency management committees, but 
the composition varied as did the function of the emergency management 
committee.  Institutional clarity regarding roles and responsibilities for off-campus 
facilities and branch campuses was lacking.  Clarifying these roles would 
enhance institutional knowledge.  
With respect to strategic planning, the research showed that only two of 
the 10 HEIs engaged in a strategic planning process that resulted in a strategic 
plan being developed and available for public viewing.  It was not clear if these 
plans contributed to optimal preparedness decisions being made, but the plans 
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did contain a level of specificity regarding goals and objectives that, if followed, 
would likely contribute to enhanced levels of preparedness.     
With respect to decision-making processes, none of the HEIs indicated 
they engaged in any specific type of structured decision-making process.  
Rather, decisions seemed to be made based upon consensus or by a decision 
maker in response to a presentation that had been given on a specific program 
or project.  No one was aware of a tool for evaluating preparedness alternatives.  
Opinions about the potential value and effectiveness of an analytical tool that 
would enable this type of an evaluation were mixed, although this finding was 
based upon statements made spontaneously and not in response to a specific 
question.  A couple of individuals indicated the field of emergency management 
would benefit from a more systematic approach that capitalized upon science 
and technology. Others thought that the level of uncertainty associated with 
emergency management preparedness planning made it challenging, if not 
unrealistic, to apply a formalized decision-making process and expect that it 
would produce decisions that were any more optimal than the way in which 
decisions are made without such a tool.   
In terms of decision-making criteria, responses were diverse.  Money was 
an obvious consideration as was branding or reputation.  Other criteria included: 
focusing on likely threats; addressing those risks that could be addressed with 
given resources; planning for pending and known events; impact of past events; 
liability or perceived liability; perceived value of engaging in a certain activity; and 
what other institutions were doing to be prepared.  Several of the HEIs indicated 
that the institution’s values were intentionally considered when making 
preparedness decisions, others were not certain and still others did not believe 
these values were considered.    
In summary, the results of this research did not reveal any definitive 
organizational structures, strategic planning practices, decision-making 
processes, or decision-making criteria specific to HEIs that would lead to optimal 
preparedness decisions being made, but aspects of what was uncovered could 
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be incorporated into a framework that would enable decision makers to evaluate 
preparedness alternatives in order to make optimal decisions.  Several 
interesting ideas—such as the use of GIS, having a faculty member manage the 
emergency management program, and structuring an emergency management 
program around ESFs—were discovered that might of interest to other HEIs 
even if they were not incorporated into a process for evaluating preparedness 
alternatives.  Integrating the results of this study with the information gleaned 
during the literature review, the following chapter will present a rudimentary 
framework for evaluating emergency management preparedness alternatives 
developed by blending traditional decision analysis methodologies with Raha’s 
2010 concept of starting the decision-making process by clarifying intrinsic 
values and building a value diagram.    
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V. DECISION ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents a rudimentary framework for evaluating pre-incident 
emergency management preparedness activities.  The framework was 
developed using decision analysis concepts and is based upon the information 
gathered during the course of the research combined with aspects of the 
researcher’s personal knowledge about emergency management and the way in 
which a HEI functions.  This chapter will address the following questions: 
• Using value diagrams, how might we clarify the value frame in 
emergency decision making?  
• How might we create decision diagrams that are consistent with a 
value diagram and could possibly be shared across different 
emergency management contexts?  
• How might we get clarity of action on a specific emergency 
mitigation decision? 
B. VALUE DIAGRAMS 
For purposes of illustration, the value diagram of Stanford University’s 
President (Figure 15), which was presented earlier, will be used as the starting 
point for illustrating the way in which a value diagram could be used to clarify the 
value frame in emergency decision making, as well as how to create a decision 
diagram that is consistent with a value diagram (2010).  As a reminder, Raha 
created this diagram after interviewing the President of Stanford University.  The 
fundamental or intrinsic values that guided the decision making of the university 





















Figure 15.   University Decision Maker’s Value Diagram (After Raha, 2010) 
Based upon the responses provided by the interviewees in this research 
project, the fundamental values of an emergency management program at a HEI 
could be considered to be: to protect lives, to protect property, and to preserve 
the institution’s reputation.  If these were to be determined to be intrinsic values 










Figure 16.   Conceptual Value Diagram for HEI Emergency Management 
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C. BUILDING A DECISION DIAGRAM FROM A VALUE DIAGRAM  
This section will illustrate how to build a decision diagram from a value 
diagram.  For simplicity, one branch of the value diagram shown in Figure 15 will 
be expanded.  Raha (2010) calls this process “unpacking a node.”  The node, 
which will be “unpacked,” will be the one titled “prosperity of the university.”  In 
Figure 17, the blue circles represent the ways in which the prosperity of the 
university takes place.  Donations (development), student tuition, portfolio 
performance, and grants from sponsored research are some of the major ways in 
which the prosperity of a university can be created.  These examples are not 
exhaustive and could be altered by a more thorough analysis.  Following in the 
spirit of Raha’s “rules” for drawing value diagrams, only intrinsic value nodes may 
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Figure 17.   Value Diagram to Decision Diagram—Prosperity of the University 
The next diagram (Figure 18) shows the ways in which the prosperity of 
the university can be impacted, primarily through major expenditures such as 
business operating costs (salaries, contracts, utilities, etc…), building 
construction, maintenance, and liability.  Facilities could be included within the 
business operating cost node but was purposefully listed as a separate node 
because of an influence that will be seen in the next diagram.  Building upon the 








Yield %  












Figure 18.   Value Diagram to Decision Diagram—Expenditures 
The next diagram (Figure 19) shows the way in which perceptions might impact 
outcomes.  Reputation was mentioned by several of the individuals interviewed 
as part of this research project as a factor that decision makers either use or 
should use when making decisions, so it was specifically included in this 
diagram.  Upon reviewing the diagram, a senior level administrator added 
“perception of safety” as a consideration distinct from reputation.  He stated that 
the perception of safety was a factor that influenced students and their parents 
when they were deciding between elite universities, which, in turn, impacted the 
student yield percentage, which, in turn, impacted the prosperity of the university.  
This distinction might not be included in another decision maker’s diagram.  The 
point was raised that the perception of safety also influenced some faculty 
members’ decisions to accept an offer of employment at one institution over 
another.  Because people often think “crime” when they hear the words “safety,” 
it is worth noting that at least for some individuals, safety also includes safety 
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Figure 19.   Value Diagram to Decision Diagram—Reputation and Perception 
The precipitating critical incident and traumatic outcomes have been added to the 
diagram in Figure 20.  It is also worth noting that a distinction was not made 
initially between natural disasters and man-made incidents, but as the diagram 
evolved, it became clear that a distinction was warranted.  For example, there 
might be different values attached to the perception of safety in connection with 
the threat of an active killer situation as compared to the threat of an earthquake.  
Another refinement to the conceptual decision diagram that occurred after the 
inclusion of the critical incident is that the facilities node was altered to represent 
facilities damage.  The rationale for this change is that the quality and type of 
facilities can impact faculty recruitment, especially in the sciences where lab 
space is important.  If a faculty member is deciding between two institutions, the 
type of facilities available to her could be a determining factor in her decision.  
Conversely, in the wake of a disaster, especially one that results in significant 
damage that might not be readily repaired, an institution risks losing faculty 
members to competing institutions.  The loss of faculty members has potential 
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consequences including: costs to fill the position, loss of sponsored research, 
and the impact on student yield rates.  With respect to the latter, some students 
decide which educational institution to attend based upon whether a specific 
faculty member is employed by the HEI or not.  If a faculty member elects to 
leave one HEI for another, some students (namely graduate students) may 
follow.  Many institutions care about the quality or caliber of students in addition 
to the number of students.  Thus, damage to facilities can have an impact on the 
quality of research or teaching.  The diagram shown in Figure 20 also adds a 
value dimension to measure the intrinsic value of the quality of education.  This 
distinction came about after discussions with a Provost about the quality of 
education as compared to the mission of education.  Such a distinction might not 








































Yield %  




Figure 20.   Value Diagram to Decision Diagram—Precipitating Emergency 
Event and Trauma Impact 
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In the aforementioned diagram (Figure 20), it is important to point out the 
distinction between the “# and severity of traumatic outcomes” and “trauma 
disvalue.”  The “# and severity of traumatic outcomes” is a prudential or systemic 
value that can be quantified using commonly accepted practices.  For example, 
severity could be measured by hospital treatment costs per injury.  This node 
could be further refined to indicate hospital costs for trauma and the cost of the 
loss of a life.  This node could be refined even further to represent the costs 
covered by insurance and costs not covered by insurance.  “Trauma disvalue,” 
on the other hand, is the amount of money a decision maker would be willing to 
spend in order to prevent someone from being injured.  This value would be 
based upon a personal preference, which in this case is being shown as an 
intrinsic value.  This attribute might appear to be nonsensical to some, but people 
make these types of financial tradeoffs unconsciously all the time.  Consider, for 
example, that individuals are often willing to pay hundreds of dollars over the 
face value of a concert ticket in order to be able to see their favorite musical artist 
perform from the front row seats.  Similarly, people pay more for a home or a 
hotel room that has an ocean view compared to a home or hotel room in the 
same vicinity that does not offer the attractive view.  The value of these trade-offs 
is in the mind of the decision maker.  What is intriguing about including a node for 
an intrinsic value in the decision diagram is that it provides a mechanism for 
measuring factors that are often hard to measure—such as quality of education, 
or the political costs of a decision or the social value (or disvalue) of a decision or 
the value of knowledge.  Granted, some might balk at the idea of reducing these 
types of considerations to dollars.  The school of decision analysis from which 
Raha (2010) received his education argues that reducing trade-offs to a common 
variable (money) forces a decision maker to examine what really matters. 
The next diagram (Figure 21) is intended to illustrate the idea that the 
purpose of a preparedness or mitigation tool or program is to influence the 
system.  To keep the original value diagram developed by Raha (2010) intact, 


























































Figure 21.   Value Diagram to Decision Diagram—Impact of Intervention on 
System 
The next diagram (Figure 22) represents specific ways in which a program 
or tool might impact the risk (threat, vulnerability, and likelihood) of a critical 
incident.  Depending on the tool, there could be additional factors that could be 




















Figure 22.   Value Diagram to Decision Diagram—Impact of Intervention Tool 
Blending the diagrams in Figure 20 and Figure 22 produces the 
conceptual diagram shown in Figure 23.  The lines illustrating the influence of the 
tool have been drawn thicker in Figure 23 to highlight their effect.  In this 
example, the tool is expected to impact the number of people exposed to risk, 
which, in turn, impacts the number of people who might be injured, which, in turn, 
impacts liability claims, which ultimately impacts the prosperity of the university.  
A similar effect might be expected with respect to the tool having a mitigating 
effect on the impact of a critical incident, which ultimately impacts the prosperity 
of the university, which ultimately impacts the ability of the university to perform 
its fundamental mission of education.  What should be apparent is that the visual 
diagram captures the interconnectedness of decisions much more effectively  
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than a written description.  Additionally, the process of developing the decision 
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Figure 23.   Value Diagram to Decision Diagram—Impact of Intervention on 
Value 
A decision maker could focus solely on costs without the intrinsic nodes—
coercion disvalue, trauma disvalue, and educational mission value—which would 
result in the conceptual diagram shown in Figure 24.  Note that the value being 
determined in this model is the prosperity of the university, which is not unlike 



































































Figure 24.   Decision Diagram without Value Attributes 
The conceptual decision diagrams that have been shown thus far are 
quite complex and they do not adhere strictly to the formal principles of decision 
analysis for drawing and building decision diagrams; they could, however, be 
converted into true decision diagrams by following these axioms and verifying 
accurate decision analysis notations have been used.  For purposes of 
illustrating how decision analysis could be used to evaluate preparedness 
alternatives, a simplified example (Figure 25) will be referenced throughout the 
remainder of this chapter.   
D. EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES 
1. Framing the Decision 
Most of the interviewees in this study mentioned saving lives as a 
fundamental desired outcome of emergency management.  Using a reduction in 
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trauma as the desired outcome, the decision represented in Figure 26, which 
does not yet include the “trauma disvalue node” seen in Figure 25, can be 
summarized by the question: “Using trauma as the predominant measurement 
criterion, what is the value of emergency management intervention Y?”  Included 
in the decision is the probability (uncertainty) that a given event will take place, 
which is represented by the node titled “Emergency,” and the probability that 
trauma will be reduced by the intervention, which is represented by the node 
titled “Success|Intervention.” “Success|Intervention” stands for “success given 
the intervention.”  Also included in the decision is the price of the tool, which is 
represented by the deterministic node “price of the tool.”  The node 
“implementation cost | intervention” represents the cost to implement the tool.  
This node could be calculated using the salary data of those involved with the 
implementation and any “hard” costs such as computers or other physical 
resources.  The questions contained within the diagram are as follows:  What is 
the probability of a given emergency taking place (“emergency”)?  If that 
emergency takes place, what do we believe about the distribution of serious 
injuries (# traumatic outcomes”)—would they be high, medium, or low (and we 
could put numbers on each)?  Given a level on the number of injuries, what are 
the likely treatment costs (“trauma treatment costs”)?  To decide whether to 
invest in a given intervention, the price of the tool and the cost of implementation 
must be determined.  And finally, taking all of these considerations into account, 

























Figure 25.   Emergency Management Intervention Decision Diagram without 
Value Attribute 
Figure 25 illustrates a decision based solely upon cost.  What impact does 
an individual’s intrinsic value on trauma to others have on this decision?  As 
previously mentioned, individuals are often willing to pay hundreds of dollars over 
the face value of a concert ticket in order to be able to see their favorite musical 
artist perform.  The value of the ticket is not the purchase price, but the most that 
the purchaser is willing to pay for the ticket.  Applying this line of thinking to the 
emergency management decision being examined, a decision maker might have 
strong personal feelings about preventing harm to others.  His feelings about this 
issue could be so intrinsic to his being that he would be willing to pay to prevent 
harm from occurring to others.  Figure 26 incorporates the disvalue of trauma into 




Figure 26.   Emergency Management Intervention Decision Diagram with Value 
Attribute 
2. Analyzing the Decision 
This section will be divided into two parts.  The first part will analyze one 
alternative and provide five examples of how the final value of the intervention is 
altered by changing the input variables.  The second part will describe how 
various interventions (alternatives) can be compared to one another in order to 
assist a decision maker choose between different options.  The results shown in 
all of the examples in this section were reached using a computational model 
built by Raha (2010) specifically to solve the decision diagram Figure 26.    
Figure 27 shows the various possible input variables for the model as well 
as the calculated outputs.  The green rectangles are the inputs and the bright 
green rectangle (which turns to red if the value is a negative number) titled 
“Value of Intervention” shows the calculated value of the intervention.  In 
Example 1, the intervention is assumed to be 100 percent successful.  If the 
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decision maker does not believe that the intervention will be successful in 
achieving these results, she can input the anticipated success of the intervention 
as being less than 1.0 in the input box labeled “Probability of Success of 
Intervention.”  The consequence of entering a probability of success that is less 
than 100 percent is that the number of traumas that are anticipated to be reduced 
by the introduction of the intervention will not be as high.  In other words, more 
people will be injured if the intervention is not 100 percent successful, which will 
increase trauma costs.  As shown in Figure 27, there are a number of other 
variables included in the computational model that contribute to the final 
valuation:  the probability of the emergency, risk-taking attitude (preference), risk 
tolerance, the price of the intervention, implementation costs, the probability the 
intervention will be successful, the anticipated reductions in injuries given 
success of the intervention, and the trauma disvalue.   
a. Analysis of a Single Intervention Decision 
For purposes of illustration, the emergency scenario will be an 
earthquake and the intervention being considered will be a mass notification 
system.  The time frame will be constrained to be over the course of the next five 
years.  All values are hypothetical.   
(1).  Example 1.  Figure 27 shows the input variables used in 
this example.  Based upon the given inputs, the value of the intervention is 
$3,925, as shown in the green rectangle.  The positive number means that the 
value of the intervention exceeds the cost of the intervention, although not by a 
very large margin.  A negative number would have indicated that the intervention 
costs were more than the anticipated benefits.  Using trauma costs as the only 
value being considered, the results indicate that purchasing the mass notification 
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Figure 27.   Valuation Results Example 1 
(2)  Example 2—Risk Attitude.  The specific input variables 
used in example 2 as well as the anticipated value of the intervention can be 
found in Appendix B (Figure 30).  In example 2, the only input variable that was 
altered was the decision maker’s preference or attitude about risk.  The 
significance of this variable is that it allows for personal preferences regarding 
risk to be factored into the decision.  A decision maker’s preferences would be 
discovered during conversations with the decision maker.  In the first example, 




change causes the final valuation to shift from being a positive investment of 
$3,925 to a negative investment of $3,750.  Theoretically, the decision maker 
should not invest in the tool if the value is a negative number.    
(3)  Example 3—Probability of Event and Success of 
Intervention.  The specific input variables used in example 3 as well as the 
anticipated value of the intervention can be found in Appendix B (Figure 31).  In 
this example, the probability of success of the intervention was set at .8 (80 
percent) and the probability of an earthquake occurring was set at .5 (50 
percent).  The value of the intervention with these inputs is negative $88,598, 
significantly less than the value of the intervention when it was assumed that the 
probability of success of the intervention was 100 percent and the likelihood of 
the emergency taking place was also 100 percent.  Most decision makers would 
not be able to make this type of determination in their heads without the use of a 
decision support tool.  If trauma is the only value being considered, then the 
results of this model would indicate that purchasing the mass notification system 
would not be a worthwhile investment.   
(4)  Example 4—Increasing Trauma Disvalue.  The 
calculations for Example 4 can be found in Appendix B (Figure 32).  In the first 
three examples, trauma disvalue was set at $0.  Example 4 was included to show 
how much money a person would need to be willing to expend, using the same 
inputs that were used in the previous examples, to have the value of the 
intervention become neutral.  In reality, placing money on the table, so to speak, 
does not guarantee a change in the outcome.  The point of including this number 
is to demonstrate the value of paying for the “ocean view,” which in this case is 
the value a decision maker would be willing to pay so that no one suffers an 
injury.  This number could also be interpreted as representing the level of trauma, 
in dollars, a decision maker must be willing to accept if the only available tool 
being applied to a problem is the mass notification system.  The trauma disvalue 
to make the value of the intervention neutral was $131,367 for the first person.   
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(5)  Example 5—Capped Trauma Disvalue.  The calculations 
for example 5 can be found in Appendix B (Figure 33).  In Example 4, trauma 
disvalue was modeled using the assumption that a person would be willing to 
spend more money to prevent high trauma numbers relative to the amount of 
money she would be willing to spend to prevent a fewer number of traumas.  
Example 5 was included to show how altering this assumption impacts the final 
valuation.  In this example, the decision maker has placed a ceiling or cap on the 
amount of money he is willing to spend to prevent trauma to others.  If the cap 
were to be set at $2,039,720, then the value of the intervention becomes $0.  
The trauma disvalue for the first injury is $99,478.   
3. Comparing Alternatives  
a. Comparing Alternatives—Example 1 
This section shows how a series of emergency management 
alternatives can be compared to one another based upon the value/cost ratios.  
This type of comparison can assist a decision maker choose between 
alternatives when confronted with multiple potential options.  The input variables 
and calculations used to create the graph displayed in Figure 28 can be found in 
Appendix B (see Figures 34, 35, and 36).  For purposes of illustration, the three 
alternatives are being considered: a CERT program (see Figure 34), a mass 
emergency notification system (see Figure 35), and the purchase of a risk 
assessment/business continuity tool (see Figure 36).  Again, the value being 
calculated is based solely upon trauma costs.  In the example below, the impact 
of the intervention on the number of traumas was kept constant.  All values are 
hypothetical.   
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Figure 28.   Comparing Alternatives Example 1—Cumulative Value to Cost 
Comparison for Three Emergency Preparedness Activities 
The ratios shown in the graph are predicated upon the decision 
maker’s beliefs about the expected reduction in traumas given a specific 
intervention, as well as the cost of the intervention, including implementation 
costs.  The intervention that provides the highest benefit to cost ratio is the CERT 
program, followed by the emergency notification program, and then the risk 
assessment /business continuity tool.  The graph also shows that if the CERT 
program and the emergency notification system were both implemented, the total 
cumulative cost of both programs would be $290,000 and the expected 
combined value of both programs would be $297,079.  The decision maker is 
then faced with the decision of investing $297K for a return on the investment of 
$7,097.   
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b. Comparing Alternatives—Example 2 
For purposes of illustration, the anticipated reduction in the number 
of injuries was increased for the risk assessment / business continuity tool (see 
input variables in Figure 37).  The input variables and calculations used to create 
the graph displayed in Figure 29 can be found in Appendix B (see Figures 34, 35, 
and 37).  As seen in the graph (Figure 29), the reduction in the number of injuries 
has a significant impact on the overall value of this intervention and causes the 
mass emergency notification system and the business continuity tool to switch 
places, and causes the mass emergency notification system to become the least 
attractive alternative based upon a value/cost ratio.  Again, it is highly unlikely 
that most decision makers would be able to make this type of assessment 
without a tool. 
 
Figure 29.   Comparing Alternatives Example 2—Cumulative Value to Cost 
Comparison for Three Alternative Emergency Preparedness Activities 
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4. Making the Decision 
Using Example 1 for illustration, given that the decision is related to life 
safety, a decision maker would likely make the decision to invest in both a CERT 
program and an emergency notification system because lives would be saved 
without an unreasonable expenditure.  If the investment did not have a nexus to 
a fundamental or intrinsic value for the decision maker, a profit of $7,097 on a 
$290K investment might not be as attractive to a decision maker.  The distinction 
between a fundamental value and a prudential value comes into play at this point 
in the decision-making process, which illustrates one potential value of Raha’s 
(2010) proposed methodology of clarifying values as part of the decision-making 
process.  
5. Summary 
The examples in this section were provided to illustrate how minor 
changes in attitudes and beliefs can impact the anticipated value of a given 
decision.  Without the benefit of an analytical tool, the impact of these minor 
changes would not be readily apparent to most individuals.  In addition to gaining 
a better understanding about a single alternative, the results from the model can 
also be used to compare several alternatives.  This comparison provides a 
decision maker with an even more robust understanding of the value of the 
possible alternatives from which she may choose.    
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This thesis took the position that because of the ubiquitous presence of 
HEIs throughout the United States, HEIs are positioned to contribute to the 
nation’s preparedness in at least two ways:  
1. By influencing the preparedness behaviors of the over 18 million 
students who enroll in degree granting post-secondary educational 
institutions each year by modeling preparedness behaviors; and  
2. By being prepared organizations within their own communities.   
The intent of this research project was to gather information about the 
ways in which HEIs are currently making emergency preparedness decisions and 
how those most familiar with emergency management at HEIs think that these 
decisions should be made in order to develop an analytical tool specific to HEIs 
that would enable decision makers to evaluate proposed preparedness 
alternatives in order to determine the best course of action for the HEI. The 
underlying assumption of this approach is that the use of an analytical tool will 
lead to one of two primary outcomes:  
1. upon seeing the positive value (benefit) of a given activity, a 
decision maker will invest in that preparedness activity, which will 
contribute to the HEI being better prepared to prevent, respond to 
and recover from man-made and natural disasters, which will, in 
turn, contribute to the community’s preparedness; or,  
2. upon determining that the proposed activity would not benefit the 
HEI, the HEI decision maker(s) will make an informed decision not 
to invest resources into that preparedness activity, which will 
minimize wasteful expenditures.   
Regardless of the actual outcome of the analysis, the intent was to 
develop a tool that would enable this type of assessment to be performed so that 
decision makers can make optimal decisions on behalf of the HEI.     
Decision research has indicated that humans are apt to make less than 
optimal decisions, especially when faced with assessing risk and uncertainty, so 
the assumption was that a normative based approach would assist decision 
makers make better decisions than they would make without the use of such a 
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tool.  Decision analysis was selected as an approach for developing the model 
because it offers a normative approach to decision making.  Additionally, 
decision analysis was selected because it offers the ability to incorporate 
uncertainty and preferences into the analysis of a decision, as compared to 
simplistic weight-and-rate multi-criteria methods that lack this ability; it offers the 
ability to depict a decision visually in a way that shows the interdependencies 
that exist in a decision; and it affords a mechanism for understanding how 
changing one’s beliefs and preferences with respect to different variables 
contained within the decision impacts the final valuation.  Raha’s (2010) work on 
value diagrams was valuable to the development of this framework because it 
offered a method to incorporate intangible preferences and, more importantly, to 
clarify and communicate the intrinsic values that are in the minds of individual 
stakeholders involved in the decision-making process.  Clarifying individual and 
institutional values should lead to a reduction in the amount of time spent 
debating in the realm of systemic and prudential values when the heart of a 
disagreement about a given course of action really stems from differences in 
intrinsic values.  Additionally, once intrinsic values have been identified and 
agreed upon for the purposes of organizational decision-making, the framework 
can help ensure that subsequent decisions are consistent with these underlying 
intrinsic values.  As a reminder, decision analysis does not profess or try to 
predict the future; rather, it affords a process consistent with the norms of good 
decision making for making the best decision possible at the present time with 
the information that is and can be known. 
The persons who were interviewed for this research included emergency 
managers, police chiefs, and one risk manager.  Interviewees were asked a 
predetermined set of questions, but the structure of the interviews, most of which 
were conducted by phone, also allowed for discussion and the inclusion of 
information that had not specifically been solicited.  When developing the 
questions to ask interviewees, it was assumed that several factors would 
influence the decision-making process relative to preparedness including, but not 
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limited to: the organizational structure of the emergency management program, 
strategic plans specific to emergency management, decision-making processes, 
and specific criteria for determining which activities to pursue.  The final set of 
assumptions preceding this research was that the responses to the interview 
questions would contribute to a comprehensive picture of the current state of 
emergency preparedness planning at HEIs; that some common themes and 
patterns would emerge; and that these commonalities would be the ones that 
would be incorporated into an analytical framework.   
The interviews produced a broad and diverse set of responses, including 
several interesting concepts, and the responses did afford an overview of 
aspects of emergency management programs at 10 HEIs, but the pervasive 
themes and patterns that were anticipated did not emerge.  In fact, there was a 
fair amount of diversity in the content of responses.  Taking this diversity into 
account, a rudimentary conceptual decision diagram for evaluating preparedness 
alternatives was developed using the information gleaned from the interviews as 
well as the researcher’s personal knowledge about emergency management and 
university operations.  The conceptual decision diagram that was created to 
depict the interdependencies that exist within a HEI and how a preparedness 
intervention might impact the system was quite complex.  For simplicity, a branch 
of the overall diagram was selected to demonstrate how a decision analysis 
would be performed.  Trauma to individuals was selected as the factor to be 
evaluated.  This criterion was selected because reducing harm to individuals is 
one of the fundamental principles of preparedness and would likely be an 
intrinsic value for most decision makers.  The decision diagram was simplified 
and refined.  A computational model was then created for this simplified decision 
diagram with the assistance of Raha.  Five examples were shown in this paper to 
demonstrate how even minor alterations to just one distinction—such as the 
probability that an emergency event will take place, or the anticipated reduction 
in the number of injuries as a result of implementing an intervention—can have 
significant impacts on the final valuation.  These types of impacts would not be 
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readily apparent to most individuals without the assistance of a tool, which is why 
this thesis has advocated for the development of an analytic tool to assist 
decision makers optimize decisions that are made about which preparedness 
alternative to pursue.   
In terms of next steps, principles of decision analysis that were not 
covered in this paper—such as the use of the tornado diagram and sensitivity 
analysis—would allow for the more complex diagram to be simplified to reflect 
those aspects that have the greatest impact on the final valuation.  This exercise 
would be worthwhile as it reduces the complexity of the model as well as reduces 
the amount of information that must be gathered in order to make an informed 
decision.  In other words, every nuance included in an initial conceptual decision 
diagram need not be evaluated because of the minor influence some factors 
have on the final valuation.  Having someone adept in decision analysis work 
with a group of HEI emergency managers and decision makers to further refine 
the decision diagram could lead to the development of a more refined tool that 
would prove to be useful for HEIs.  Integrating Raha’s (2010) work regarding 
clarifying intrinsic institutional values might offer a worthwhile starting point for 
conducting this analysis.   
Moving away from the idea of using the results from the interviews to 
develop an analytical tool that utilizes a normative approach to decision making 
and looking at ways to enhance preparedness decision making independent from 
a tool, the results of this study, combined with insights gleaned from the literature 
review, provide several potential areas for improved preparedness decision 
making at HEIs.   
From an organizational perspective, the absence of a dedicated 
emergency manager or emergency management department could result in 
emergency management preparedness “falling through the cracks” because no 
one has direct responsibility for focusing on emergency management and 
preparedness.  Evidence of this possibility was seen with the lack of clarity 
regarding responsibility for emergency management planning for the off-site 
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facilities and branch campuses at many of the HEIs in this study.  At the same 
time, while the existence of a formal or dedicated emergency management 
department could be perceived as representing an institution’s commitment to 
emergency management, this arrangement could also mask an institution’s 
commitment to emergency management.  If senior level administrators believe 
that they have addressed emergency management by creating a department and 
hiring people to address the issue, they may disengage from the emergency 
management planning process.  By comparison, the senior level administrators 
at HEIs that do not have a dedicated department might feel more responsibility 
for emergency management because the burden and responsibility for ensuring 
the HEIs’ preparedness falls directly on their shoulders; so they remain engaged 
in the decision-making process.  This observation about formalized emergency 
management departments merely stands as a cautionary warning to senior level 
administrators not to be lulled into a false sense of preparedness based on the 
fact that the institution has committed resources to an emergency management 
program.   
Guidelines from the U.K. noted that smaller/less complex institutions have 
tended to adopt top-down risk management processes, suggesting that risk 
management processes are overlaid onto existing management processes rather 
than being truly embedded (HEFCE, 2005).  The results of this research did not 
necessarily support the idea that the size of the institution determines whether 
the process is overlaid or embedded.  In fact, although the specific question was 
not posed, based upon the responses to other questions, emergency 
management did not appear to have been integrated into the overall operational 
culture of any of the HEIs in this study.  The significance of this point is not to 
distinguish between how smaller and larger institutions approach emergency 
management, but rather to stress that an emergency management program that 
has become embedded into the overall operational culture of the HEI, if not the 
day-to-day operations, will result in greater institutional awareness and 
involvement and will likely result in higher levels of preparedness compared to a 
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top-down or overlaid process.  The idea of embedding risk management into the 
organizational culture of a HEI by requiring department level risk assessments; 
engaging in a bottom-up/top-down review; tying the review to the annual budget 
cycle; and even making risk management or emergency management part of the 
annual performance evaluation for all employees were some of the most 
compelling ideas that emerged from the literature review.  These ideas did not 
surface during the interviews as practices that had been adopted by the HEIs 
involved in this research.   
In terms of roles and responsibilities, there was evidence of “stove piping” 
of information regarding institutional risks and strategies being employed to 
address those risks.  There are several disadvantages of this model: pockets of 
individuals could be duplicating work on projects that might be similar in nature, 
resulting in inefficient uses of time and resources; or working on projects that 
have overlapping impacts, which might be enhanced by a more collaborative and 
collective approach; or, because individuals assume that someone else is 
addressing a particular matter, no one ends up addressing the risk at all.  Given 
the myriad risks and interdependencies that exist within a HEI, the emergency 
manager, if there is one, should be involved with, or at least be advised about 
and be aware of, the content of the institution’s risk assessment as well as 
informed, if not consulted, on which risks are being addressed and how they are 
being addressed.  The results of this research did not indicate that emergency 
managers were expected to perform this type of a role at the HEIs involved in 
this study although a couple indicated that they thought that they should.    
The recommendations made thus far are associated with a more 
centralized and perhaps somewhat regulatory approach to emergency 
management.  None of the emergency managers in this study appeared to have 
the institutional authority to mandate that certain preparedness activities be 
performed.  Thus, to accomplish their goals, they relied upon persuasion to 
garner buy-in and participation. Although driven by necessity, this decentralized 
approach might have unintended, positive consequences for an institution’s 
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overall preparedness.  Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) present an argument in 
The Starfish and the Spider that networked systems, especially those systems 
that evolve through the voluntary input of stakeholders, are more robust and 
resilient than centralized systems.  Examples offered to support this theory 
include the decentralized Apache Nation being able to withstand attacks from the 
seemingly more powerful hierarchical arranged Spanish Army in the 1680s; why 
Alcoholics Anonymous has survived and flourished without a designated leader; 
and how Craigslist and Wikipedia not only function but have flourished by 
“allowing” users to exert control over the process rather than a centralized office 
being the governing and driving force (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006).  
Extrapolating this concept to the HEI environment, if the theory espoused in The 
Starfish and the Spider is accurate, then a centralized approach to preparedness 
might not lend itself to developing a resilient HEI when compared to a more 
decentralized approach.  Many HEIs tend to operate in a somewhat 
decentralized manner, especially larger HEIs, so they are already positioned 
organizationally to operate as a network, at least in theory.  The question 
becomes, what would need to be in place to induce or spark the departments of 
a HEI to voluntarily engage in preparedness activities and function more like a 
network with respect preparedness as opposed to relying upon a centralized 
office of emergency management to be more-or-less solely responsible for the 
institution’s preparedness?  This thesis did not endeavor to answer this question, 
but rather poses it for others to consider.  Whatever the answer might be, it will 
have to be compelling enough to overcome the psychological barriers that have 
been offered to explain why people do not engage in preparedness efforts.  The 
relevant point is that an organizational structure that relies upon a central office 
of emergency management might not actually offer the best structure for 
facilitating a HEI’s overall level of preparedness, but a hybrid approach that 
incorporates an element of centralization combined with a decentralized 
approach in which the school or departments play an active role in ensuring 
preparedness at the school or department level. 
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With respect to strategic planning, it seems logical to assume that 
engaging in a process that identifies the current state of emergency 
management, the desired state of preparedness and a plan for accomplishing 
those goals would benefit the decision-making process and ultimately the HEIs 
level of preparedness.  Despite the apparent logic, most of the HEIs in this study 
had not engaged in a strategic planning process, developed a strategic plan 
specific to emergency management nor even defined what it meant to be 
prepared.  This study did not attempt to measure the level of preparedness of the 
HEIs in this study, so it is unknown if engaging in a strategic planning process 
does actually enhance the decision-making process or the institution’s level of 
preparedness.  A potential area of future research would be to conduct an 
assessment of preparedness at HEIs and see if there is a relationship between 
strategic planning and levels of preparedness.  One of the challenges will be to 
define the measurements that will be used to gauge preparedness since there 
are many definitions and opinions about what it means to be prepared. 
Assuming that strategic planning does contribute to more optimal decision 
making, then one recommendation is that HEIs should engage in an emergency 
management strategic planning process that includes defining and establishing 
specific preparedness objectives.  The emergency management strategic plans 
from the University of Washington and the University of Oregon were offered as 
two examples of fairly robust strategic plans that might offer insights to other 
HEIs about how to structure such a plan.  It was also noted that HEIs 
undoubtedly have faculty members with expertise in business or organizational 
management who could assist with the strategic planning process should 
assistance be needed and wanted.   
In addition to these broader recommendations, several specific practices 
were uncovered that might be of interest to other HEIs.  One practice is the use 
of GIS mapping to visually depict geographic areas of risk; this idea is being used 
at the University of Oregon.  The primary benefit of this approach is that threats 
and hazards can be overlaid on a map to show visually which areas are at the 
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greatest risk for experiencing the impacts of various types of hazards, including 
those areas that might be impacted by multiple hazards.  This information can be 
combined with other information—such as population density, building types or 
the location of research projects—to provide decision makers with a greater 
awareness of potential vulnerabilities.  Theoretically, improving situational 
awareness should help optimize decisions that are made.  In some respects, the 
use of GIS mapping is similar to the use of decision diagrams in decision 
analysis in so far as they both depict information visually, which allows decision 
makers to see relationships and interconnections much more readily than a 
conversation or written document would afford. 
The second notable practice that emerged, also from the University of 
Oregon, is the management of the emergency management program by a faculty 
member.  The advantages of having a faculty member manage a program—such 
as credibility and ready access to other faculty and students—were addressed 
earlier.  More intriguing is the concept of managing an emergency management 
program like a research project, including soliciting research grants and engaging 
students in the management of the program.  This model provides students with 
real-life educational opportunities, which fulfills the fundamental mission of HEIs: 
to educate.  This thesis is not suggesting that emergency management programs 
need to be managed by faculty members.  Rather, HEI emergency management 
programs should leverage the expertise and knowledge contained within the 
organization to enhance the preparedness of the institution. 
This final observation leads to what might be the most significant insight 
gleaned from this research: the potential for HEIs to contribute to the nation’s 
preparedness by utilizing the expertise that is already contained within the HEI—
the faculty, staff, and students—to develop innovative and creative ideas—such 
as the use of GIS mapping along with the application of decision analysis—to 
help tackle complex emergency management problems.  What is needed is a 
leader or a catalyst to engage these resources in such a way that they become 
interested in and committed to looking inward to help the HEI enhance its 
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preparedness efforts, which will, in turn, contribute to the preparedness of the 
community where the HEI is located, which will contribute to the preparedness of 
the state where the HEI is located.  State preparedness will, in turn, contribute to 
the nation’s preparedness.  Perhaps, HEI emergency managers could be those 
leaders whose influence starts locally but expands nationally.   
In closing, in keeping with this line of thinking regarding the potential 
impact HEIs and HEI emergency managers could have on national 
preparedness, this thesis proposes replacing the proverbial mantra “Think global 
and act local” with the following: “Think and act locally in order to have an impact 
globally.”  And, in order to make optimal decisions about how to best act at the 
local level, invest the time and resources into developing a strategic plan, but 
avoid becoming wedded to the plan and inflexible; be aware of heuristics and 
biases that might have a negative impact on preparedness decision making; 
utilize a structured decision-making process, preferably one that has elements of 
a normative approach to decision making, to make preparedness decisions; and 
strive for an approach to emergency management preparedness that is both 
centralized and decentralized in order to enhance the resiliency of the institution.   
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
I. INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
a. What is your current position (title)? 
 
b. How long have you been in this position? 
 
c. How long have you been in the public safety /emergency management 
profession? 
 
d. Please briefly describe your professional experience / background 
 
II. RESEARCH QUESTION: What are the overarching characteristics of the 
higher education institution? 
 
a. General Characteristics 
 
i. Is the institution public or private? 2 year or 4 year? 
 
ii. Is the institution part of a system or is an in independent 
institution? 
 
b. Mission and Values 
 
i. How does the institution define its core mission?   
 
ii. How does the institution define its core values?  What are the 
institution’s core values? 
 
c. Geographic location and structure of the institution 
 
i.  Describe the institution’s geographic composition.  For example, 
is the campus largely self-contained or are its facilities spread out 
across a geographic region?   
 
ii. Does your institution operate branch academic campuses?  If yes, 
where are they located? 
 
iii. Does your institution operate facilities that support the operation of 
the campus (other than academic branch campuses) that are 
located off the main campus?  If yes, please describe the types of 
operations that are managed off-site? 
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d. Composition of the main campus: 
 
i. What is the average daytime population? 
 
ii. How many undergraduate students are enrolled? 
 
iii. How many graduate students are enrolled? 
 
iv. How many faculty work on the main campus? 
 
v. How many staff work on the main campus? 
 
vi. Is the campus population predominantly commuter or residential 
based? 
 
1. How many students live on campus? 
 
2. How many faculty and staff live on campus? 
 
3. How many or what percentage of students live off campus 
in areas that are owned or operated by the institution? 
 
4. How many or what percentage of students live off campus, 




e. Emergency Management 
 
i. What entity or entities are responsible for emergency 
management planning for the main campus? 
 
ii. Does the institution have a central department of emergency 
management?  If yes,  
 
1. What are the responsibilities of this office?   
 
2. How many people are employed in this department? 
 
iii. Do departments or schools within the university have recognized 




1. What are the responsibilities of these positions?   
 
2. How do these positions relate to the university’s central 
emergency management program?   
 
iv. Branch campuses: 
 
1. What entity handles emergency management planning at 
the branch campuses?  
 
2. How are the emergency management plans for these 
branch facilities incorporated into the university’s 
emergency management plans?   
 
v. Off-site facilities 
 
1. What entity handles emergency management planning at 
the off-site campuses? 
 
2. How are the emergency management plans for these off-
site facilities incorporated into the university’s emergency 
management plans? 
 
vi. Emergency Management Advisory Committee  
 
1. Does the institution have a formalized Emergency 
Management Advisory Committee?  If yes, 
 
a. What is the mission of this committee? 
 
b. Which entities are represented on the committee? 
 
c. Which department / position chairs the committee? 
 
d. How does this group influence the decisions that 
are made about pre-incident university emergency 
management initiatives, needs and programs? 
 
III. RESEARCH QUESTION: How are preparedness and mitigation decisions 
currently being made at colleges and universities?  
 
a. Strategic direction 
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i. What are your institution’s guiding principles with respect to 
emergency management?   
 
ii. Does the institution have an emergency management strategic 
plan? Does the institution have an operational plan? If yes (to 
either or both), 
 
1. Is this plan documented? How is the plan shared with 
others? 
 
2. Which entity or entities developed the strategic direction / 
operational response? 
 
3. What process was used to develop the strategic plan / 
operational response? 
 
4. How long ago was the plan developed? 
 
5. How often is the plan updated? 
 
b. Risk Assessments 
 
i. Does the institution conduct enterprise-wide risk assessments? If 
yes, 
1. Which entity is responsible for conducting the 
assessment? 
 
2. How often are assessments conducted? 
 
3. What process is/was used to conduct the assessment? 
 
a. Do you utilize any type of decision support tool to 
conduct these assessments? 
 
4. How is this information obtained from a risk assessment 
used to inform decisions about which mitigation or 
preparedness programs, initiatives to pursue? 
 
ii. Do individual departments or schools conduct local risk 
assessments? If yes, 
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1. Are these individual risk assessments reviewed by a 
central department or group?  If so, what department or 
group?   
 
2. How are these results conveyed to key stakeholders such 
as police, fire, risk management and emergency 
management? 
 
3. How are these results integrated into a common operating 
framework for the university? 
 
iii. Which emergency management related threats most concern your 
university? How was this determination made? 
 
c. Preparedness 
i. How does the institution define preparedness? 
 
ii. How does the institution measure its level of preparedness? 
 
iii. How would you suggest measuring level of preparedness? 
 
iv. How does the institution decide which specific emergency 
preparedness initiatives and programs to pursue? 
 
v. What aspect or aspects of the emergency management program 
specific to preparedness activities do you consider to be the most 
successful? 
 
vi. Does the institution utilize any type of decision support tool to 
determine which programs or initiatives to pursue?  If yes, please 
describe the tool and the process. 
 
vii. What criteria do decision makers consider when deciding which 
preparedness initiatives to pursue?  
 





i. How does the institution define mitigation? 
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ii. How does the institution determine what level of mitigation actions 
to pursue? 
 
iii. How does the institution measure or evaluate its mitigation 
decisions? 
 
iv. How does the institution decide which mitigation initiatives and 
programs to pursue? 
 
v. What aspect or aspects of the emergency management program 
specific to mitigation efforts do you consider to be the most 
successful? 
 
vi. Does the institution utilize any type of decision support tool to 
determine which mitigation programs or initiatives to pursue?  If 
yes, please describe the tool and the process. 
 
vii. What criteria do decision makers consider when deciding which 
mitigation initiatives to pursue? 
 
viii. In what ways could the levels of mitigation be improved?   
 
ix. What do you consider to be the barriers to implementing stronger 
mitigation efforts?  
 
IV. RESEARCH QUESTION: How could the pre-incident emergency 
management decision-making process be improved? 
 
a. Are you aware of any decision support tools, systems or processes for 
evaluating preparedness activities? If yes, please describe. 
 
b. Are you aware of any decision support tools, systems or processes for 
evaluating mitigation activities?  If yes, please describe. 
 
c. What criteria do you think decision makers should consider when deciding 
which preparedness activities to pursue? 
 
d. What criteria do you think decision makers should consider when deciding 
which mitigation activities to pursue? 
 
e. How could the pre-incident emergency management decision-making 
process be improved? 
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Figure 31.   Valuation Results Example 3—Altering the Probability of the Event 
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Figure 34.   Valuation for CERT Program—Comparing Intervention Alternatives 
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Figure 35.   Valuation for Mass Emergency Notification System—Comparing 
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Figure 36.   Valuation for Business Continuity Tool—Comparing Intervention 
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Figure 37.   Valuation for Business Continuity Tool—Comparing Intervention 
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